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Introduction: Background to the study 
The “War on Terror” 
The carefully planned and coordinated terror attack of 11 September 2001 
was the bloodiest attack on the American mainland in modern times. At 
short intervals, three hijacked American Airlines and United Airlines airlin-
ers were flown into the World Trade Center in Manhattan and the Pentagon 
in Washington. A fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania. The Twin Towers 
collapsed, thousands of civilians were killed and powerful symbols of 
American economic and military dominance were brought low.  
Live TV coverage – where CNN had the standing title of “America under 
attack” – enabled the whole world to witness the unprecedented catastrophe. 
The drama unfolding on their screens showed terrified Americans in a brutal 
fashion that the USA was no longer unassailable or invulnerable. At the 
same time as the authorities appealed for calm, emergency measures were 
taken: airports were closed, the White House, other Federal buildings and the 
UN were evacuated, and the National Guard put on alert.  
In his address to the nation on 11 September, President George W. Bush 
said among other things: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our 
very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist 
acts… These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American 
resolve.” 
With a few exceptions, the entire world condemned the atrocity. The 
sheer scale of the attacks quickly focused attention on the “al-Qaida” net-
work of the exiled Saudi, Osama bin Laden. In his 11 September speech, 
Bush continued by saying that all intelligence and police resources would be 
utilised to bring those responsible to justice: “We will make no distinction 
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor 
them.”  
In this way the “war on terror” was put on the international agenda. But 
how does one make war on terrorism, or for that matter on any other -ism? 
Time and time again political actors try to eradicate ideologies by force of 
arms, and usually end up encouraging fresh recruitment.  
The ideological cradle of the Islamist movement is madrassahs through-
out the Muslim world, and Western universities too; in fact, wherever one 
Islamist is preaching, teaching and agitating, there is a potential “hotbed of 
terrorism”. As a result of this, actors are tempted to focus on “sanctuaries” 
and “training camps”, real or alleged, which at least offer the hope of a co-
herent geographical target – that is, they can be bombed. In his State of the 
Union address of January 2002, Bush mentioned training camps eight times. 
The same goes for the concept of “terrorist states”, which are also to be 
found on the map. If all you have is a hammer, as the proverb goes, then eve-
rything looks like a nail.  
And so the first fruit of the “war on terror” was the attempt to eradicate 
Osama bin Laden’s main base of operations and his “training camps” in the 
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“terrorist state” of Afghanistan. It was highly convenient for the USA that 
his hosts, a government known as the Taliban (from talib, a religious stu-
dent), inspired by a Deobandi puritanism that makes the Iranian theocrats 
look positively liberal, had brought law and order to Afghanistan only at the 
price of a ferocious imposition of Pashtun tribal mores, a price paid most 
heavily by the women of Kabul. This regime had practically no defenders in 
the West, and was not even officially recognised by most countries; non-
Pashtun warlords still resisted in the north. The USA and its Western allies 
suddenly rediscovered and glamorised these warlords under the respectable-
sounding rubric of “the Northern Alliance”, and used them as its cannon-
fodder to drive the Taliban out of the major towns (which is what always 
passes for “victory” in Afghanistan). A large number of civilians were killed, 
even more infrastructure was destroyed, the leaders of both Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban escaped to fight another day in the time-honoured guerrilla fashion, 
but despite all this, the claim could reasonably be made that the Allied mili-
tary campaign had in fact deprived Osama bin Laden of his main sanctuary 
and training base.  
The very “success” of this operation in its authors’ eyes may have further 
encouraged the tendency of the American Administration to conceptualise 
“terrorism” not so much as something that people do, for example when they 
are sufficiently infuriated with you, but as something that is nurtured in par-
ticular places. It naturally follows from this conceptualisation that those 
places where “terrorism” is nurtured are Bad Places and deserve to be dealt 
with accordingly. Apparent success in dealing with the first such Bad Place 
will strengthen the hands of those who want to go after the other Bad Places, 
and weaken the hands of those who think of the terrorist threat as something 
to be fought with the traditional police and intelligence weapons.  
Of course, a counter-terrorist campaign by the security services is by its 
very nature covert and not very photogenic; it is surely the case that a lot is 
currently going on behind the scenes that academics, journalists and citizens 
do not know about and perhaps ought not to know about. That very secrecy, 
however, creates the danger that a terrified and angry population will imag-
ine that “nothing is being done”. Sending military forces against Bad Places 
in a blaze of publicity (yet another “CNN war”) is far more effective as a 
means of reassuring the citizenry – and assuaging their thirst for revenge.  
The dynamic is not unlike that of empires that annex neighbouring terri-
tories in order to prevent the tribes who live there raiding their provinces or 
encouraging rebellion, only to find that they have a nice new province that is 
now being raided from somewhere else even further away. The downside of 
this approach is that if you run out of Bad Places, without the “terrorism” 
having ceased, you have to discover or even invent new ones.  
The “war on terror” is of great interest as a study in rhetorical technique. 
Demonisation of the enemy may be considered under two headings: first, the 
venerable concept of “terrorism” itself, and second, the more recent concept 
of “the Axis of Evil”. To sit down and analyse these concepts as techniques 
of rhetorical manipulation is not, of course, to either condone what the “ter-
rorists” do or to ignore the fact that “the other side” is demonising “us” in 
pretty much the same ways.  
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The rhetoric of “terrorism” 
Defining “terrorism” – or not 
A major problem for the international coalition against “terrorism” is – or 
should be – to define what it is fighting against. Such denotative definitions 
are attempted in government and UN documents.2 If no attempt is made to 
do this, the way is open for authoritarian, oppressive and even totalitarian 
regimes to achieve international legitimacy, respectability and American aid 
by joining the “war on terror”. These regimes will want to add their own 
separatists, insurgents and even dissidents to the “hit list” and thus bring 
down the concerted wrath of the international community on their heads. On 
the other hand, defining “terrorism” in a scholarly way – that is, creating 
precise and unambiguous inter-subjective definitions that can then be used to 
measure the incidence of the phenomenon in the real world – is notoriously 
difficult.  
One reason for this is that the word chosen for definition has the suffix 
normally associated with an ideology, and definition of an ideology can usu-
ally begin with its creator (for instance “Marxism”); yet “terrorism” is not so 
much an ideology (although both apologias and handbooks certainly exist) 
as a constellation of different people doing different unpleasant things to dif-
ferent victims for different reasons. In much the same way, “accidents” are a 
wide variety of occurrences, united only by the fact that they are unwanted 
and happen to us.  
Without presenting any formal definitions here,3 we would mention that 
the attempt to delimit “terrorism” from other forms of political violence, in-
cluding war, has focused inter alia on (1) whether the targets are civilian or 
military, (2) whether these targets are chosen for their intrinsic nature, or to 
send a message to and frighten the wider society, and (3) whether the perpe-
trators are non-governmental organisations or not. The first issue attempts to 
distinguish terrorism from separatist, insurgent and guerrilla warfare; the 
second differentiates terrorism from tyrannicide, assassination or strikes at 
political organisations and economic assets; and the third involves the ques-
tion of “state terrorism”.  
It is worth remembering that the word actually originated in state terror-
ism, namely the phase of the French Revolution under Robespierre called 
“the Terror”. In the same tradition, Robert Conquest’s title for his book on 
the Stalinist purges was the Great Terror. During the Second World War, 
the word “terror bombing” was initially used for air raids on cities, what 
subsequently became known as “strategic bombing”, then “countervalue 
strikes” and other coinages of Pentagonese. It would appear that the concept 
of “state terrorism” is less prominent in public debate than it once was, and 
Cicero’s forensic question Cui bono? offers us an explanation: states are not 
interested in any definition of terrorism that includes the things they them-
selves do. Instead of terrorism conducted by states, including ours, we now 
have “terrorist states”, on which more below.  
                                                     
2  9/11 Noam Chomsky, interview. Greg Ruggiero, editor. Seven Stories Press, New York 
2001. 
3  But see Bjørgo & Heradstveit, Politisk terrorisme, TANO 1993. 
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Another change in recent years is an increasing tendency to subsume 
separatism, insurgency and guerrilla war into terrorism, so that strikes by 
uniformed irregulars against purely military targets qualify. People may, on 
request, define “terrorism” in a particular way, only to abandon that defini-
tion by identifying a steadily wider spectrum of acts as they occur as being 
terrorism. For example, Osama bin Laden’s bombing of the embassies was 
terrorism because the victims were civilians; but his strike against the USS 
Cole was also terrorism, because he is a non-governmental actor; but then 
the irregular operations by the Iraqi army and Ba’ath militias against the in-
vader are also terrorism. The final stopping-point on this slide will have to 
be that enemy armies fighting in the open field are “terrorists”, probably 
because they are the armies of “terrorist states”, whereas “our” armies 
fighting in the open field are naturally not. This disjunction between what we 
might call the “formal” and the “ostensive” definitions of terrorism, whereby 
people think one way when asked to consider abstract definitions but quite 
another way in response to particular events and their media labelling, could 
be a fitting subject for empirical investigation.  
In this present study, however, instead of attempting to define “terrorism” 
as an objective and measurable phenomenon according to the method of the 
social sciences, we shall take entirely the opposite tack; we shall view the 
concept as subjective and fluid, with a content that switches radically both 
by context and over time. Political events and new contexts will cause a 
gradual accretion of new connotations to the term. The only factor that 
remains stable over time is the term’s affective element. It is precisely this 
strong affective content, allied to the term’s otherwise fluid and ambiguous 
character, that makes it such an effective rhetorical instrument for political 
actors in all periods but most especially following 11 September. Our opin-
ion is, therefore, that a study of the frameworks for subjective understanding 
of the concept in a particular place and time is more interesting than yet 
another attempt to create a watertight “scholarly” definition.  
“Terrorism” as political communication 
Denotative language uses many words in a neutral, precise manner to 
describe a phenomenon. For this reason it functions very poorly as a rhetori-
cal instrument, for rhetoric works best with connotative language, that is, 
using few words in a loose, diffuse and flexible manner. Rhetorical language 
is also affective, and there are few words that pack such an emotional punch 
as “terrorism”.  
Manipulation of emotions is not, of course, confined to those who 
employ the concept of “terrorism”, it is part of the terrorist method – at least 
under the old-fashioned, conservative definitions that exclude regular and 
irregular warfare. As well as a functional strike against American political, 
economic and military power, the 11 September attacks were an outstanding 
example of symbolic political communication. The Twin Towers were not 
just a building, not even just a valuable economic asset, but the very symbol 
of New York, as the Empire State used to be. There was talk of there being a 
Koranic verse about the enemies of God finding no safety in their “high tow-
ers”, and that was indeed the message: there is no sanctuary. Classic terror-
Introduction: Background to the study 
nupi september 03 
9 
ism aims to communicate to the citizenry that the state cannot protect them. 
And if the state cannot protect its citizens then it loses its legitimacy; this 
may be expressed most clearly in Western social contract theory, but is 
probably a cultural universal. 
It should also be noted that the lethality of this action was a new depar-
ture and has led some analysts to talk about “the new terrorism” in contra-
distinction to the old. Traditional terrorism operated on the slogan “few 
killed, but many who see”, and the anthrax attacks fell into this category, 
causing half a dozen fatalities but enormous panic and disruption. The 
destruction of WTC and its concomitant assaults on the Pentagon and White 
House, however, involved “many killed, and many who see”. It was more 
like an act of war by a foreign state than a traditional terrorist attack, and 
was indeed labelled as both “war” and “terrorism” at the same time, an 
ambiguity whose rhetorical use is of great interest, see further below.  
The political challenge of a bloody demonstration of the failure of state 
protection demands a riposte from the state; it must counter-demonstrate its 
potency and ability to protect. Since in fact no state can offer absolute secu-
rity against terrorism, the temptation is for this counter-demonstration to take 
the form of symbolic acts. The more the state is actually fumbling in the dark 
against a diffuse and invisible enemy, the more it will feel itself obliged to 
take specific and visible action to demonstrate its control, whether or not this 
action actually addresses the problem. This can naturally backfire, and a 
state turned oppressive in the cause of counter-terrorism will then serve as 
the recruiting sergeant of the terrorist movement. To provoke the authorities 
into repression is classic Leninist revolutionary doctrine.  
Terrorism and counter-terrorism alike are thus a kind of psychological 
warfare, in which the amount of ink spilt often exceeds the amount of blood. 
All wars involve propaganda, but in this case the manipulation of words and 
images is all the more intense because the parties have trouble getting at one 
another in the conventional military manner. Neither side is at all interested 
in lukewarm attitudes, in subtle distinctions or in shades of meaning. Given 
the nature of the 911 attacks, it was not so difficult for the USA to mobilise 
its own citizens to support a programme of crushing al-Qaida and catching 
Osama bin Laden; it was a little more difficult to mobilise other countries, 
but not very; and more difficult again to mobilise them for the war on 
Afghanistan. The fact that after that expenditure of so much blood and 
treasure al-Qaida remained fairly uncrushed and Osama bin Laden very 
much uncaught made it harder to maintain that mobilisation, at the same 
time as the mobilisation was more necessary than ever, lest the Administra-
tion be obliged to admit failure.  
To achieve the desired effect, the authorities’ mobilisation must rest on 
affective components that engage us, and/or be related to certain core values 
that are subject to general consensus. To explain how flying planes into the 
World Trade Center involve such core values and affective components is 
surely superfluous; of greater interest is the process by which the mobilisa-
tion resulting from this is parlayed into a programme of invasion and occu-
pation of a “shopping list” of sovereign states.  
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The “extended terrorism concept” 
In demagogic terms, the affective reaction to the WTC strike constitutes a 
propaganda capital that can be invested in other enterprises in order to enjoy 
the returns of public support for those enterprises. In other words, whatever 
can be linked to 911 will be reprobated by the public, and whatever can be 
linked to the punishment of or revenge for 911 will be supported by the pub-
lic, until and unless that capital is exhausted. The fact that the WTC strike 
was a real event, as opposed to a possibly fictitious conspiracy (like 
McCarthy and his Communists in the State Department), and also an act that 
meets every possible definition of the word “terrorism”, indeed an archetype 
of “terrorism” that will probably endure for centuries, makes it an ideal point 
of departure. The game then becomes to see how far the term can be 
stretched and how long the affective capital can be made to show a return.  
We mentioned above that al-Qaida’s attack on the United States is con-
ceptualised as “terrorism” and “war” at the same time. This has several rhe-
torical consequences. One concerns the treatment of prisoners and detainees 
– the authorities seem to have invented the new concept of “illegal combat-
ant” in order to argue simultaneously that they are not protected by the 
Geneva Conventions since they are not prisoners of war but criminals, and 
that they are not entitled to a trial because they are not criminals but prison-
ers of war.  
An ancestor of the rhetoric of the “war on terror” is the “war on drugs”, 
which similarly legitimised extraordinary measures with grave consequences 
for due process and civil liberties. Common to both “wars” appears to be the 
financing of American police departments by forfeiture of assets considered 
(but not proven) to be drug- or terrorism-related, which offers certain players 
a powerful stake in the continuance and development of the system.  
Another consequence is the mobilisation of American society as if for 
war, without the usual conceptualisation of “war” as an affair between par-
ties with equal standing in international law. In limited war the enemy may 
be negotiated with, in total war one may demand unconditional surrender, 
but in the “war on terror” the aim is extirpation. That is, extirpation of “ter-
rorism”, but what is that? Extirpation of terrorists, no doubt, but who are 
they? People who have carried out terrorist attacks, people who are planning 
terrorist attacks, people who might one day plan terrorist attacks, or people 
who don’t like us? Allied to the new American doctrine of “preventive war” 
against all possible future threats, this conceptualisation risks creating a logic 
that must culminate in a war of extermination of nations or religions. When 
the enemy is not merely terrorist organisations but now sovereign states, this 
confusion of the categories is additionally dangerous. The courtesies of 19th-
century diplomacy and war are, of course, long gone, but the “terrorist state” 
appears to take the absorption of international manners by the rhetoric of 
demonisation even further.  
We may note that the rhetorical function of the phrases “states that spon-
sor terrorism” and “terrorist states” is not the same; first, a state that spon-
sors terrorism (a concept that has been with us for many decades, and may 
be traced back to the “pirates” of the Barbary Coast if not further) may con-
ceivably be persuaded to stop doing so, whereas a “terrorist state” is clearly 
a state that must be destroyed altogether. As ancient and medieval philoso-
Introduction: Background to the study 
nupi september 03 
11 
phers might have put it, in the first case terrorism is an “accident” of the 
state, in the second case it is its “essence”.4  
Second, if terrorism is defined intersubjectively, it is by no means certain 
that Western states do not sponsor terrorism; the intelligence forces of the 
major players do “wet work”, ranging from blowing up Greenpeace vessels 
to devastation of other countries by mercenary forces such as the Contras. 
However, hard as it might be for an American citizen to admit that his coun-
try also “sponsors terrorism”, it is clearly both psychologically harder and 
more hazardous for him to stand up and call his country a “terrorist state”, as 
if there were nothing more to be said about it. The “terrorist state” is a sepa-
rate ontological category, a different order of being, from “our” democratic 
freedom-loving states, and so comparisons of actual behaviour are both 
unnecessary and unpatriotic. Cognitive attribution theory may be invoked 
here: We do this “wet work” because we are regrettably obliged to counter 
the actions of the terrorists, They do it because they are Evil.  
“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter” is an aphorism 
that has a long history. If this is intended to mean that there are no objective 
criteria by which the terrorist can be distinguished from the freedom-fighter, 
the maxim is rather doubtful; if, however, it is meant to be a comment on the 
partisan use of the terms by the actors themselves, it is perfectly accurate. 
States may once have called one another “belligerent powers”, using the 
same terminology for themselves as for their enemies, but they have never 
done so with respect to insurgents, rebels, guerrillas and partisans. “Now 
Barabbas was a robber” – John 18:40, in the KJV. It is generally suspected 
that Barabbas was in fact a Zealot, what we would now call a cadre of the 
Judean Liberation Front, and that “robber” was the Romans’ rhetorical 
label.5 If we jump forward nearly two millennia, we find that the then infant 
Soviet power called the Central Asian resistance in the 1920s “bandits”, as it 
later did the Afghan mujihadeen. In the Second World War Germans called 
both the Special Operations Executive and the various Resistances “terror-
ists”.  
The conceptualisation of any armed enemy other than a brother-monarch 
or a fellow-member of the community of nations as a criminal is thus noth-
ing new, and we have no expectation whatsoever that this usage will ever be 
abandoned. However, recent years have seen an escalation of this inevitable 
rhetoric. It used to be that organised and uniformed entities fighting the secu-
rity forces were called rebels, insurgents or guerrillas. For example, when 
the Viet Cong blew up a building in Saigon, that was terrorism, but they 
were not called terrorists when they engaged in a firefight with the US 
Marines in the Delta, and neither was the North Vietnamese Army. How-
ever, the current trend, which actually precedes 911, is for states to refuse to 
admit that they are fighting a “war” against insurgents, even when they are 
losing. While international news media talked about the “civil war” in Sri 
Lanka, and called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam “rebels”, “separa-
tists” or “insurgents”, for instance, successive Colombo governments pre-
                                                     
4  We may also recall Sartre’s comments on the distancing and dehumanisation involved in 
saying, “He is a waiter”, as opposed to “He is a man who is waiting at table”. 
5  The NIV, a translation for a far less authoritarian age, has sufficient confidence in this 
speculation to write: “Now Barabbas had taken part in a rebellion.” 
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ferred the rather bizarre language of attacks on military bases by “terrorist 
infantry” supported by “terrorist artillery” and even “terrorist naval vessels”. 
In the same way, Russia is fighting Chechen “terrorists” both in Moscow 
theatres and on Caucasian battlefields.  
As we mentioned above, the civilian-target criterion is forgotten when 
considering the strikes on the Marine compound in Beirut or the USS Cole, 
and we have just seen the non-governmental-actor criterion forgotten when 
considering the resistance of Iraqi irregulars to invasion. The rhetoric is now 
only a single step away from using the word “terrorist” to denote the uni-
formed armed forces of a sovereign government, and it is very likely that the 
neologism of “terrorist state” will be used to take that final step.  
The rhetorical capital of the affective reaction to civilian terrorism has 
thus been invested in the stocks and bonds of the demonisation, not only of 
organisations that murder civilians, not only of separatists, insurgents and 
rebels, but also of states that yesterday were considered members of the 
international community, albeit unpopular ones. All the criteria that once 
attempted to distinguish “terrorism” from other forms of political violence 
appear to have been swept away, and most especially the principle that the 
definition of an act should be independent of who it is who commits it. The 
variety of acts and actors now stigmatised as “terrorist” by the architects of 
the “war on terror” is so wide that the only common feature appears to be 
that they are doing something unpleasant or inconvenient to us. In other 
words, “terrorist” has been mapped onto “opponent”.  
It is normally the case that when terms are rhetorically extended, they 
become overextended, overused, worn out and ultimately meaningless. The 
capital is exhausted. People take to using the terms ironically, as happened to 
the neologisms of “political correctness”. This happened very quickly to “the 
Axis of Evil”, which was comprehensively and hilariously mocked from day 
one (and so replaced by “terrorist states”), but there is little sign of this 
happening to the “extended terrorist concept”. Perhaps there are exceptions 
to the rule; for example, in the United States “commie” retained its force 
from the Bolshevik revolution right up to the fall of the Soviet empire. This 
may because the power of the word was rooted in an unusually intense fear, 
or because communists attracted serious state repression. Both factors are 
equally applicable to “terrorist”. Should anyone ironically call himself a “ter-
rorist” on the basis of his opposition to the New American Century project, 
if the outrage of his neighbours will not cure him of this, indefinite detention 
without trial or counsel may.  
Finally, it is worth noting the related rhetorical topos of “cowardly”. This 
word was frequently conjoined with “terrorist” by the British when repro-
bating the IRA, and was an understandable epithet for pub-bombers who did 
their best to kill random civilians without getting caught. The application to 
terrorists who sacrifice their own lives was, however, an immediate Admini-
stration response to the World Trade Center strike. Attempts to point out that 
self-sacrifice for a cause is not the usual meaning of “cowardly” are coun-
tered by emphasis on the evilness of the act, so that “cowardly” becomes a 
synonym of “wicked”, and those arguing that it was indeed wicked but not 
cowardly are accused of justifying the atrocity. The second phase of the 
development of this topos was seen in the invasion of Iraq, when Iraqi snip-
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ing was also “cowardly” and Saddam Hussein was a “coward” for hiding in 
his bunkers. It would appear that, on the part of the Other, rational modes of 
resistance to attack are fundamentally illegitimate. The next war, therefore, 
will be fought against the cowardly criminals of a terrorist state, a member 
of the Axis of Evil.  
The rhetoric of “the Axis of Evil” 
In his State of the Union Speech of 29 January 2002, Bush singled out Iraq, 
Iran and North Korea6 and continued: “States like these, and their terrorist 
allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” 
This phrase promptly became one of the defining concepts of his Admini-
stration.  
Bush used the word “evil” five times in this speech, three times referring 
to enemies. He used it also in his speech to the nation on 11 September, and 
a week later to Congress he described terrorists as “planning evil”. In 
November of that year Bush told Newsweek that Saddam was also “evil”. 
These are clear examples of demonisation, and one of the reasons the phrase 
“the Axis of Evil” attracted so much criticism and is said to have done so 
much damage is that calling other countries Evil is not generally considered 
to be the language of diplomacy. There is probably an echo of Ronald 
Reagan’s “Evil Empire” for the Soviet Union, which was equally criticised 
at the time. It is possible that many Americans semi-consciously imagine 
that, since the Evil Empire is no longer with us, the application of such a 
label has a beneficent effect that can be repeated in the case of the new ene-
mies. This may be connected with the rise of fundamentalist Christianity, 
which is encouraging them to see world politics in eschatological terms.  
Certainly Bush himself, as a “born-again Christian”, has an entirely 
dualistic view of life, as a struggle between Good and Evil, with no middle 
ground. “Those who are not with us, are against us,” he told the more secular 
Europeans, who insist on trying to understand the complexities. Although 
Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union “the Evil Empire”, and although he 
was supported by the Religious Right, he was not in fact personally reli-
gious; he never gave the impression, as does Bush, that he had been commis-
sioned to do God’s will on Earth.  
Although the use of the word “evil” for flying hijacked aircraft into 
civilian buildings will strike many people as justified, it is the corollary, the 
other side of the eschatological coin, that is especially dangerous: the 
assumption that the division of Good and Evil coincides with the division 
between Us and Them. Consequently, in this dualistic world-picture, the 
United States is a force for Good, even the force for Good. This means that 
anything it chooses to do is Good and anything that offends or inconven-
iences it is Evil.  
The Axis component can be considered on several levels. In the first 
place, it is an incoherent metaphor, as an axis is a straight line; the figurative 
use is, in fact, taken not from Cartesian geometry (the x and y axes on a 
graph) but from the axis of the Earth’s rotation. An axis around which 
something revolves is made by two points; you can have three points joined 
                                                     
6  A secret Pentagon report later added Syria, Libya and China. 
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in a triangle, but then nothing can revolve around a triangle. This geometri-
cal nonsense actually derives from a misunderstood modification to the 
metaphor shortly after it was coined. The original Axis was that between 
Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy; originally rivals, they were driven 
together by the Western Powers’ hostility to the remilitarisation of the 
Rhineland and the conquest of Ethiopia. In 1936 they announced that hence-
forth the world would revolve around the Rome-Berlin Axis. Germany and 
Italy thus became “the Axis Powers”. After the signature of the tripartite 
Anti-Comintern Pact in the same year, Japan was called an Axis Power too, 
but in fact there was no strategic collaboration between the European Axis 
and the Japanese. The metaphor has thus been a logical absurdity but a pow-
erful affective tool since 1936.  
Logic, of course, is no answer to rhetoric, and the point is that the word 
“Axis” evokes “our” enemies of the Second World War. It is a metonym for 
fascism and nazism. This historical resonance is the second level. Nobody 
today can in polite society say anything good about the Axis Powers, and 
anyone compared with them is stigmatised. Comparisons with Hitler have 
been made before, but employing not so much the theme of Axis as of 
“appeasement”; the message has been “We must get him now before it is too 
late!” Sir Anthony Eden, for example, used (and was probably imprisoned 
by) this metaphor about Gamel Abdul Nasser in 1956. The same message 
was preached about Saddam Hussein before the Axis of Evil speech. At the 
end of May 2003 Bush further reinforced this equation of the old and new 
“Axis” by talking about “evil” at Auschwitz itself.  
A third and related level is that the Axis metaphor implies the alliance of 
the countries included in it. Given the intense antipathy between Iraq and 
Iran, and the lack of much visible connection between either and North 
Korea, the trope has occasioned much ridicule, with TV and Internet wits 
grouping together triplets of countries allegedly offended at being left out of 
the Axis. In theory, we might speak of the world revolving around an axis of 
inveterate enemies, in the sense that their quarrel is what powers interna-
tional politics. That would be a reasonable use of the metaphor, and using it 
for Iran-Iraq (without North Korea) would not be inappropriate; but the pub-
lic consensus seems to be that this is not in fact what President Bush meant. 
Nor would such a use have much mobilising power. It appears rather that 
Bush was using the Axis metaphor in the original sense, to suggest that Iraq, 
Iran and North Korea were not only Evil countries in themselves, but were in 
alliance with one another against the rest of us. In other words, not merely 
Evil but a conspiracy of Evil. Now, demonisation and conspiracy theories 
always go hand in hand; the human mind appears to be naturally inclined to 
weave all perceived threats into a single pattern.  
In this way the Axis of Evil concept allows a return to the bipolar world 
of the twentieth century, when all one’s enemies were fronts for Interna-
tional Jewry, International Capital or International Communism. It allows 
Americans to think that “evil” is a feature of particular geographical regions, 
faraway countries about which they know little, and thus not of Texas or 
Nebraska, which are part of the kingdom of Good. It suggests that “terror-
ism” is something that is mostly created or promoted by a list of countries 
acting in concert, but whose membership is not fixed forever. We can easily 
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envisage the Axis of Evil in the year 2010 being two or three countries other 
than Iraq, Iran and North Korea.  
Finally, we may note how the use of the tropes of the “war on terror” and 
“the Axis of Evil” in the same rhetorical discourse serve to imply, without 
actually stating, that the Axis is collectively responsible for the attacks of 11 
September. The attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction, the promo-
tion of radical-Islamic terrorism and acts of general dictatorial unpleasant-
ness are all mixed up together, with the implication that responsibility for 
any one of them is responsibility for all of them. This we might call the prin-
ciple of “the indivisibility of evil”. 
We are writing this introduction during the fall of Baghdad, and we note 
how the American people are rejoicing in an imagined revenge for 911; 
thanks to the endeavours of their politicians and media, more than half of the 
US public now believe that Saddam Hussein was involved in the strike.7 In 
the State of the Union Speech, Bush never claimed that North Korea had 
anything to do with 911; its qualifications for Axis membership were the 
attempt to develop nuclear weapons and the starving of its own people. By 
the time the Administration turns its attention to North Korea, however, we 
may be seeing a campaign to insinuate that Kim Jong Il was in league with 
Osama bin Laden too. In any case a sovereign state’s procurement of the 
only means of deterring attack from the USA (that is, nuclear weapons) 
qualifies it for being placed in the Axis of Evil, and being so placed is a 
powerful incentive to procure said means. This constitutes a positive-feed-
back loop, so that it is unlikely that the Axis club will have any difficulty 
recruiting new members. Those Americans who desire enemies appear to be 
assured a steady future supply.  
And Iran? Bush said: “Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and 
exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for 
freedom.” This is as clear a justification for invasion and regime change as 
was presented for Iraq.  
The present study seeks to illuminate the rhetoric of the “war on terror” 
and “the Axis of Evil” by charting the attitudes and reactions to it of opposi-
tional members of the Iranian elite.  
Sample and methodology 
The data for this study were collected during fieldwork in Iran in March–
April 2002. We conducted “in-depth interviews” with 18 members of the 
Iranian political elite who may currently be considered part of the political 
opposition (see Appendices for list of interviewees). The survey is based on 
similar field interviews conducted in April 2000 in which a total of 14 
respondents from the Iranian opposition were interviewed. The project is 
part of a cumulative programme of research into Iranian elite attitudes, 
where the aim is operate to a greater extent with closed reply categories and 
thereby save on the time-consuming follow-up work of coding the responses.  
                                                     
7  USA Today poll August 2002, see http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0823-
02.htm.  
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Definition of the “political opposition” in Iran 
Before we embark on the analysis, it is necessary to define what we mean by 
“the political opposition” in Iran. This country is a strange case, in that the 
political opposition occupies positions of power. This may seem like a con-
tradiction in terms, but Iran is a hybrid of democratic and theocratic institu-
tions, in which the latter have the upper hand. Uniquely, the ultimate author-
ity is neither the President, nor the Prime Minister, but the supreme religious 
leader. For the purposes of this analysis, therefore, we are defining the 
“Iranian political opposition” entirely without reference to the formal rela-
tionship to the theoretical structure of government, but in ideological terms.  
The political struggle in Iran today is not for or against the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 per se, but between the conservatives and the reformers. 
“Conservatives” include everybody from moderate conservatives to the 
ultraconservatives8; the latter take a more violent line, and are inclined to 
support a coup d’etat as a tool of the internal political struggle. Common to 
all the conservatives, however, is that they support the theocracy in its pre-
sent form. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini converted the essentially mystical 
doctrine of the velayat-e faqih theocracy into actual political authority, 
whereby the legislative, executive and judicial powers were vested in the 
experts in shari’a – of whom he himself was naturally the foremost.  
It should be borne in mind, however, that sections of the clergy who are 
conservative in the theological sense of the word were often Khomeini’s 
bitterest opponents and are now to be found in the ranks of the reformers. 
What the “conservatives” are conserving, therefore, is not traditional Islam 
but the specific ideology and power structures of the Islamic Revolution. 
The ultraconservatives wish to use radical and drastic means to maintain and 
defend that revolution and Khomeini’s heritage.  
“Reformers” are here defined as those who support the rule of law, free-
dom of expression and pluralism. They want to replace Khomeini’s religious 
absolutism as an overarching and governing principle with a synthesis of 
Islamic and democratic principles. Young people in particular are supporters 
of the reformism of the popularly elected President Mohammad Khatami. 
Although he is himself of the established clergy, himself helped to make the 
Revolution, does not polemicise against the velayat-e faqih, and accepts 
Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei’s supremacy, Khatami derives his legitimacy from 
popular election and is the primus motor of the reform process that, if 
allowed to continue, may neutralise the theocracy. The ultimate paradox of 
our method is therefore that we count the Head of State as part of the politi-
cal opposition – although he is not on our list of interviewees. 
In sum, the “political opposition” is deemed to be those forces that sup-
port reforms tending to strengthen democratic processes and institutions, and 
thereby weakening the autocratic politics of the velayat-e faqih.  
A vital question is whether the President can fulfil the expectations of the 
younger generation. At the moment he has no power to do this. We thus see 
that the tug of war between conservatives and reformers is replaced by new 
fracture lines: the youngsters (often called the Revolution’s children) may in 
                                                     
8  In Iran’s own political terminology, these are called “radicals”, because they are radical 
Islamic revolutionaries. However, this usage is at odds with Western nomenclature and so 
highly confusing. 
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their disappointment revolt against Khatami, and the most militant of the 
young people may by-pass the President’s synthesis of Islamic and democ-
ratic principles and go straight to a secular democracy.  
An arbitrary sample 
We have made an arbitrary sample of political elites who represent policies 
and political ideologies that are in competition with the established ones, and 
that may one day in the future be the mainstream. We have also included 
representatives of Iran’s cultural and artistic elite, a segment of the popula-
tion that has been an important catalyst in the reform process that the country 
has been undergoing for the last decade. It should be emphasised that this is 
not a population sample in the statistical sense. Social science knows of no 
inter-subjective and consensual definition of “elite”, and so no universe of 
“elite members” can possible be identified.9 In other words, it is impossible 
to take a statistically representative sample, and for our research purposes it 
is not even desirable.  
The interviews were in-depth, and lasted on average an hour and a half; a 
few questions had closed response categories, while most were open. This 
methodology involves time-consuming work to code the responses, but the 
open method was a natural consequence of our not knowing the response 
universe very well. In other words, we were prepared to be surprised by what 
the elite said. Open questions provide interesting information, and our sur-
veys have shown that for political elites this procedure is stimulating – the 
interviews give more of themselves than is the case with closed questions. 
The problems arise subsequently, when we try to review and organise the 
data. Categorising and coding of replies is a time-consuming process, but 
gives the reader a certain quantitative picture of the results in addition to the 
opportunity to enter the cognitive world of the respondents via the extensive 
answers. 
On the other hand, the questionnaire was standardised, so that all the 
interviewees were asked the same questions. Here it was a great help that we 
were able to build upon the knowledge and expertise we had already 
acquired through a corresponding elite survey undertaken in April 2000.10 
These elite interviews are also a part of a cumulative research strategy 
involving plans for further Iranian interview rounds. In this perspective it is 
important to elicit the cognitive universe of the respondents, and for this rea-
son we have chosen to present replies on most topics almost verbatim, which 
is not usual in such investigations. The objective is next time to operate with 
closed response categories on the basis of the knowledge garnered from the 
2000 and 2002 surveys. 
It should be noted that this is not exclusively a matter of “snapshots” of 
political attitudes as in opinion polls, because our arbitrary sample of 
respondents includes a dynamic perspective; that is, it tries to look forwards.  
                                                     
9  Heradstveit, Daniel 1981, The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Psychological Obstacles to Peace, 
Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, p. 40. 
10  “Elite Perceptions of Ethical Problems Facing the Western Oil Industry in Iran”, Journal 
of Iranian Research and Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2001, and “Local Elites Meet Foreign 
Corporations. The examples of Iran and Azerbaijan”, Cahiers d'études sur la 
Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, No. 32, 2001. 
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Limitation of the data 
We have limited our survey to the political opposition in both countries and 
must therefore assume that the statements made in our interviews reflect a 
political strategy, that is, the rhetoric of the opposition. It must be assumed 
that the responses are part of a political strategy to discredit the supporters of 
Ayatollah Khamenei and the revolutionary doctrine of the Islamic republic. 
The fact that we were foreigners helped to soften this aspect, because con-
versations with foreigners emphasise the informative (perception-reflexive) 
at the expense of the agitation and demagogy (instrumental) that dominate 
the domestic power struggle. However, what is said in oral interviews may 
easily fail to match the facts. Our survey makes no attempt to measure the 
“truth quotient”. On the contrary, our aim is to chart not facts but percep-
tions. 
PART I  11 SEPTEMBER 
 
 
Chapter 1 
The Iranian political elite’s view of  
terrorism 
Introduction 
Following our general meditation on the rhetorical use of the terrorism con-
cept, this chapter will turn to the “intuitive” definitions of terrorism, that is, 
the definitions people use in daily speech and apply politically. Such intui-
tive definitions do not have the same level of precision as scholarly,11 but we 
are here not interested in the terminology of formal political science and 
international jurisprudence. This book is about rhetoric. Whereas a scholar 
always endeavours to formulate a definition that is as precise and unambigu-
ous as possible, the rhetorician aims for the exact opposite; as a rule, politi-
cal actors prefer their terms to be imprecise and fluid. Where the context is 
to persuade and influence, the objective measurement of what conforms to 
the definition in the external world is of no interest. Political rhetoric does 
not make use of scholarly definitions written in denotative language. 
Our purpose is rather to chart what Iranian political elites understand by 
the term. In the first chapter we touched upon Western players’ rhetorical 
extension of the concept of “terrorism” in the “war on terror”. Our aim in 
this second chapter is to see how the Iranian actors’ understanding of the 
term “terrorism” functions in their own political rhetoric.  
The respondents’ definitions of “terrorism” 
We shall now report on how the respondent sample preferred to define ter-
rorism and the thoughts they had on this subject, working upwards from the 
bottom. 
As will be seen from the table, one of the respondents replied by empha-
sising the ideological component of terrorism, which may be considered an 
answer to a different question. Only one respondent chose the definition that 
is rooted in the etymology of the word, a definition frequently emphasised in 
the Western literature, that terrorism is acts designed to terrify a populace. 
Two respondents brought up American economic warfare against Iraq, 
which was more an attempt to extend the concept than a formal definition; 
                                                     
11  Bjørgo & Heradstveit 1993, op.cit. 
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the victims of this economic warfare, it was said, were no less important for 
not being interviewed by Larry King.  
 
Table 1 The Iranian political elite’s intuitive definition of the term “terrorism” 
N = number of statements* 
Political actors determine the definition on the basis of self-interest 13 
Political context determines what is terrorism or not 11 
Violence against the innocent 8 
Economic terrorism 2 
Acts that cause fear 1 
Ideological terrorism 1 
 N=36 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no significance tests are reported, nor 
are percentages given. 
 Violence against the innocent 
A substantial proportion of the sample defined terrorism in the same way as 
many Westerners, in terms of the objective status of its victims. Some 
respondents explicitly emphasised the commonality between the Iranian and 
what they considered to be the international definition, as enshrined in con-
ventions, that is, attacks on non-military targets and arbitrary violence 
against civilians. Many of them thought it was both right and important to 
escape from provincial thinking and converge on international criteria in this 
way; it was part and parcel of the reformers’ emphasis on human rights.  
It was pointed out that Muslim countries that condemned 11 September 
were silent when Afghanistan was invaded. The Organisation of Islamic 
Conference, that met in Kuala Lumpur between 1 and 3 April 2002 to dis-
cuss terrorism, did not produce any special “Muslim” definition, but did state 
that such a definition should be global and worked out within the framework 
of the UN. It is worth noting how moderate Muslim attitudes can be, when 
expressed in a calm environment.  
It was emphasised that this was how President Khatami defines terrorism. 
Three of those involved in the hostage drama in the American embassy in 
1979 now support Khatami; they state approvingly that there is much less 
violence in Iran than two years ago. The Iranian groups that employ terrorist 
methods both nationally and internationally no longer dare to say so in pub-
lic. In this way the respondents’ emphasis on the consensus definition serves 
to distance them from what has been the stereotype since the days of the 
Revolution; it was said that Iranians had lived such an isolated existence that 
their ideas about terrorism were not very sophisticated.  
The USA and Iran were in agreement on the issue of innocent civilians, 
but definitions quickly become adjusted in the light of self-interest.  
Freedom fighters and terrorists: the political context 
In this way the respondents thought 11 September was indubitably a case of 
terrorism. Blowing up a café in Jerusalem, however, was not quite the same 
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thing. The majority of the respondents thought it was impossible to say what 
was and what was not terrorism on the basis of the act alone; it depended on 
the context and the reasons for the terrorism. It is possible to conceive of acts 
that harm innocent civilians, but which are nevertheless legitimate because 
the actors have good reason and their behaviour is legitimate. The Iranian 
respondents were extremely concerned with the issue of terrorist acts in a 
just cause, which adds a second dimension at right angles to the civilian-
victim criterion.  
National liberation movements fighting for their country and people, 
therefore, are not committing terrorism. Resistance to occupation is legiti-
mate.12 Iranian opinion, citing international norms, distinguishes acts as non-
terrorist when they are committed in a war of liberation and resistance to 
occupation generally, and the struggle for Palestine in particular. When 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other Palestinians are resisting oppression, there-
fore, their killing of Israeli civilians is not terrorism. The casualties are 
intruders; the Palestinians are the true victims. On the other hand, organised 
violence against the occupied Palestinians by the overwhelming Israeli state 
power is terrorism. Most of American policy and what Israel is doing in the 
occupied territories is terrorism, but incidents staged by Libya and Iraq are 
not considered terrorism by these respondents, and the same goes for 
Muslim groups. In brief, Muslim action is not classified as terrorism. This is 
the position of the Iranian conservatives, which we found was shared by 
many of the reformers too. Officially Iran does not accept suicide bombing, 
but the readiness of unofficial opinion to justify it in terms of righteous cause 
constitutes a sharp distinction between Iranian and American thinking.  
The most noticeable aspect of this line of argument is the degree to which 
the focus is on Israel and the USA in the Palestine conflict. The paucity of 
other specific examples may be that the respondents are confident they know 
the official Iranian line and the American line in the Palestine issue, but are 
not sure about Iran’s position on other issues.  
Terrorism is whatever we don’t like 
While some respondents emphasised the congruity between Iranian and 
Western views with regard to the innocent-civilian criterion, the strongest 
current of respondent opinion emphasised a quite different similarity – 
namely that both parties used the concept of “terrorism” just as long as it 
suited them and no longer. “Terrorism” was a label that actors applied to acts 
that were against their own interest.  
 The main thrust of this line of argument was that the USA was extremely 
partisan, selective and unjust in the way it uses the “terrorist” label, particu-
larly but not limited to the Palestine conflict. In American and Israeli lan-
guage, everything the Palestinians do is terrorism but nothing they them-
selves do is terrorism. If one Jew is killed, the Israelis have no problem with 
killing 42 Palestinians, and the Americans support them. The American defi-
                                                     
12  Much of what was done by the resisting occupied populations in the Second World War 
falls under the narrow and act-specific definition, but no one ever calls it terrorism 
because there is consensus that the goal was legitimate, see Bjørgo & Heradstveit 1993, 
op.cit.  
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nition of terrorist is the same as the Israeli, namely anyone struggling against 
the Israeli occupation of their land; the Americans show not the slightest 
interest in why the members of Hamas in Palestine or Hizbollah in Lebanon 
do what they do. Israeli state terrorism is simply not a concept the Ameri-
cans recognise. This is because of the Israeli influence over the US; if terror-
ists blew up a building in Oslo, we were asked, do you think the USA would 
have come to your support in the same way? Norway does not have a power-
ful lobby in Washington.  
It is the Americans who think narrowly and provincially, rather than uni-
versally – whatever injures white people, Christians, Jews, is terrorism. But 
their own actions never are.  
Some of the respondents, however, think that this cuts both ways, and the 
same mechanisms apply to their own side too. Iran’s definition of terrorism 
in the Palestinian conflict is practically the mirror-image of the American 
one, they say. Just as the Americans see the Palestinians as a threat, and ergo 
everything they do is terrorism, so too the Iranians see the Israelis as a threat, 
and ergo everything they do is terrorism. Every country selectively defines 
terrorism as something harming its own interests; for example, anyone wag-
ing irregular war against Iran itself would be a terrorist, or fighting a war of 
liberation against countries with which Iran has good relations, or perhaps 
merely countries with which Iran does not have bad relations. But just as 
Iran is no better in this respect than the USA, it is no worse either.  
Some respondents even claimed that Iranian authorities conducted “ter-
rorism” against their own population, although there was “much less” of this 
than previously. The violence and bloodiness of Iranian politics in recent 
history has made the topic of terrorism quite inflammatory. A famous news-
paper editor told us that when he wrote that the Palestinian suicide bombers 
were terrorists, the conservatives became upset and claimed that this was a 
dangerous line of thought. (It was also mentioned that the Iranian authorities 
were critical of USA’s attempt to censor the al-Jazeera television station, 
while simultaneously banning 17 of their country’s own newspapers.)  
To sum up, there is some disagreement about the concept of terrorism 
among the Iranian oppositional elite. They do not think definitions to be par-
ticularly important, one cannot create a precise definition. The differences 
are not in formal definitions of terrorism, but in the preferred ostensive 
examples. A few challenge the conservative position that the activity of the 
Palestinian suicide bombers is not terrorism but a legitimate war of libera-
tion. At the same time, the indignation over tendentious and selective label-
ling by the USA was universal. In the same way, there was general agree-
ment that it was unacceptable to pontificate about terrorism as a phenome-
non without knowing the context of and the motives for these acts. The 
respondents do not accept “international terrorism” as the point of departure 
for a discussion; terrorism is not a global conspiracy but a specific local 
response to specific local conditions. There is no such thing as a global ter-
rorist network, only a multinational terrorism founded on Islamic ideology, 
as for example bin Laden’s (see next chapter).  
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The respondents’ perceptions of the causes of terrorism 
Respondents were asked about their opinions of the fundamental causes of 
terrorism, and their responses were by and large in line with the debate in the 
West. Much of what they said was already familiar to us. In fact, we were 
surprised by how little difference there was.  
The responses can be grouped into four categories: 
 
• Structural factors globally  
• Structural factors locally 
• Muslim attitudes 
• Western attitudes 
Structural factors globally  
One respondent thought it lay in human nature to commit evil acts, and cited 
the Oklahoma City bombing.  
 Apart from this truly universalist explanation, however, the respondents 
focused on world political, economic and social imbalances, the global eco-
nomic and cultural “class system”. A recurrent explanation of terrorism was 
the clear gulf between rich (that is, Western) and poor (that is, Muslim) 
countries. This gulf has led to very unhealthy relations of dependency in 
which the poor countries are the losers, it makes people act abnormally, and 
in such soil the seeds of terrorism are sown.  
Migration from the countryside to the cities creates unrest. Migrants also 
go to the West, where they see the differences up close, and are enraged by 
them.  
The gulf is not solely one of economics, but also asymmetrical power 
relations. Superior military power creates terrorism because it makes the 
West think it can push Muslim nations around. The USA, it was said, will 
accept nothing less than “the white flag”, that is, abject subordination. We 
are thus talking about the collective and cumulative sense of inequality, in 
the political, economic or psychological arenas, or any combination thereof; 
and this frustration is directed against the USA, because it tries to impose 
obedience by threats. However, many Muslims are willing to suffer martyr-
dom as Imam Hussein did on the Plain of Karbala; they are not frightened by 
American military superiority, only enraged. As the Koran says, “I will let 
my blood flow so that the blood can speak for me”.  
One respondent cited what we would call alienation: that a sense of humi-
liation or powerlessness caused by modern society could result in a disposi-
tion to terrorism anywhere. Frustration with modernity applies not only to 
the countries that it has rendered peripheral, but also to the population within 
the central countries that it has rendered marginal. There is common ground 
between the marginalised people of the “South” and the marginalised people 
of the “North”, the underclass or “fourth world”. Both in this way and with 
respect to terrorism, the developed countries are entangled in the problems 
of the periphery. In both locations the response to marginalisation, alienation 
and frustration is religious fundamentalism.  
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Structural factors locally 
Local structural causes of terrorism are the failure to solve regional crises, 
such as Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kashmir and the Basque Country. Any-
one who feels he is not heard and excluded from dialogue is a potential ter-
rorist. Injustice is exploited by the great haters in their recruitment. 
By far the most important local structural factor is the Palestine issue. 
More than anything else this has become the symbol of Muslim civilisation, 
the touchstone for relations between the civilisations and the driving-force of 
terrorism. Arab intellectuals think Sharon is a tool of the USA. Thanks to 
American backing, Israel can do whatever it likes without paying the price. 
Iran was originally opposed to the Oslo Treaty, but now supports it, and also 
supports Crown Prince Abdallah’s plan for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-
1967 borders in return for the acceptance of Israel by the Arab states and 
peoples. This is a step forward. A just peace that does not humiliate Muslims 
and is based on the UN’s peace principles would improve the situation.  
We do not need to say any more about this, the Muslim arguments are 
well known. Of greater interest would be what the respondents do not men-
tion, internal structural relations in Muslim countries, which invariably have 
corrupt leaders and where the gulf between poor and rich is generally appal-
ling. In other words, conditions that breed militant and violent Islamists. If 
we had posed direct questions we would surely have received answers, but 
our method did not allow it. However, what is of interest here is “what the 
dog did in the night” – failed to bark. Although they were encouraged to 
answer freely and at length, the failure of the respondents to mention internal 
causes reveals an important structural feature of Muslim civilisation – 
namely the lack of facility at critical thinking and self-criticism. Instead of 
talking about their own painful failures, they focus on other causes that are 
much easier to talk about, such as the conflict between Palestinians and Isra-
elis. It is not their fault, it is all the fault of the West.  
Muslim attitudes 
In the border area between structural factors and attitudes, respondents 
emphasised how globalisation, television and the Internet made it much eas-
ier for Muslim peoples to compare themselves with the West. They thus 
become acutely aware of their own miserable situation, and censorship can-
not touch the Internet. The results of such a comparison are deeply tragic, 
especially for the young people entering the workforce; it leads to frustration 
and rage that may be turned against their own regime, but equally well 
against the West.  
There is also a cultural class division between traditionalism and moder-
nity. Muslims who cannot reconcile themselves to the march of modernity, 
also fall into despair and are tempted to commit desperate acts.  
Apart from this, there was little talk of Muslim attitudes, but respondents 
did say that Muslim civilisation was isolating itself and regarding Islam as 
the solution to all its problems. If rationalism is replaced with religion, mod-
ernity will have no chance, and Muslim countries will be even less able to 
compete with the West.  
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It was interesting and suggestive, however, that only a single respondent 
referred to “ideology” as a driving force in terrorism. In contrast, Western 
analyses treat ideology as the main explanation of 11 September. Perhaps 
this is because in the West, the word “ideology” is often just code for 
“Islam”.  
Western attitudes 
There was more talk about Western attitudes as conducive to terrorism. The 
greatest indignation is reserved for the West’s double standards, as seen in 
the local conflicts in the area. We saw this for example in the 1991 Gulf 
War, when Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait was treated far more 
harshly than Israel’s occupation of Palestine. The same applies to possession 
of weapons of mass destruction, and to discrimination against Muslim 
migrants to Western countries. The respondents also cited the Western sup-
port for oppressive dictatorships in Muslim countries.  
The West’s glorification of its own culture and ignorance and denigration 
of Muslim culture is also a form of violence. The West discriminates on both 
an individual and a collective level – whole Muslim nations are made into 
outcasts. In other words, Western attitudes lead to collective and individual 
marginalisation and to the accumulation of bad memories in both the indi-
vidual and the national consciousness. It is these bad memories that can eas-
ily be released in terrorism.  
 Muslims are simply assigned less importance as a group than others. The 
life of a Jew is worth more than the life of a Muslim; they are weighed on 
different scales. A Muslim is punished for what a Jew does with impunity. 
As long as Americans think that someone’s grandchild in the USA is worth 
more than someone’s grandchild in Afghanistan, terrorism will continue.  

Chapter 2 
11 September: the conspiracy 
theories 
After outlining the Iranian oppositional elite’s sentiments on terrorism gen-
erally, the logical next step would be to report their attitudes to Osama bin 
Laden and al-Qaida and then their sympathy with or revulsion at the World 
Trade Center strike. Such a sequence assumes, however, that it was in fact 
bin Laden who organised the attack, and this is precisely where many people 
in the Middle East beg to differ. Almost no Westerners harbour any alterna-
tive theories, it is axiomatic that “bin Laden did it”, but in Iran this is not 
axiomatic. Instead, we find that some respondents agree that al-Qaida carried 
out the attack, but many more adhere to the conspiracy theories that are 
endemic to the region.  
Iranian conspiracy theories  
Social psychology describes conspiracy theories as comprehensive and inter-
nally consistent perceptual systems, vigorously asserted and extremely hard 
to refute; for the proponent can always argue that his theory may be true. In 
fact, lack of evidence for the conspiracy may be taken to mean that the con-
spiracy is very well hidden indeed and so is doubly dangerous. Nothing is 
taken at face value, but whatever happens is interpreted as part of a complex 
and inimical pattern.  
Iran is well known for generating such conspiracy theories to explain 
political events. The country nurtures two kinds of conspiracy theory: the 
one focuses on conspiracies of Western colonial powers, and is common to 
the entire Muslim world. The other involves belief in Satanic forces that 
have worked against Iran from ancient times to the present.  
Foreign intervention 
As elsewhere in the Middle East, this phenomenon is rooted in historical 
experiences involving foreign powers and secret organisations. Intervention 
by Great Powers in Iranian politics have been many, very real and most 
alarming; they have had the most profound consequences for the nation. 
According to Ahmad Ashraf,13 the Persians have felt helpless against 
rumours of conspiratorial foreign interference; in the same way, since by 
their nature conspiracy theories cannot be verified or falsified, foreigners 
have felt helpless to disprove that they are behind anti-Iranian conspiracies.  
                                                     
13  See Ashraf, Ahmad, “Conspiracy theories and the Persian Mind”, Encyclopaedia Iranica, 
May 1996, also http://www.iranian.com/May96/Opinion/Conspiracy.html. 
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The country most frequently designated as the conspirer against Iran is 
the United Kingdom. This began with British interference in the constitutio-
nal revolution of 1905–11, continued with the Russo-British convention of 
1907 dividing Iran (or Persia as it was then called) into spheres of influence, 
and resulted in the actual occupation of the country during the First World 
War by the UK, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. After the war the shah felt 
compelled by the Bolshevik threat to sign the Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1919 
that virtually made the country a British protectorate. Then came the British-
supported coup that brought to Pahlavi dynasty to power for the first time 
(1925–41). The reason for all this meddling was, of course, the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, which later became British Petroleum.  
This changed in 1953, when the nationalist leader Mossadeq was over-
thrown and the Shah’s absolutism reintroduced. When it became clear that 
the CIA and the British were in league, the Americans began to share and 
ultimately take over the British role as conspirer-in-chief. The negative atti-
tudes to the West that emerged in our interviews were directed exclusively 
against the USA. We had expected some anti-British sentiment too, but this 
country was practically passed over in silence. After 1953 the USA was 
blamed for everything that went wrong in Iran. This could scale the heights 
of absurdity, as with the Shah’s agricultural revolution, which was regarded 
as a conspiracy to ruin Iranian agriculture so that the USA could dump its 
inconvenient agricultural surpluses on Iran.14  
This is not necessarily the same as hatred of America per se. Recent opi-
nion polls15 show that the majority of Iranians are actually well-disposed to 
the USA, as were the majority of our respondents. This positive attitude, 
however, can and does co-exist with the most fantastical conspiracy theories 
that discredit and mock the US.  
Satanic forces 
The ruling idea of the Satanic variant of the conspiracy theory is that Iran 
has not achieved the status the country ought to have had, politically, militar-
ily or culturally. This is because of Iran’s special religious status, which has 
attracted equally special attention from the Devil. That is, there is a global 
spiritual conspiracy against Iran. One manifestation of this in the secular 
world is global Zionism; another is Western man, who has lost his spiritual 
bearings and has thus fallen into decadence. Unfortunately, the East has lost 
spiritual power too, which has made Muslim civilisation vulnerable to West-
ern decadence – what, with a label borrowed from Martin Heidegger, is 
often called “westoxication”.16 
The belief in Satanic forces was strong in the pre-Islamic period, and 
remains so in Shi’i Islam. Although these Satanic conspiracy theories are 
ultimately not rooted in history but in religion, they do not live in a vacuum 
but are mixed together with and reinforce the other variant of conspiracy 
thinking, the foreign power.  
                                                     
14  Ashraf 1996. 
15  The Economist, 18 January 2003. 
16  Ashraf 1996, op.cit. 
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Destructive effects 
It should never be assumed that this phenomenon is confined to people with 
low levels of intelligence and education. Surprisingly, it is equally strong in 
the elite. As Ashraf sees it, conspiracy thinking has been strengthened rather 
than weakened in recent years. Iranians of all social classes and different 
ideological orientations are using conspiracy thinking as an important intel-
lectual tool for understanding history and politics.17 Our respondents con-
firm this by asserting that in Iran it is normal to blame the USA for all the 
country’s woes. For example, a former minister in Bazargan’s secular gov-
ernment was in deadly earnest when he served us with a detailed explanation 
and “proof” that the USA was behind Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution.  
Addiction to conspiracy theories have some unfortunate consequences. 
One of these is an oversimplified and dualistic outlook on the world, black-
or-white thinking that sees politics as a struggle between Good and Evil. 
This was blatant in Khomeini’s rhetoric, in which USA was “the Great 
Satan” and Saudi Arabia was “the Little Satan”.18 Against this demonic 
background, Iran itself was a light unto all nations. Our respondents, 
although they were oppositionals and reformers, appeared themselves to 
think in the same moralising fashion. It should be obvious how dysfunctional 
this outlook is in terms of leading Iran to modernity.  
A second baleful consequence of conspiracy theories is that they act as 
collective defence mechanisms to explain away everything that goes wrong. 
That is, explain them as someone else’s fault. It is particularly when some-
thing unpleasant or even shameful happens – something which one does not 
want to admit or take responsibility for – that conspiracy theories flourish. 
They soothe the distress that is occasioned by the event by disclaiming lia-
bility. In his book What went wrong, Bernard Lewis has identified this com-
pulsion to find external scapegoats.19 One of his main points is that, instead 
of asking the question, “What did we do wrong?”, Muslims too easily ask 
the question, “Who has done this to us?” Such a refusal to ask critical 
questions and accept responsibility can prevent people drawing the conclu-
sions necessary to make rational decisions.  
One of the respondents, however, was courageous enough to complain 
about the conspiracy mentality and to assign responsibility for it to the 
authorities. The government’s horror of critical thinking leads it to encour-
age conspiracy theories; this is, as the respondent sees it, the reason why 
despite the Revolution the social sciences are still weak in Iran. The lack of 
official interest in the social sciences is because they are critical by nature; 
and contrariwise, the absence of critical thinking leaves the way open to con-
spiracy thinking.  
The same respondent also mentioned that censorship supported the con-
spiracy theorising; people who know that they can rarely rely on official 
explanations are obliged to fill in the gaps by fantasy. He also claims that in 
no other country is conspiracy theory as strong as in Iran.  
                                                     
17  Ibid. 
18  Candidates for “Little Satan” vary: Saudi Arabia, Israel and the UK are the main variants.  
19  Lewis, Bernard, What went wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response. 
Oxford University Press, New York 2002. 
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We always think that there is an outside power behind anything that happens. It 
is like this because we have been dictated to by Russia and Britain for centuries. 
After the Second World War the USA more or less took over. Historically spea-
king we find many examples of this kind of conspiracy theorising – in Iran it is 
continually claimed that it was the USA that was behind the Iran–Iraq war, and 
that the Islamic revolution was America’s work. Since the Revolution the Iranian 
people have continually been reminded that the USA is behind all their misery. 
Because of censorship people never believe entirely in official explanations. 
These must be subject to secondary interpretation and this is where conspiracy 
thinking comes in. It is claimed that Muslims cannot have organised such a 
drastic operation as the attack on the WTC. It is then more reasonable to believe 
that an organisation in the USA is behind it. It is claimed that the USA wanted an 
excuse to invade Afghanistan, at the same time as it wanted to distract attention 
from the Palestinian question. The same thinking recurs in the assertion that the 
USA needs an excuse to attack Islamic movements globally. Even media that 
operate freely promote this kind of thinking. The USA is here tarred with the 
same brush as Zionism – even in the free press. 
The conspiracy-theory approach to 11 September  
Muslims writing in the Western press attributed the strike to the USA, the 
CIA or Israel. This is a surprising, and to Western ears improbable, theory, 
but of course we cannot prove that it is not true. The essence of conspiracy 
theories is that nothing is what it appears, and actors who do not seem to be 
on the same side make secret compacts. 
Conspiracy theories embraced and rejected 
Our working hypothesis was that there would be a cognitive-dissonance 
connection between the two questions, Did bin Laden do it? and Do you 
approve? We expected that revulsion against the attacks would lead to a very 
extensive belief in conspiracy theories implying that the Muslim world was 
innocent. In addition, such theories are, as we have seen, a common pattern 
in the region. Our results, however, refused to conform entirely to this 
expectation. 
 
Table 2 Who do you believe were behind the incidents of September 11th? 
N = number of respondents* 
Bin Laden (al-Qaida) 5 
Statements containing conspiracy theories  10 
Other 3 
 N=18 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no significance tests are reported, 
nor are percentages given. 
 
One-third of our respondent sample said straight off that in their opinion 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida were behind the attack -- alone. They were 
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thus free of the usual Iranian compulsion to accuse foreign powers of com-
plicated conspiracies. 
Although none of the respondents approved of the attacks and the great 
majority thought them an atrocity (see next chapter), they were far from 
agreed that it was al-Qaida that had in fact carried them out. Or at any rate, 
not alone. While not the overwhelming majority we expected, more than half 
the sample attributed responsibility to the USA, in a conspiratorial fashion – 
the USA was operating behind the scene in collusion with bin Laden and al-
Qaida. The action, they said, would never have succeeded without the col-
laboration of powerful forces within America, for instance the CIA; it was 
too sophisticated for a Muslim terrorist group to carry out alone. The insis-
tence of many respondents that “we cannot know who was behind the 
attack” may be a way of avoiding attribution of responsibility to other 
Muslims, but their supplementary explanations show all the signs of conspir-
acy theorising, although expressed in a hypothetical and oblique manner.  
Respondent speculations 
We shall now illustrate the theme of conspiracy by reproducing some of 
these speculative attributions. Italics denote coding of the response in the 
category of conspiracy theory. 
11 September has to do with the military-industrial complex on which 
American capitalism is founded. Hollywood films illustrate this. The films 
have no artistic merit, they are produced solely to show the new super-mod-
ern military technology. Hollywood was ahead of the curve. What we saw 
with the WTC was theatre, a spectacle with a view to justifying the military-
industrial complex. We must ask what contextual factors helped to create the 
bin Laden/al-Qaida phenomenon. The powerful – like USA – have a certain 
attraction for people round them. The USA’s position has seen Americans 
able to attract the best minds in the world, the country is therefore ahead of 
all others as regards science and for this reason among others can preserve 
world hegemony. Who was it gave weapons to al-Qaida and bin Laden? 
Pakistan? It was the USA. Bin Laden’s rhetoric is pre-modern. The events of 
11 September and all that they have led to are a show in which the inhuman 
is presented, not just in the USA but also in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a 
country in which Buddha statues were destroyed. 
Everything we have seen is a result of the USA’s military machine. 
We can wonder how those who carried out the actions on 11 September 
had only lived two or three years in the USA. Here there is something that 
doesn’t fit. There must have been others involved who knew the country 
better than they could have done after only two or three years. All that busi-
ness with airline schedules and so forth… I don’t say that this means that the 
CIA or others were involved, but it is highly probable.  
I am convinced that we can’t reply on the FBI theories. They scatter so-
called facts around and launch theories that don’t make sense. I was in the 
USA when we were fighting against the Shah. The FBI, who interrogated 
me, had clearly exaggerated and wrong ideas about the Iranian resistance 
movement. When bin Laden took part in the war against the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan, he was an agent for the CIA. Bin Laden was the bait that the 
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USA planted to be able to start its strategic offensive. If the USA was behind 
the attack on 11 September, the goal was to win absolute hegemony. The fast 
and effective way the Israelis exploited the situation gives the impression 
that Israel, the USA’s closest ally, had advance notice of what was going to 
happen. The Israelis are always ready, but this time they acted so fast and 
deliberately that they must have been in part prepared for it.  
It is said that bin Laden had serious kidney problems. French and British 
diplomats claim that he is dead, and the USA knows it, but the Americans 
are not interested in this being known, as he is useful for their future offen-
sives.20 
You must have a cause you really believe in, be relatively intelligent and 
at the same time action-oriented (determined) to be able to carry out this 
kind of action. It wasn’t soldiers who were behind it, but they were never-
theless to some extent both rational and sophisticated. The  
mystery is how after only two or three years in the USA they could have 
such good knowledge of how the country functioned. The Americans must 
have helped them.  
The important thing is not who carried out the attack. The event in itself 
is the main thing, that it was possible. Asahara21 and bin Laden have the 
ability to channel hate in certain directions. They are charismatic and can 
sway people. But this kind of person is everywhere, in the West as well. It 
may be difficult to find out who was behind it. The forces behind it operate 
within a complicated network of hidden links between the various actors, 
which are hard for others to disentangle.  
It is too early to decide who was behind it. We have no documents prov-
ing one thing or the other, and will probably never have any. In analysing the 
whole thing we must try to find out who had an interest in it happening. 
Then none or all of these you mention may be behind it. Bin Laden may 
have controlled the operations under CIA guidance. I would remind you that 
Atta22 worked for Pakistani intelligence. More important than finding out 
who did it is analysing the effects of what happened. What we conclude is 
that the events have initiated an “American strategic offensive”.  
I am convinced that bin Laden and al-Qaida were behind it. But I do not 
ignore the possibility that someone in the secret services of Israel and the 
USA may have assisted in the implementation. It is undeniably strange that 
one person in Afghanistan can have realised such a big project. He must 
have had professional help. 
                                                     
20  NTB/Reuters 16.7.02: Osama bin Laden took a wound to the shoulder in the American-led 
attack on his headquarters in the Tora Bora mountains of eastern Afghanistan in 
December, but is now fit and well, according to an Arab editor with close ties to bin 
Laden’s circle. Bin Laden will not be making any more videos until al-Qaida mounts 
another attack on the USA, his supporters are supposed to have told Abdel-Bari Atwan, 
editor of the London-based magazine Al-Quds Al-Arabi. 
21  Shoko Asahara, the leader of Aum Shinri Kyo. 
22  Muhammad Atta, engineer and town planner, was one of the leaders of the WTC 
operation. He spent much of his life in Europe and the USA; when living in the US, he 
received 100,000 dollars from Pakistan, which he shared with the other conspirators and 
may have spent on flying lessons (Peter L. Bergen, Hellig krig. Osama bin Ladens 
hemmelige nettverk, N. W. Damm & Søn 2002, pp. 45–46).  
CHAPTER 3  
11 September: Osama bin Laden 
In Chapter 2 we looked at the belief not only that al-Qaida and bin Laden 
were not alone in organising and carrying out the attacks in New York and 
Washington, but also that “it is not possible to know” who was behind them. 
In this chapter we will ignore these agnostics and discuss the attitudes of the 
Iranian oppositional elite to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida as the prime sus-
pects. Assuming that they are indeed the guilty parties, in this chapter will 
examine the respondents’ support or rejection of the means, and their attri-
bution of the motives. In the next chapter we will look at their opinion of the 
results achieved.  
Support or rejection of 11 September 
As we said in Chapter 2, our working hypothesis was that there would be a 
cognitive-dissonance connection between the two questions, Did bin Laden 
do it? and Do you approve?, so that answers to the one could be predicted 
from answers to the other. This turned out not to be the case.  
The respondents 
 
Table 3 What do you think of the incidents of September 11th?* 
N = number of respondents* 
Cannot support 11 
Support 0 
Do not support, but understand the reasons behind  5 
No opinion 2 
 N=18 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no significance 
tests are reported, nor are percentages given. 
 
So as to preserve the nuances in the response universe, we will now repro-
duce some of the replies, followed by a discussion.  
An inappropriate question to ask! I am absolutely against what happened. 
Iran was the only country in the Muslim world in which there was not a 
single voice expressing sympathy with or supporting bin Laden. Not even 
the fact that the USA has bombed Middle Eastern cities to rubble justifies 
such acts. Not only Americans were affected, there were men and women 
from more than 60 countries in the building.  
I am very strongly against it. I think it is completely inappropriate to ask 
the question at all. It would have been better if it had never happened. Not 
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until far in the future – perhaps ten years – will we understand the scope of 
this. 
I am very strongly against. Even if there was just cause for what hap-
pened, it can still not be defended. The TV images were enough to make it 
clear that it was simply horrible. 
 I am strongly against and get upset when I meet people who defend it. No one 
supports such acts. What happened was both inhuman and tragic. No one with a grain 
of sense would support such ideas. Iran has also condemned it.  
 I am against the events. They are an expression of weakness, desperation 
and frustration. If it is true that 19 Saudis were behind the attack, it shows 
that the Muslim world has problems understanding the international system 
and the logic it rests on. USA emphasised that the events had nothing to do 
with Islam, but I think religion plays a role, and I think it has to do with 
Israel.  
I am very strongly against the events. Even if we accept that the USA 
inflicts great damage on the Muslim world and kills Muslims, these acts can 
nevertheless not be justified. If they had attacked a military base, we could 
perhaps have defended it, but I disapprove of killing innocent people for no 
reason.  
Of course I am against what happened. The actions did not even have any 
clear objective.  
I am against in the strongest terms. Bin Laden and the Taliban cannot 
help the Muslims. The most important thing in the time to come is to pro-
mote civil society. Perhaps we can, as the Islamists claim, compete with the 
USA, but then it must be with other means than those the Islamists use. 
Fundamentalism, which is a hybrid of a democratic and a populist 
impulse, has been in decline in the last ten years. The negative consequences 
of the events of 11 September may accelerate that decline. 
In a human perspective, I am against what happened. The acts struck at 
people who were doing nothing else than living their ordinary lives. The 
Koran says that doing your daily work is jihad. It is unacceptable that such 
people be deprived of peace and safety.  
Everyone says that they are unhappy about what has happened in the 
USA, but tell me why there have not been the same reactions about Palestine 
and Bosnia. 
11 September represents a turning-point in history. What happened then 
is of greater significance than the Gulf War. It will be interesting to see what 
happens in the time to come. I cannot now say whether I support the events. 
I do not believe in killing of innocents, but I have no problem under-
standing the motives behind these acts. 11 September has had a negative 
effect in that it has reduced the threshold for violence in international poli-
tics. 
The rule must be to be against all murder. But what happened on 11 
September is so complicated that it is hard to take a stand. We cannot ignore 
the possibility that the WTC may be the beginning of a new epoch. It may 
open the way to something quite new. We must wait and see what happens 
now before we can pass a final judgement. 
For five decades the USA has been humiliating Muslims. 11 September is 
a reaction to this. I myself hated the USA. My sister took part in the hostage 
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action in 1979, the family applauded. Now we have fought the USA for 25 
years, it’s enough. 
The WTC is a reaction to the frustration felt in the struggle against the 
USA. The fundamentalists have no faith in dialogue. They are convinced 
that a religious code gives them protection and that use of terror is the only 
way to react. The battle of Karbala and the significance of martyrdom in 
Shi’a gave them the strength to carry out the acts.23  
By claiming that “those who are not with us are against us”, Bush reacted 
in line with bin Laden’s fundamentalism.  
Discussion 
The most striking feature of the respondents’ attitude to 11 September is the 
almost unanimous agreement that, in the struggle of the Muslim world 
against the West, this is not the way to go. This is despite the fact that many 
express great understanding for the acts in the light of what they consider to 
be American harassment of and interference with Muslims.  
It was claimed that the action has reduced the violence threshold in inter-
national politics – and subsequent events have, of course, proved our 
respondents right.  
There is reason to think that there would not have been such a consensus 
had not the Iranian government, immediately and in unambiguous terms, 
condemned the terrorist acts. Most respondents were crystal clear in their 
condemnation, and some even sounded insulted by being asked the question 
at all. In Iran, which turned out to be “the only country” in which there was 
not a single voice raised in defence of bin Laden and his men, the question 
could appear to be an attempt to cast suspicion.  
If we look at the sample as a whole, however, some interesting nuances 
appear. Among the responses that claim that they do not support the terror-
ism, but understand the reasons, two different variants recur. One group 
insists that the reasons are not adequate to justify such horrible acts; the 
other group argues that, while they themselves could not contemplate per-
forming this kind of act, they nonetheless fully understand those who could. 
Some respondents are difficult to assign, because they choose to talk instead 
about long-term consequences, how what happened on 11 September is so 
complex that it is hard to grasp it, that it is a watershed that inaugurates a 
new epoch in international politics, and so forth – not very specific. For our 
purposes we have classified these as “no opinion”, even though they can be 
interpreted as supporting 11 September.  
The surprising thing about the results is that not a single respondent 
comes right out and says that he supports the terrorist strike of 11 Septem-
ber. A recurrent theme is that they cannot accept the murder of innocent 
civilians, though we also hear the subtler argument that they were against it 
because the casualties of the World Trade Center were not only Americans 
but people from 60 different countries. The implication is that it would have 
been more acceptable if Americans alone had died. 
                                                     
23  Bin Laden & co. are not, of course, Shi’i, and we can only speculate as to why the respon-
dent said this. 
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Such a clear condemnation of the 11 September actions deviate from the 
attitudes we find in most Muslim countries. Even if the secular and religious 
authorities of the Muslim world officially condemn the strike, it is said, by 
and large the Muslim in the street has a different opinion. Even though bin 
Laden was not exactly a hero, there was sympathy for him all over the 
world; even in Europe there were groups who put his face on their T-shirts. 
Nothing like this happened in Iran, here there was no one who expressed any 
sympathy for him. This is probably due to the effect of the Iranian govern-
ment’s quick and very clear condemnation, and also to the fact that the 
country was at least partly playing on the same side as the USA against the 
Taliban. Our respondents said that Iran distinguished itself from the rest of 
the Muslim world in that there was little or no sympathy for bin Laden. It 
may seem like a paradox, but Iranians who condemned meaningless violence 
still felt a certain pleasure in seeing peripheral countries playing such an 
important role in the USA.  
Most interesting of all, however, is when we compare the degree of con-
sensus in Table 3 with that in Table 2. The relative consensus on personal 
condemnation of 11 September in Table 3 is not to be found in Table 2, 
where the sample divides down the middle on the question of who was 
responsible. The reason may be that on the question of responsibility the 
respondents have been less influenced by Iran’s unambiguous official policy 
than on the question of condemnation, which has made for more spontane-
ous and revealing answers. We had the impression that the question as to 
who was responsible came as more of a surprise than the question on their 
attitude. On the second question they could “spout the party line”, while on 
the first question they are tempted to give responses that exculpate Muslim 
civilisation.  
Given the unanimous condemnation of the attacks on moral and political 
grounds by the elite respondents, our expectation was that they would be at 
greater pains to exculpate the Muslim world by denying al-Qaida’s responsi-
bility or asserting American complicity via conspiracy theories. This they 
did to some extent (see Chapter 2), but less than we expected. 
Explaining Osama bin Laden 
Our analysis is based on cognitive attribution theory. The basic premise of 
this theory is that people tend to explain their own behaviour situationally 
and the behaviour of others, especially opponents, dispositionally. That is, 
we do the bad things we do because we have to, the situation leaves us no 
choice; but our enemies do the bad things they do because they are by nature 
wicked and evil. And contrariwise: if our enemies do good things, it is 
because something is obliging them to do so, but if we do good things it is 
because we are virtuous and heroic.  
In order to see whether the acts of both sides are perceived in accordance 
with the theory, we also asked the respondents to explain the behaviour of 
George Bush and the Americans. Since it concerns the post-911 world, how-
ever, this is to be found in Chapter 5 introducing the subject of the effects of 
the attacks. 
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The coding problems of “dispositional” and “situational” in attribution 
theory are comprehensively discussed in the literature.24 The main problem 
is that the same statement can be seen either way, depending on interpreta-
tion. Coding cannot, therefore, be automatic and must be done by someone 
versed in the theory and trained in coding. In many cases this means a judg-
ment call. Semiotic theory tells us that we cannot understand the meaning of 
a word in isolation, but must read it in the relevant context, which here 
means the whole interview.  
Moreover, the theoretical framework has subsequently been expanded by 
the addition of a third type of explanation, the expressive. Whereas a pure 
dispositional attribution asserts that the actors do what they do because of 
their permanent characteristics (their innate and fixed natures), and a pure 
situational attribution treats the actors as compelled to do what they do by 
the situation in which they find themselves, the expressive attribution focu-
ses on characteristics of the actors that are not permanent, innate or fixed. 
The actor is then led to do what he does by these contingent characteristics, 
although is not compelled to do so. Whereas the situational attribution is 
absolutely disculpatory (we have no choice) and the dispositional attribution 
fixes absolute blame (they are wicked), the expressive attribution is sympa-
thetic up to a point (they shouldn’t have done that, but we understand why 
they felt they had to). There are serious problems of interpretation and cod-
ing here, to which we shall return after looking at the respondents’ state-
ments.  
The respondents’ attributions 
 
Table 4: Causal explanations of September 11th?* 
N = number of causal statements* 
Situational Expressive Dispositional 
11 6 8 
 N=25 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no significance tests 
are reported, nor are percentages given. 
 
Below follows a selection of respondent statements, grouped by topic: 
Poverty 
The reason is primarily in the divide between poor and rich. In this case a 
religious person was behind it, but this is not always the case.25 People sup-
port both the religious and the non-religious.  
Bin Laden is a rich man, but is seen as a spokesman for the poor. 
Mohammed’s wife26 was also rich and did much for the poor. 
 
                                                     
24  For example Ross, D., 1975, Distortion in Social PErception Process, Memeo, Stanford 
University.. 
25  Hitler was mentioned as an example of a non-religious terrorist. 
26  Khadija, a merchant’s widow, was the Prophet’s first wife. She was ten years older than 
him, and, after she died, he took several new wives to cement political alliances.  
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Palestine 
The main reason is in Israel’s occupation of Palestine and the arrogance the 
USA has shown in this context. 
Frustration 
It is conceivable that they were cunning strategists or that they simply did 
not know what they were doing. They may have acted out of frustration and 
hopelessness without any plan or sophisticated objectives.  
It is an open question whether those who were behind it had clear objec-
tives. But one thing is certain, they must have been determined. That is pre-
cisely why they succeeded with the operation. 
Deep frustration is behind it. Only those who see no other way out use 
such means to gain a hearing.  
The driving force may have been revenge. The events may have been 
pure revenge with no other purpose. Religious people will not find any justi-
fication for such behaviour in the Koran. No religion offers an ethical plat-
form for such acts.  
More than a structured organisation, al-Qaida is a kind of identity. Those 
who join it are people who have decided to do what they think promotes 
their cause. The hijackings of 11 September were an expression of frustra-
tion without any specific and goal-oriented strategy behind them. The feeling 
of powerlessness and hopelessness drove them to carry out the acts.  
Crisis maximising 
If there were rational objectives behind it, the purpose had to be to draw the 
USA into a confrontation with the Muslim world and in that manner under-
mine the USA’s legitimacy in this area. 
Bin Laden knew he was going to die, but because he fully and firmly 
believed in Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”,27 he wanted to implement 
this plan.28 
Bin Laden’s determined intelligence 
Bin Laden is the only person who is both smart enough and determined 
enough to carry out an action that has so totally changed the image of the 
USA. He is also a capable businessman.  
Hatred of the USA 
Their narrow perception of who are the “good guys” ands who are the “bad 
guys” may be the basis.  
The motives can be attacks on 
 
* the USA’s foreign policy 
* capitalism 
                                                     
27  The theories of the American Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington are controversial. 
In his book The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of world order he claims that 
future conflicts will be between the great world civilisations and that China and the 
Muslim world are a threat to the hegemony of the West. Religion and language are deci-
sive to the formation of the various civilisations, and it is these two elements that will be 
the primary fault-lines in humanity in the days to come. 
28  This respondent rarely or never uses the word “terrorism” about the events. 
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* the USA’s supreme power position 
* the USA’s military power. 
 
It was a confrontation with the USA and the policy that country pursues in 
the Muslim world. 
The Holy Places of Islam 
The attack was carried out as revenge for the injustice the USA has inflicted 
on Muslims. Bin Laden considered the USA his arch-enemy, not just 
because of Palestine, but mainly because of the occupation of the Holy 
Places. Bin Laden sees Saudi Arabia as occupied by the USA.29  
Bin Laden is a true son of the opposition to American interference. He is 
also for the strong Saudi traditionalism symbolised by the cities Riyadh, 
Mekka and Medina. It is the interaction between these variables – hatred of 
the West and strong traditionalism – that has created bin Laden. 
As a Wahhabi, bin Laden is first and foremost concerned with Saudi 
Arabia, Palestine is secondary. This priority is characteristic of all Wahhabis. 
For Muslims, Mecca is “the mother of cities”. As bin Laden sees it, the PLO 
has compromised itself. He is more in tune with Jihad, Hamas and 
Hizbollah.30 
11 September has had the opposite effect on Iran and Hejaz.31 In Saudi 
Arabia, the incident has led to a general radicalisation. Arab governments 
have been radicalised.  
The reason was first and foremost the American troops in Saudi Arabia.  
Religion is the crucial motive 
For bin Laden, religious conviction is decisive. He launched an attack on 
some of the main pillars of the capitalist system.  
Bin Laden wants Islam, not the USA, to have global hegemony. 
Bin Laden is charismatic, but this is not enough. He is relatively harmless 
because he is not able to mobilise the masses like for instance Khomeini. 
With the aid of mass movements, Khomeini channelled the hatred of the 
USA into concrete policy. He was a pragmatist who renounced his pan-
Islamic ambitions for the benefit of Iran, but bin Laden stands for pan-
Islamic goals.  
To answer this question, we have to put ourselves in their place. Bin 
Laden goes back in history, to the golden age of Islamic civilisation. No 
other civilisation could compare with the Islamic when we had lofty scien-
                                                     
29  Osama bin Laden’s role in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 
1980s gave him the status of a hero. After the war ended in 1989, he returned to Saudi 
Arabia. When, in the following year, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threatened 
Saudi Arabia, bin Laden and his holy warriors offered their help. The Saudi government 
rejected it and allied with the USA instead. American military forces were stationed in the 
country. Bin Laden takes this as a deadly insult and claims that it is forbidden for infidels 
to have permanent residence in the country. As the Guardian of the Holy Places (the two 
cities Mecca and Medina), Saudi Arabia has a special position in the Muslim world, mak-
ing the offence worse. Bin Laden breaks with the House of Saud. 
30  When bin Laden was in Sudan, al-Qaida made alliances with a number of militant organi-
sations including the extremist Islamic Jihad from Egypt. A Palestinian group has the 
same name, and it is this one that the respondent is referring to. 
31  The respondent is using the name Hejaz, the region where Mecca is located, as a meto-
nym for Saudi Arabia. 
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tific and religious debates and were masters of our own house. As bin Laden 
sees it, Islamic civilisation has since been marginalised. Western civilisation 
has oppressed Islam without anyone in the Islamic world being able to stop 
it. He asks himself why it is that the Muslims make it so easy for the USA to 
bomb Iraq. And why Israel has been allowed to oppress the Palestinians for 
50 years without Muslim countries trying to prevent it. Bin Laden’s sense of 
marginalisation, and his perception of the West as an oppressive civilisation, 
goes deep. Even if he feels powerless and unable to affect the course of his-
tory, 11 September was a way of marking his existence, even if leads to his 
own annihilation.  
Commentary 
Expressive attributions 
In this analysis we have departed from the simple dichotomous model of 
cognitive attribution theory in which causal explanations are seen as the 
result of characteristics either of the actor or of the situation the actors finds 
himself in, because in our opinion this dichotomy does not do justice to the 
causal explanations we find in our material. Characteristics of the actor and 
contextual explanations cover a lot of ground, it is true, but we are left with a 
residue of causal explanations that do not fall under either of these catego-
ries, and these are important for 11 September.  
Examples of this non-dichotomous explanation are statements such as 
“the cause of what happened is the enormous frustration Muslims feel”. 
Frustration is not a situational attribution because it is an inner state of the 
actor himself, and yet it is a kind of inner state that attribution theory does 
not regard as a characteristic of the actor. In the theory, actor characteristics 
have a more permanent nature. For example, that a person is “greedy” may 
be an explanation of his behaviour that recurs in many contexts, while “frus-
tration” is normally a transitory state that can change quickly with the situa-
tion. It is therefore incorrect to code frustration as a permanent characteristic 
of the actor. And yet frustration is not a situation that creates a framework 
for the actor’s behaviour either, it is after all an inner state. As a causal vari-
able, therefore, it must be tied to the actor, but avoiding generalisation. It is 
not determined wholly by the actor’s nature, nor by the exterior situation, but 
by both together and in a context. If we observe an actor who is greedy in 
one situation, it is reasonable to expect him to be greedy in others, but an 
actor who is frustrated in one situation will not necessarily be frustrated in 
others.  
Being frustrated is not, therefore, a permanent characteristic of the actor 
but an inner state that arises as a result of the situation in which he finds 
himself – an inner state created by external circumstances and personality 
traits. As regards responsibility, this attribution is more akin to the situatio-
nal than to the dispositional attribution; the actor cannot be held responsible 
because the roots of his actions are at one and the same time in his inner 
state and in features of the situation. The “expressive” explanation is thus 
one that exculpates the actor – he has acted in the same way as others could 
have acted in the same situation. There is nothing that could be considered 
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deviant about the behaviour. If we look at Table 4, we see that it is this 
explanatory model that dominates the respondents’ attributions of motive to 
the actors behind 11 September. The majority of respondents offer explanati-
ons that are either situational or expressive, and this implies exculpation of 
the perpetrators, even though to some degree we also find dispositional 
explanations.  
Some may discern a contradiction here, in that the interviewees express 
disapproval of the terrorist act at the same time as they exculpate the perpe-
trators. There is, however, no real inconsistency. In their expressive attribu-
tions the respondents are also exhibiting their own empathy and understand-
ing. This is why we call the results the respondents’ self-image, their ability 
to identify with and understand the perpetrators is so great that it is undeni-
able that they see them as part of themselves. It is as if they are saying, 
“What they did is not right, but they are nonetheless part of us, we have no 
problems understanding how they could do it”. Desperation, frustration, 
hopelessness and impotence are terms employed to understand the situatio-
nal logic that drove the terrorists.  
Religion and explanation 
If the debate in the West and our Western prejudices was all we had to go 
by, we would be tempted to say that religion was the main cause of 11 Sep-
tember. It is therefore interesting to note that our interviewees by and large 
decline to explain bin Laden’s actions in purely religious terms. Their expla-
nations are largely contextual, situational, and this implies that they consider 
bin Laden’s behaviour rational. This means that they are assuming that 
everyone who found himself in the same situation as bin Laden would act in 
the same way, it is not necessary to have a special disposition such as being 
“evil”, “a religious fanatic” and so on.  
This attribution is stronger than it appears to Western eyes, because cod-
ing for religion requires great care. For example, consider the statement: “As 
a Wahhabi, bin Laden is first and foremost concerned with Saudi Arabia, 
Palestine is secondary. This priority is characteristic of all Wahhabis.” Taken 
in isolation, this sounds as if the respondent is saying that bin Laden is acting 
from religious motives, because he is a Wahhabi, and therefore the 
attribution is “dispositional”. On the other hand, we can easily interpret 
Wahhabism not in terms of a religious peculiarity but in terms of Saudi 
Arabian nationalism. One of bin Laden’s main objectives is to liberate the 
Holy Places from American contamination. There is no distinction between 
the Holy Places and the state, because the state’s legitimacy rests on its guar-
dianship of the Holy Places. The state was created as a deal struck between 
the Wahhabi pietists and the House of Saud; the generally difficult distinc-
tion between religion and nation-building does not exist here. If bin Laden’s 
priority is the state of Saudi Arabia, then his motives may be classified as 
secular, promoting the nation’s interest in the normal way, and the respon-
dent’s attribution then becomes a “situational” one. That is, his behaviour is 
a response to the situation in which Saudi Arabia finds itself, and not the 
result of a permanent characteristic of Osama bin Laden (“dispositional”). 
That the interviewees perceive bin Laden as aiming primarily to protect 
and promote Saudi Arabia qua state is interesting in the light of Saddam 
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Hussein’s rhetoric in the Gulf War of 1991. Despite the fact that Iraq has its 
own holy places, which, though they do not rank as highly as Mecca and 
Medina, are of great importance for the Shi’a, he made no attempt to exploit 
them for mobilisation purposes in the war. Saddam Hussein confined himself 
to what has been rhetorically consensual in the Muslim world since 1948, 
namely Palestine. He wanted to transfer this emotional capital to his own 
war, inter alia through a metaphorical process expressed in the slogan “The 
struggle for Palestine is now in Kuwait”. Khomeini tried a similar line with 
his slogan from the 1980–88 war, “The road to Jerusalem runs through 
Baghdad”.  
As the respondents see it, bin Laden is indubitably more devoted to Saudi 
Arabia than to Palestine. This does not mean that he does not care about the 
common Islamic struggle, but that Palestine is number two in his hierarchy 
of values. The sufferings of the Iraqi people also recur with a high fre-
quency, but the above-mentioned values are more central to bin Laden’s 
cognitive structure. 
It would seem that the respondents perceive that bin Laden’s “master 
belief”32 is his anti-Western attitude. His actions are therefore based on 
“instrumental beliefs” related to this fundamental attitude. He is convinced 
that the marginalisation and humiliation of Islam is a consequence of the 
West’s unjust policies.  
Without quite coming out and saying it, therefore, the respondents with 
their situational attributions are exculpating the perpetrators. What they did 
was rational and understandable. When our respondents distance themselves 
from the acts, it is often because the acts “had no purpose”, they were a shot 
in the dark. The terrorists had no concept of what their acts would lead to in 
the “liberation” of Saudi Arabia, in Palestine, in Iraq, or for the struggle 
against the USA and the West. That is, the complaint is not so much that 
they were wrong as that they were wrong without achieving anything. 
(Elsewhere, however, several of the respondents claimed the results as a 
great victory over the USA and the West; the Muslims have attained greater 
equality with the Americans, because now the latter cannot feel secure.) 
 
                                                     
32  George, Alexander L., 1969, “The Operational Code”, International SAtudies Quarterly, 
pp. 190–222. 
PART II  AFTER 911 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
The world after 911: General 
Consequences of 911  
A historic turning-point for Islam 
In the same way as in Western countries, the interviewees emphasise the 
radical effect of 11 September. Only the future can show what the conse-
quences will be, but everyone in the interview sample was agreed that it was 
a political earthquake.  
The most important thing is that Muslims in the heart of capitalism car-
ried out a “successful” attack on the superpower. This takes the struggle of 
the Muslims against the Western hegemony, oppression, harassment and 
hypocrisy into a new phase, a line has been crossed, Muslims can now face 
the Christians more as equals and need not be dominated by the idea of 
Western superiority.33 While not approving of the mass murder of innocent 
civilians, in their hearts the Muslims applaud the attacks because they give a 
glimpse of hope in what they see as a struggle for equality and justice. Here 
are some respondents:  
The events of 11 September did not create profound changes in the inter-
national system, but they accelerated a trend that was already under way. 
The consequences for this region were great. Among other things, they 
affected Iran’s national security policy, strategic position and politics gener-
ally. 
The events marked a turning-point for Muslim intellectuals and radicals. 
For the first time ever, Muslims dared to mount a direct attack on the USA, 
and that in the heart of enemy country. Before, the USA and its policies were 
condemned on the verbal plane, but the radicals did not dare to declare war.  
11 September may be a concept that will affect our thinking even more 
than the Holocaust, because today, unlike the time after the Second World 
War, there is a process of globalisation under way. Postmodern ideas and the 
pluralism that follows globalisation affects the way we think. 
The events, which are so important that they can be compared with the 
Industrial Revolution, mark a turning-point in history. Think of the Second 
World War, the shock changed the course of history. The USA now 
understands that it cannot rule out an attack on its own territory, in the heart 
                                                     
33  See Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, “The fundamental attribution error and 
Arab images of the Gulf war”, Political Psychology, No. 2 1996. 
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of modernism. Architecturally New York is exposed. After what happened, 
the USA will probably not expose itself in the same manner. The country has 
become humbler. The event is an icon – even architecture will now change. 
11 September was a turning-point in that we passed a threshold we had 
never previously crossed. The question was always whether to return vio-
lence for violence. The WTC shows that we are prepared to use violence. 
Even if what happened was officially condemned, Muslims think it was a 
correct thing to do, it was popular among Muslims.  
It changed our perceptions of the USA. Now we understand that they are 
vulnerable too.  
Even if the Iranian respondents consider that the methods used on 11 
September were neither acceptable nor morally defensible, there is little 
doubt that the dramatic assault on the American people’s sense of security 
and superiority also gave them a good feeling. At last the USA got a dose of 
its own medicine, the same sense of humiliation and insecurity caused to the 
Iranians by the CIA coup against Mossadeq in 195334.  
Positive or negative consequences? 
We asked the respondents whether they thought it probable that the events of 
11 September would lead to anything positive.35 The sample divided: one 
part championed a very pessimistic view, the other expressed the hope of a 
better understanding between the USA and the Muslim world. Greater 
insight into the nature of the conflict would change American policy vis-à-
vis the Muslims in a positive direction. However, it was emphasised that 
such an understanding depended on the Americans beginning to think in a 
new way.  
None of the respondents suggested that 11 September might possibly lead 
to changed behaviour on both sides; that, as a result of the shock, Muslims 
would distance themselves more strongly from terrorism. The attribution of 
the unhelpful attitudes to the USA alone was emphasised by the assertion 
that the conservative Administration in the USA represented a problem of 
equal magnitude to terrorism (see “Explaining George Bush” below). 11 
September gave the Administration the chance to make the country more 
powerful yet, the USA has progressed from superpower to hyperpower. It is 
also said that never has the USA had a more ideological Administration, and 
in this way it is a mirror-image of bin Laden.  
American self-examination 
Respondents in the “optimistic camp” claimed that they thought it particu-
larly positive that the USA had for a few months been obliged to reflect on 
its place in the world. For the first time, American intellectuals penetrated 
                                                     
34  Prime Minister 1951–53, seen as the foremost champion of freedom and democracy in 
Iranian history. In his first year in office he nationalised the big British oil interests, but 
the Iranian wish to control their own resources was not accepted by the West, and he was 
overthrown in a CIA-sponsored coup two years later. The fact that this also squashed a 
promising democratic movement was of no interest to the USA and the UK, which prefer-
red a dictatorship that gave them control over Iranian oil. These dramatic events have in 
many ways determined Iranian attitudes to the West. 
35  The replies to this question have been combined with those to more general questions 
about consequences of 911.  
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the “sound barrier” in the tabloid media and communicated with public 
opinion about Islam in a sympathetic and understanding manner. For the first 
time the Americans learnt something useful about Islam. They also realised 
that events in distant parts can affect them, and in the long run this recogni-
tion may have positive consequences for American foreign policy. The day 
the USA realises that the answer to the question, “Why do they hate us so?” 
is to be found in the USA’s own behaviour, there is hope that the superpower 
will change its policies, with beneficial effects on both itself and the Muslim 
world. We will now quote a couple of respondents: 
The USA will naturally do everything it can to prevent something similar 
happening again, but then it is important to ask the question why this hap-
pened. Before, there was a kind of indifference, there was talk about civil 
society, and that was about it. Now, not only does the USA understand that 
the problems of the world are much closer than they thought, they also real-
ise that it is possible to get involved, that action is needed.  
When the USA attacked Afghanistan, even in New York there were pro-
tests against the bombing of innocent civilians. This shows that they had 
become aware that there was something fundamentally wrong and that they 
can no longer sit on the fence.  
American naivety and intellectual laziness 
Not all the respondents, however, were as sanguine about the ability of the 
American people to learn the right lessons from 11 September. Many 
respondents insisted, “The Americans are naive”.  
What happened caused the Americans to ask the question, “Why do they 
hate us so?” A natural response to this question, to the smashing of their 
sense of security, would be to conduct self-examination and pay some atten-
tion to other cultures and identities. But, say these respondents, the USA did 
not react in this way. The critical review was pushed into the background. As 
usual, the Americans proved a disappointment. This unique chance the 
attack offered to reshape the USA as a nation with a human face was frit-
tered away – instead they just did PR.  
We will now quote four respondents: 
 
Europeans are much more interested in and knowledgeable about the 
policies of their governments. The USA is a big country with stable con-
ditions, and so Americans have no particular need to ask questions. There 
has been no permanent change in this attitude.  
 
For the first time people in the USA asked questions about the country’s 
foreign policy. Even educated Americans who don’t normally take an 
interest in foreign affairs, began to ask questions. Unfortunately, this 
behaviour was only short-term and superficial.  
 
If anything positive is to come out of 11 September, the USA must go 
much deeper into the Islamic culture. In order to find an answer to the 
question “Why do they hate us so much?” you must know the culture of 
those who are doing the hating. Understanding in the area of power and 
economics is not enough, it is equally important to have knowledge of the 
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culture. And this the USA does not have. Culture is the basis of human 
behaviour. The USA uses professional PR agencies to change its image in 
the Muslim world. 
 
At an early state in the crisis there were two schools in the USA. The first 
questioned the reasons for all the hatred of the USA. This led to a fine 
public debate, which concluded that a necessary adjustment of policy 
would reduce the hatred. The other school aimed at a rapid military vic-
tory in Afghanistan, which undermined the first school.  
American backlash 
Several respondents emphasised the “backlash” angle, the complete opposite 
of the increased understanding claimed by the optimists. Here are seven 
respondents: 
The right-wingers benefited from 11 September. In the longer term I 
nourish a certain hope that American opinion will think in new paths regard-
ing certain aspects of USA’s foreign policy.  
The Americans rallied round both patriotism and nationalism. 
The local and national reactions in the USA show that the country intends 
to use the events as an instrument to maintain its dominant role in world 
politics. 
The country has exploited the provocation to establish its power politics. 
They have concentrated exclusively on their narrow national interests and 
established their hegemony.  
After 11 September the international system may appear to be much more 
advantageous for the USA. The rather fluid system with several centres of 
power has to a great extent been changed to a monopolar system dominated 
by the USA, its hegemony has been strengthened. It is thanks to 11 Septem-
ber that the USA is a hyperpower today.  
Despite high costs, public opinion has accepted the line that allows the 
USA to interfere in other states’ politics. The hope used to be that economic 
strength would create peace, but now they are trying to create peace by 
military means.  
The gulf between tradition and modernity is getting steadily deeper and 
reminds us of the era of the Crusades. In the same way as previously in his-
tory, this gap leads to the strengthening of militant movements and the 
growth of new ones. That Bush interpreted 11 September as a crusade meant 
that Iran found itself in sharp opposition to the West, a development it may 
be difficult to reverse. 
Sinister interests 
There were even hints that 11 September was welcomed by certain forces in 
the USA. Here are eight respondents: 
Terrorism is not the only problem we are facing. The conservative 
administration in the USA has gradually changed the world. The counter-
weight to this policy must be extended collaboration between all nations.  
The WTC has reinforced the problems between Islam and the West and 
that is dangerous. The USA will exploit the events as an excuse for all kinds 
of action in the Muslim world. We are afraid that the USA will use the 
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events as a stalking-horse to impose its own will on our part of the world. So 
we don’t take this event lightly. 
We should not forget that the Cold War had a positive effect on the 
American economy. 
The events helped to solve the USA’s economic problems. This applies 
particularly to the defence industry, which in the light of the events has the 
power to lead the world into a more militaristic track.  
The USA exploited the events to promote its economic interests. The 
Americans know how to create conflict, which then accelerates the sale of 
their own weapons.  
Bin Laden has given Bush a helping hand in the implementation of his 
political programme. For example, it gives the USA a big technological lead 
over Europe. In Iran we relate politics to individuals, but here it is more 
accurate to speak of a system that is always on guard and that competes for 
international hegemony.  
Before 911 Bush’s agenda was to improve the American economy, but he 
had difficulties getting his policies through. The WTC gave Bush the excuse 
to shower money on the military and thereby create jobs. Bush’ agenda is 
almost exactly that of Ronald Reagan, not to mention the eternal Republican 
programme: spending money on arms instead of welfare and schools.  
The events have helped to solve Bush’s crisis of legitimacy. He now pro-
files himself as a strong leader.  
The pessimists even suggest that 11 September may, in contrast to the 
situation in the Vietnam era, give the USA the excuse to attack anyone it 
likes.  
One respondent said, Israel is a hair in the soup for Bush. After 11 Sep-
tember Israel displayed genius in confusing its own agenda with the USA’s. 
Neither Arabs nor Iranians understand how Israel managed this.  
Explaining George Bush 
In order to balance the cognitive-attribution analysis of bin Laden and al-
Qaida (see Chapter 4 and Table 4), we looked also at the respondents’ causal 
attributions of Bush’s and American behaviour in the same framework of 
dispositional, expressive and situational attributions. The results were spec-
tacularly in accordance with the predictions of theory, namely that “the 
enemy” is explained dispositionally. The results display an absence of plu-
ralistic thinking and nuances, the USA is seen in black-and-white terms, and 
highly coloured by emotion.  
We must emphasise, however, that this table is the result of a specific 
request to “explain” American behaviour in general; causal attributions of 
American behaviour in other and particular contexts may be quite different, 
see Chapter 6 section 1.  
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The respondents’ attributions 
 
Table 5 Causal explanations of Bush’s (the USA’s) behaviour generally 
N = number of causal statements* 
Situational Expressive Dispositional 
4 0 18 
 N=22 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no significance tests are 
reported, nor are percentages given. 
Commentary 
Whereas bin Laden’s behaviour was explained in terms of all three models, 
but with a preponderance of the “sympathetic” situational and expressive 
attributions, the behaviour of the USA was explained almost overwhelm-
ingly in terms of dispositional attribution, that is, with an unsympathetic 
focus on permanent characteristics of the actor rather than the situation in 
which he finds himself. Moreover, such a focus on the actor’s characteristics 
at the expense of all other causal factors tends to bring in emotion, as these 
are characteristics one either likes or dislikes, is for or against. We neither 
love nor loathe situational constraints, only people and peoples.  
The intrinsic characteristics of the USA cited by the interviewees reveal a 
deep hatred of the superpower. What they first and foremost connect with 
the country, is various forms of humiliation. Statements within this category 
recur with the highest frequency. Very often the respondents use the word 
“humiliation”, at other times they imply it: we hear about a power that 
imposes its will on others, that is not willing to negotiate until the other side 
has raised the white flag, that threatens people into obedience. The word 
“arrogant” is also used. Among the clearest expressions of a dispositional 
attribution, however, are phrases like “insatiable hunger” or “burning desire” 
for absolute hegemony and world empire. The superpower has an almost 
pathological need to control everybody and therefore behaves in a deviant 
manner.  
Only by way of exception do we hear causal explanations of American 
policy that are contextual or situational, as for example that the USA is 
exploiting its superior military position to secure its interests and obtain 
influence, like any other superpower would.  
The enemy image 
An interesting feature of the enemy image the respondents are drawing is 
that it is restricted to the USA. Given the European great powers’ former 
colonisation and interference in the oil industry, not least the British, we 
would have expected the respondents to tar all the Western countries with 
the same brush. But their picture of the West is actually multifaceted; the 
USA stands virtually alone as a representative of the evil and abnormal in 
international politics – in other words, as the “Great Satan” in Khomeini’s 
terminology.  
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The respondents paint us a picture of a nation with a shallow approach to 
foreign policy and little knowledge of Muslim cultures. Instead of displaying 
empathy with and understanding of Muslim culture, the USA is obsessed 
with doing PR for itself. In contrast to the more aware and reflective Euro-
peans, the Americans do not question this policy. It is true that in the imme-
diate aftermath of 11 September there were signs of a change of heart, but 
these proved to be transitory.  
Frustration at the attack resulted in patriotism, nationalism and jingoism, 
and thus strengthened the legitimacy of the right-wing president. The new 
trust that the people reposed in the president, which made it possible for him 
to continue his policies, was not the result of any election, but a gift from the 
perpetrators behind the attack on Manhattan. Terrorism gave Washington 
increased freedom of action, which it used inter alia to award Israel a more 
privileged position and thereby free hands to conduct a heavy-handed policy 
vis-à-vis the Palestinians. 
Instead of the natural reaction to such a shocking event, namely humility, 
critical reflection and innovative thinking towards a positive choice of path, 
the opposite occurred. Instead of trying to solve the problems that underlay 
11 September, the superpower is endeavouring to exploit the attack in its 
own interest, building up its military and economic power in order to do 
whatever it wants in the Muslim world. The attack was the springboard for 
an aggressive and blinkered policy, the crudest possible power politics based 
on military technology.  
In short, the interviewees see a superpower dominated by imperatives 
that resemble the Satanic forces beloved of the conspiracy theorists. The 
USA has grown from a superpower to a hyperpower that wants to command 
everybody and cooperate with nobody. It is out of control.  
Comparison of the two analyses 
These descriptions of the USA’s choices and foreign policy after 11 Septem-
ber by and large coincide with analyses in Western countries including the 
USA itself. In this way the respondents said nothing new. What was striking, 
however, is the interviewees’ stereotyping of “the Americans” as superficial, 
at the same time as they themselves seem to suffer from the same kind of 
shallowness and reluctance to criticise their own side.  
The strange thing is that none of the respondents saw fit to comment on 
the fact that the trigger for this negative development in American policy 
was an act of terrorism carried out by actors from the Muslim world. Instead, 
they criticise the American national character and style, which suggests that 
there is something wholly unique about this people, who do not behave like 
“normal” nations. When terrorism fails to lead to self-searching and studies 
of Muslim culture, the fault lies with the American people.  
We saw in Chapters 2 and 3 how the respondent sample was markedly 
uninterested in criticising their own culture, the Muslim world, other than by 
reference to isolation and conspiracy theorising. The same lack of self-
examination with which they reproach the Americans is clearly absent in the 
party with whom they identify, defend and sympathise with.  
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The US versus Europe 
We asked the respondents whether they thought European reactions to 11 
September differed substantially from American reactions. An overwhelm-
ing majority, seventeen to four, described European attitudes and policies as 
quite different from American, although some of this majority emphasised 
that Europe lacked the power to do anything about it. The way the United 
Kingdom always follows the USA rather than the Europeans was noted.  
One reason for this was an innate European preference for diplomacy and 
conflict resolution, which one respondent attributed to experiences in the two 
world wars. This same respondent was not afraid to spell out the implication 
that, in contrast, the USA was devoted to “militarism”.  
Another main reason for the European difference is, according to the 
respondents, that Europeans simply have a greater understanding of the 
Muslim world. Geographical proximity, greater vulnerability, trading inter-
ests and cultural openness all contribute to this superior knowledge of the 
Middle East.  
This applied in particular to Iran. The fact that the USA has isolated itself 
from Iran, has no presence there and no dealings with Iranians, has left its 
mark. The Europeans are active in Iran, ad so they naturally understand the 
country better. One respondent claims that his German contacts greatly dis-
approved of American policy but were afraid to speak out.  
Recipes and warnings 
Our question about possible positive consequences of 911 was comple-
mented by another, asking what might lead to a worsening and what to an 
improvement of relations between the US and the Muslim world. 
Improvement 
There was a wide variety in the respondents’ suggestions for improvement of 
relations. We received five suggestions from nine respondents that may be 
categorised as belonging to the realm of geopolitics: dismantling Iraqi sanc-
tions, reduction of military presence, a different attitude to authoritarian 
Arab regimes, more humane treatment of Muslim prisoners (one each) and, 
of course, Palestine (five respondents). The last was expressed in terms of a 
more neutral involvement, of regarding the conflict from a humanitarian per-
spective instead of a conflict between Christianity and Islam and following 
ethical norms. One respondent said, “The USA is the only actor that can pre-
vent the Palestine issue leading to catastrophe”.  
However, sixteen respondents made replies touching on nine factors that 
we may classify in terms not of geopolitics but of psychology. These ranged 
from the very general (“better intentions”, “flexible thinking”) and so forth 
to the highly specific, such as the respondent who thought that the Iranian 
cinema had a positive role to play. Another thought that, “Formerly it was 
the prophets, now I think it is the artists who can create a better world”. One 
interviewee suggested that the Muslim world should meet American threats 
with “a disarming smile”, thus eroding any support the USA might receive 
from the rest of the world.  
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The single word that recurred most often (eight responses) was “dia-
logue”. One respondent emphasised that this should be between the NGOs, 
between academics, between elites, between states and between diplomats: 
I myself was invited to a conference in the USA, but was afraid to go. I 
was afraid of accusations of espionage for the USA and of going to jail. We 
had greater freedom before, the conservatives have become more powerful.  
A couple specifically mentioned the Huntington thesis on the “clash of 
civilisations”, but one of them emphasised that President Khatami had sug-
gested a model solution: 
Dialogue is more difficult for Muslims than for people in the West 
because the Muslims are the weaker party. It should nevertheless be added 
that the Muslim countries contain people working for mutual understanding 
between Islam and the West. If the stronger party is welcoming and mag-
nanimous, the weaker party will be conciliated. The West must be willing to 
understand the traumas that the Muslim world has experienced down the 
ages.  
Aggravation 
The other half of the question produced something like a mirror-image, in 
that the “spiritual” factors mentioned were outnumbered by specific geopo-
litical dangers. For instance, one respondent cited the USA’s continuing to 
ignore international Muslim organisations, one mentioned Muslim civilisa-
tion’s sense of encirclement, and three emphasised the baleful effect of 
Western propaganda, oversimplification and stereotyping. One respondent 
pointed out that more than a hundred of those arrested in the wake of 911 
were professors at American universities; Bush was treating all Muslims as 
terrorists. Language is a factor, and one respondent complained about Bush’s 
use of the term “crusade”. Another pointed out that the Palestinian casualties 
were dehumanised by being presented in American media solely as statistics, 
whereas Israeli victims had names. 
As against these half-dozen statements seeing the continued failure to 
understand and appreciate the Muslim world as factors likely to lead to a 
worsening of relations, however, we received nineteen that concerned spe-
cific policies – plus some rather uncategorisable reflections. One respondent 
summarised the aggravating factors in two words – “Bush’s policies!” 
Another mentioned the strengthening of extremists in the USA, in the 
Muslim world and elsewhere, while two emphasised the dangers posed by 
collapse of client Arab governments. One respondent mentioned new 
American military operations, while another four were more specific and 
referred to an invasion of Iraq.  
Not surprisingly, nine interviewees had something to say about Israel 
and Palestine, emphasising how USA’s “myopic” support for Ariel Sharon 
will continue to lead to escalating terrorism. Never has Israel behaved as 
violently as now, said one. Another was deeply pessimistic:  
The core of the Palestinian problem is on the psychological plane, but 
what is expressed on the surface is territorial and political demands. Accu-
mulated and repressed aggression is released through violence. The conflict 
over Palestine, in which the whole world is involved, is insoluble, because 
everything today revolves around Jerusalem.  

Chapter 5  
The world after 911: “The War on  
Terror” 
After our survey of the elite respondents’ opinions of the post-911 world in 
general, and the well-springs of American and European attitudes and 
actions, we turn to the more specific topic of what the Bush Administration 
calls the “war on terror”. The fact that it is not called “the war on al-Qaida” 
suggests that this is, and is intended to be, a very open-ended concept, and 
perhaps even an “endless war” against ever-new enemies. While a covert 
police and intelligence war on the terrorist networks in both East and West is 
no doubt in progress, as we saw in Chapter 1, the rhetoric of the “war on ter-
ror” is highly geared to military operations against states that are considered, 
with varying degrees of evidence and improbability, to have been “responsi-
ble” for 911. So far there appear to be three candidates for this “war on ter-
ror” – Afghanistan (ongoing during the interviews), Iraq (at that point in the 
future, but regarded as largely inevitable) and Iran itself.  
The war in Afghanistan 
We also asked our respondent sample about the actions the USA and its 
allies had taken after 11 September, also asking if they could have acted dif-
ferently. We focused on the war in Afghanistan and the question what would 
have happened if the USA had not gone to war. The hypothetical form of 
these questions was to stimulate the respondents to think alternatively and 
spontaneously, to produce subtle and unexpected answers. Contrariwise, we 
wanted to avoid the conventional group thinking that tends to attach to offi-
cial positions. Previous experience with elite interviews shows that this 
approach gets the most out of the respondents intellectually speaking. 
Respondent sympathy and hostility 
Sympathetic responses 
Many of the interviewees, like the following eight, claimed that the war in 
Afghanistan was inevitable. The “logic of the situation” dictated that it had 
to happen.  
With bin Laden, al-Qaida and the Taliban in mind, I don’t think so [that 
the USA could have acted differently].  
The USA is always trying to create stable conditions for itself.  
Here it was a question both of the legitimacy of the government and sur-
vival as a superpower. For the first time since the American Civil War, there 
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was a military attack on American territory to which anyone would have 
made a military response.  
Theoretically the USA could have reacted differently, but the country had 
been deeply wounded, the politicians were under heavy pressure.  
This had to do with the USA’s self-image. The domestic atmosphere 
forced Bush to act, anything else would have been perceived as weakness. 
The attack on the USA gained the country sympathy internationally as well. 
If the USA had not reacted, governments that supported terrorist groups 
would have been encouraged. With their actions, these governments forced 
the USA to take responsibility.  
Bush had to act to get society back on its feet and to safeguard the 
country’s international prestige. Lost legitimacy would have damaged the 
Republican Party and made it easy for the Democrats to undermine their 
position.  
It would have been a defeat for the USA’s reputation as a hegemonic 
power. If, in the situation, the superpower had not found a target to strike at, 
questions would have been asked about the American intelligence apparatus.  
There was no other alternative. Without a military attack it would have 
been impossible to break the Taliban. Because Afghanistan is a country with 
little contact with the outside world, political and economic sanctions alone 
would have been useless.  
Several respondents emphasised the brutal nature of the Taliban regime 
and the necessity of getting rid of it. However, many interviewees, while 
understanding how and why the USA was compelled to act and thus sup-
porting the war in principle, were unhappy with the means and other aspects.  
Ambiguous sympathy 
The USA is a big country. It’s like with the elephant – when it moves, it is 
bound to crush things.  
Sanctions were not an adequate solution. If Bush did not act, he would 
have domestic problems. Deciding on a military solution was not a bad solu-
tion, but the USA should have listened more to others, coordinated every-
thing better.  
After the WTC, military action in Afghanistan was the only way the USA 
could react.  
But it is important to emphasise that Afghanistan was in a special situa-
tion as regards a response to the challenges the USA was facing. Nor must 
we forget that ten years ago the USA was supporting the fundamentalists as 
a bulwark against Soviet influence. The American attitude to Iran was also a 
contributory cause to the USA’s supporting the Taliban. The USA had pre-
viously supported the Taliban and they supported Iraq when we fought them. 
The most violent period Kabul has experienced was when the USA gave its 
approval to Taliban policy.  
We understand that the USA had to strike back, but what is more difficult 
to understand is that the country exploited the events to settle old scores that 
were not related to the WTC. 
It was difficult for the USA not to go to war, but in a broader perspective 
it was not rational. If the USA had first and foremost emphasised the prob-
lems of injustice and national rights, the country would have approached the 
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original ideals on which the country was founded. But American politicians 
act like politicians everywhere. To safeguard their existence they had to 
make an immediate response. It would have been much harder work to use 
the events to create a different way of thinking.  
The UN is based on universal values, but the USA ignored the organisa-
tion. No one likes the Taliban, but if Iran had not helped to weaken them, the 
USA would not have triumphed so quickly. 
If we ignore the USA’s excessive violence, this was a natural reaction to 
such a serious attack. But the unnecessary suffering made me unhappy. 
Instead of aerial bombing the USA could have used special forces and 
thereby avoided killing innocent civilians.  
More limited operations would have been more likely to lead to the arrest 
of bin Laden.  
Hostility  
Some respondents declined even to say “Yes, but” and condemned the whole 
Afghan operation outright. They think that the USA ought to have done 
something different, and predict that it will end in tears. Here are three such 
respondents: 
Even before the WTC, the USA wanted to attack Afghanistan. The plans 
were in a desk drawer, but bin Laden gave them a good excuse.  
National pride also made them act. There were groups in the USA that 
thought rationally and wanted to proceed in a milder manner, but they lost 
out. Strong feelings in American public opinion gave the government a free 
hand.  
If Clinton had been in power, the reaction would have been milder. Bush 
the Cowboy played tough guy. But it is very naïve to think that one man 
controls everything – there is a power behind him, one that is hard to dis-
cern.  
The USA could perhaps have reacted differently. They chose the line of 
least resistance. There might have been other feasible courses that would 
have served the USA better:  
Anger and revenge motivated the Americans to the air war. The USA 
wanted to show who was boss. Instead of taking a day at a time and thinking 
carefully through the problem, the USA was the victim of the “quick success 
syndrome”. 
The USA could have acted differently by concentrating on exterminating 
the dangerous terrorist nests around the world and at the same time trying to 
do something about the causes of the hatred of the country. Here are eight 
respondents:  
If the USA had not gone to war, movements all over the world would 
have understood that the USA was also vulnerable and thus open to negotia-
tions. A negotiation line would have given the USA a moral edge vis-à-vis 
the Muslim world. Opinion tends to sympathise with the victim. Instead of 
taking up arms, they should have created a USA with a human face, now 
that would have strengthened the nation and created a positive image. The 
situation now is that a pre-existing negative picture of the USA has been cre-
ated. 
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First the USA ought to have made a serious attempt to find out why it 
happened, and then acted in concert with the world community to stop any-
thing similar happening again. Globalisation is the keyword. The events 
should have been taken up at a global level as a global problem.  
If the USA had proceeded more cautiously, the country would have 
achieved wide support in the Muslim world.  
In the war on terror the USA should have made greater use of interna-
tional channels, the UN, the EU and even NATO. 
The USA chose military solutions. It should have proceeded more wisely 
and above all acted through the UN, not unilaterally.  
The USA could have made more active use of diplomatic channels. For a 
more coordinated approach to the terrorism question, NATO should have 
had a stronger role.  
Air war was not required to overthrow the Taliban. A collaboration with 
Pakistan and Iran would have yielded the same results.  
This is not a conflict about military power, but about injustice. 
Many respondents saw the terrorists bouncing back, perhaps in even 
greater strength. Here are six in this camp:  
Instead of invading Afghanistan, the USA should have thought it over 
and sought long-term solutions. One things is certain, Afghanistan will not 
solve the terrorist problem. The people who do these things, will come back 
in greater force.  
The USA is not going to win the war in Afghanistan. The effect of the 
war is a reinforcement of a negative image that the third world already has of 
the USA. The perception of the USA as a country with the will to act multi-
laterally is gone. Hatred of the USA will grow in strength.  
Another consequence of the USA’s policy is that it gives Ariel Sharon a 
free hand to commit his crimes.  
In the short term the war, which President Bush exploited to his own 
advantage, made him popular. But the popularity will not last, before too 
long the war will make him less respected.  
If bin Laden and his groups are arrested, they will be replaced by new bin 
Ladens and new groups.  
September 11 will happen again, and with broader support from the man 
in the street. The conviction that it serves America right will be greater.  
The great degree of understanding expressed by the majority of the 
respondents regarding the USA’s decision to go to war in Afghanistan came 
as a surprise to us. Astonishingly many find good arguments for how the 
USA could not have done anything different, passivity would have had 
catastrophic consequences, such as a strengthening of al-Qaida’s role in 
international politics and a global militarisation of political Islam.  
Here the almost ritual condemnation of the superpower that dominates 
the answers to other questions, and caused us to classify them as “dispositio-
nal attributions”, is largely absent. It is reasonable to believe that the cause 
of this is that the respondents are moving from symbolic politics to pragma-
tism. Where political situations are conducive, conservative forces in Iran 
seize any chance they get to wave the banner of the Satanic enemy image of 
the USA, so as in this way to breathe new life into the fading revolutionary 
dogmas of Khomeini’s day. It is quite another matter when Iran’s national 
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interests in its own back yard are concerned – symbolism must take a back 
seat to national interest.  
Iran is most definitely interested in seeing the Taliban overthrown, and 
this was to be the introduction to what we might call a pragmatic collabora-
tion between Iran and the superpower. A honeymoon began, which soon 
gave way to bickering – over for example safe conduct for al-Qaida soldiers 
through Iranian territory, and shiploads of weapons to the Palestinians. This 
suggests that ultraconservatives were circumventing official policy and 
operating on their own, which is by no means unusual and weakens Iran as a 
nation-state, showing that the country is at war with itself and unable to 
coordinate its foreign policy. 
Despite this strife and confusion, the collaboration over Afghanistan was 
the beginnings of something new, even if the high hopes of a détente with 
the USA were dashed (see next chapter). Political developments in Afghani-
stan are of great interest precisely because they so clearly show how the 
politics of symbolism recedes into the background in Iran’s own vicinity. 
Pragmatism and symbolism co-exist – together with unofficial collaboration 
with the USA, the anti-American rhetoric lives its own life in the public 
space.  
At the same time, our sample condemns various aspects of the American 
military operations, and on a general level there is no one expressing support 
of “the war on terror” as such.  
Respondent causal attributions 
If the respondent statements on Afghanistan are analysed for causal expla-
nations within the framework of cognitive attribution theory, we find a quite 
different pattern to that generated by very general questions about the causes 
of American behaviour (see above).  
 
Table 6 Causal explanations of the American war in Afghanistan 
N = number of causal statements* 
Situational Expressive Dispositional 
18 1 19 
 N=38 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no significance tests 
are reported, nor are percentages given. 
 
Respondents who say that the USA ought to have done something different 
have been coded as making dispositional attributions, since this implies that 
the USA had freedom of choice and therefore acted not under constraint but 
in accordance with its “nature”. Even with the addition of these contra-factu-
als, however, we see that number of situational attributions has increased 
drastically in relation to Table 5.  
Moreover, those who support the USA role in Afghanistan are explaining 
this solely in situational terms. This represents a resolution of a cognitive 
dissonance problem. Just as we explain the bad behaviour of our enemies in 
terms of their evil dispositions, so that we can avoid the insight that, in their 
shoes, we would have done exactly the same, so too we explain the good 
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behaviour of our enemies in terms of their constraints, so that we can avoid 
saying anything favourable about them. It is thus possible for a respondent to 
make a scathing condemnation of the USA, with hostile dispositional attri-
butions, in the general questions, and then producing a situational explana-
tion of something that, as a patriotic Iranian, the respondent regards as a 
good deed, namely the destruction of the Taliban. At the same time the 
“hawks” are playing safe by saying that the USA could have achieved the 
same result by better means, with less suffering and so forth.  
The war on Iraq  
The rhetoric of the “war on terror”, “terrorist states” and “the Axis of Evil” 
suggests that the USA has a “shopping list” of countries that it intends to 
deal with, by means that are not specified in advance in all cases, but that 
may easily include invasion and occupation. When we were in Teheran 
interviewing the elite respondents (March–April 2002), the conquest of Iraq 
still lay in the future, although it was not difficult to see it coming. We did 
not ask the interviewees whether there would be a war, only why the USA 
wished to go to war, and what the consequences would be.  
The reasons for the war 
 
Table 7 Perception of the USA’s motives for going to war against Iraq  
N = number of statements* 
 
The USA is seeking geopolitical hegemony  
 
6 
Regime change 4 
Iraq is threatening Israel 2 
Need for an enemy image 2 
Reaction to 11 September 1 
Weapons of mass destruction 1 
Democratisation of Iraq 1 
 N = 17 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no significance tests 
are reported, nor are percentages given. 
 
The responses to this question confirm not only the results from other ques-
tions in this study but also the results obtained in other studies that we have 
carried out in Morocco and Tunisia.36 The Muslims have formed an image of 
a superpower that wants hegemony both locally and globally. Iraq is an 
                                                     
36  See Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, “The fundamental attribution error and 
Arab images of the Gulf war”, Political Psychology, No. 2 1996. 
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obstacle to the superpower’s ambitions in this respect. Alexander George 
operates with the terms “Master Belief” and “Core Belief” to denote percep-
tions that are never questioned and that form the bedrock for a series of other 
perceptions regarding a problem complex.37 Any change in the perception 
that the USA wants hegemony will lead to other changes in the view of the 
USA, because so many perceptions rest on this core or master belief. As the 
table shows, this core belief of the Muslim belief system dominates the 
interview responses.  
Our Iranian elite respondents therefore operated within familiar cognitive 
frameworks. The revolutionary rhetoric in Iran has filled the public space 
with an especially rigid enemy image of the USA, so that the respondents 
can easily fall back on pre-established beliefs. For this reason the results 
were fairly predictable. Our question provoked merely an extrapolation from 
pre-existing cognitive structures, and we could have made an educated guess 
that “hegemony” would be the dominant explanation for the American war 
on Iraq.  
However, there is also some emphasis on the USA’s wanting a regime 
change, due largely, in the respondents’ opinion, to Bush personally; his 
desire either for revenge for the assassination plot against his father or else to 
continue his father’s work or correct his father’s mistake in stopping the last 
Gulf War short of Saddam’s overthrow. In equal third place come the 
removal of the threat Saddam Hussein was considered to pose to Israel, and 
the American psychological need for an enemy.  
It is interesting that the main reason the USA had been giving for the war 
on Iraq,38 the removal of Saddam’s “weapons of mass destruction”, is quite 
peripheral to the respondents’ argumentation. The notion that Iraq can 
threaten the USA appeared far-fetched to the sample. Similarly, another of 
the proclaimed American goals, to introduce democracy to Iraq, hardly fea-
tured in the responses, and the same is true of the shock of 11 September.  
In other words, the respondents did not entirely ignore the USA’s “offi-
cial” motivations for the war on Iraq, but assigned them very little weight. 
Far more central to their perceptions are other and ulterior motives. The 
USA has a hidden agenda; the official reasons are, they think, a smoke-
screen for control of the Persian Gulf so that the states of the region have to 
submit to American power. Several give the impression that the USA’s rapid 
victory in Afghanistan has made the Americans arrogant, inspiring them to 
start new wars to secure power and control not only over the Persian Gulf 
but globally.  
We illustrate this section with some of the respondent statements, one 
from each category:  
If the USA attacks Iraq, it will be to achieve what they consider a better 
strategic position. By taking Iraq, they reckon on crushing most of the power 
the region will have in the future.  
Bush wants to complete what his father should have done – remove 
Saddam Hussein. The USA’s relationship to Saddam Hussein is based on 
                                                     
37  George, Alexander L., “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of 
Political Leaders and Decision-making”, International Studies Quarterly, XIII, p. 190–
122, 1969. Daryl Bem uses the term “primitive belief”, see Beliefs, Attitudes and Human 
Affairs, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Belmont, California, 1970. 
38  “Regime change” was not then as prominent in American arguments as it later became. 
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bitterness. The rapid victory in Afghanistan has reinforced these negative 
aspects of American policy.  
It is because the USA wants to replace dark patches [on the map?] with 
its own light. By dark patches I mean weapons of mass destruction. Iran is 
the darkest patch, Iraq less so. The USA wants to test Iraq to make the coun-
try show its cards.  
When all Americans, including the President, now take all kinds of secu-
rity more seriously, this is connected with the fact that it was New York and 
Washington that were hit. The President looks ahead and the question he 
asks is: What can happen if the USA does not act now? That is why the USA 
is talking about Iraq.  
Iraq mobilises the American people because the focus on Iraq reminds 
them about and reinforces the image of the enemies of the USA.  
Iraq will become an important part of the new Middle East that they aim 
to create after peace has been made with Israel. A precondition for the new 
Middle East becoming a reality is economically and politically liberal states. 
It is therefore important that the political conditions in Iraq be changed.  
The consequences of the war 
We took the opportunity to pose the hypothetical question of the consequen-
ces of such a war, because it was one that greatly concerned and excited the 
respondents. At the time of writing the war has already taken place, but we 
shall let the answers stand, partly because many consequences are long-
range and remain to be seen, partly to see whether their predictions as to 
short-range consequences have been fulfilled.39 The responses do not greatly 
lend themselves to quantification, as interviewees tend to cover several bases 
and free-associate rather too widely. Instead, the consequences will be 
grouped together.  
In contrast to the question of why the USA was going to attack Iraq, the 
question of the consequences did not suggest any pre-digested answers 
stemming from the Iranian revolutionary rhetoric and the “party line”. The 
fact that the question was hypothetical (when it was asked, not now) made 
for a greater chance of getting answers based on affective rather than cogni-
tive structures. 
Destabilisation 
All war is unpredictable, and the sample was afraid that anything might hap-
pen. A couple of respondents mentioned interruption in the oil supply, and 
one even feared the use of nuclear weapons. This at least we now know has 
not happened. Similarly, some interviewees emphasised the loss of human 
life, which unfortunately we cannot say is an unfulfilled prediction. As we 
saw in the previous section, there is no confidence in the USA’s expressed 
war aims. 
Many interviewees warned of destabilisation, and that on several levels. 
First is the danger that an attack on Iraq will drag other states into the con-
flict. The possibility of Turkish intervention against the Kurds was men-
                                                     
39  The respondent who predicted that France would be the only European country to oppose 
the war wins no prizes. 
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tioned, and indeed, at one point of the war, when the Peshmerga took Kirkuk 
and Mosul, this looked imminent. A couple thought that, if the war grew 
protracted, other Arab states would be forced by the pressure of their popu-
lations’ outrage to come in on the Iraqi side. Another thought the protests 
would only be verbal. One respondent thought that Iran might enter the war, 
despite the fact that the grass-roots did not share the anti-Americanism of 
the elite, in order to prevent encirclement; another that Iran might intervene 
if the war resulted in a pro-Western government in Iraq.  
No Iranians have any reason to love Saddam Hussein. Even so, one 
respondent stated that getting rid of Saddam would solve nothing. Another 
even thought that since there was no alternative, the USA does not want to 
change the Iraqi regime right now. A third emphasised that there are no 
quick fixes in Iraq. Several emphasised that their success in Afghanistan was 
leading the Americans into false confidence; Iraq is not Afghanistan and the 
same methods cannot be applied. The USA can install a new Hamid Karzai 
in Iraq, said one, but that will not ameliorate the frustration of the Iraqi 
people; others claimed that there was no possible Iraqi equivalent of Karzai.  
Other respondents remarked that it all depended on the USA’s tactics: it 
would be positive if the USA could get rid of Saddam cleanly, but devastat-
ing the country was another matter. Refugee flows into Iran were also a con-
cern. 
Another factor in destabilisation was the perception of a new age of colo-
nialism and the effect this will have on the Muslim street. Two respondents 
thought that other Gulf states would be very pleased to see the back of 
Saddam Hussein, and that anger in the streets is of no practical significance 
for policy. Even though the regimes collaborate with the USA, they serve the 
people up with anti-American rhetoric. Others, however, claimed that an 
American war against Iraq without a regional consensus would have serious 
repercussions for Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where bin Laden is a popular 
hero. The war can thus further encourage his brand of fundamentalism and 
militancy, and --- provided that the war lasts long enough – fundamentalists 
from the entire Muslim world may go to Iraq to fight.  
The question of the legitimacy and acceptance of American actions was 
linked to the issue of Palestine. Both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes derive(d) 
legitimacy from their progressive positions on this, and should there be 
peace in Palestine, both would become very isolated and the US very power-
ful. On the other hand, the USA’s double standards in the Persian Gulf and 
in Palestine were offensive, and the respondents have no confidence in the 
declared American goals of introducing greater democracy into the entire 
Gulf. Actual American behaviour in the region completely undermines all 
such ethical posturing. 
Fragmentation 
Several respondents discussed the fragmentation of Iraq, with secession by 
the Shi’i population in the south. However, they dissented from the usual 
Western image of the Shi’a as unconditionally wanting to break away: the 
Shi’i Muslims in Iraq are nationalists, they are supporters of the state of Iraq, 
said one. Others asserted that the Shi’a sympathised with Iran, regarded it as 
a bastion of their religion, desired an alliance with it, but would probably not 
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want to be actually incorporated into Iran; they would rather have a better 
position within Iraq, with an end to discrimination, or a federal solution with 
Baghdad, or form their own state. Moreover, not all the Shi’a are in fact so 
subordinate, for it is Iraq, and not Iran, that has the two vital Shi’i pilgrimage 
cities of Najaf (the burial-place of ‘Ali) and Karbala (the site of the martyr-
dom of Hussein). At the time of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Westerners had 
the impression, abetted by Khomeini himself, that the centre of Shi’i theo-
logical gravity was Qom, but in fact this seminary town is outranked by the 
Iraqi centres.  
We felt a strong sense of expectation on the part of the respondents that a 
war would put an end to the oppression of the Shi’a of the Gulf, that after 
the war they would play a stronger role in regional politics. This they expec-
ted to strengthen Iran’s position, at the same time as frightening the Sunni-
ruled states. If the Shi’a did not get that stronger and regionally destabilising 
position, however, they would be no better off than under Saddam. As for 
Kurdish independence, this would affect both Iran and Turkey.  
Consequences for Iran 
Despite this, to our surprise some of our elite Iranians had hopes that the 
removal of Saddam Hussein would lead to a democratisation of Iraq that 
could in turn “infect” Iran itself. One claimed that if conditions in Afghani-
stan and Iraq improved, Iranian people might say they preferred to live in 
these countries, which would accelerate liberalisation. A democratic Iraqi 
government might be able to pressure Iran to normalise its relations with the 
West and strengthen the existing political trends towards market liberalism 
and political pluralism. If this seems to be a contradiction of their acute 
scepticism that democracy is in fact on the American agenda, it is a contra-
diction in their own attitudes. The reverse of this coin is that an American 
failure in Iraq would affect the Iranian situation in the opposite direction; 
this would put wind in the sails of revolutionary dogmatic forces, which 
would intensify their anti-American discourse. The politics of symbolism 
would defeat the politics of feasibility.  
On the other hand, a Western government in Iraq will weaken Iran’s 
position in the oil market. Iran will have to compete with Iraq and follow the 
latter’s rules, which are more in accord with global norms. That is, Iranians 
will have less free hands in negotiating with Western oil companies than 
they are today. Competition with Iraq for Western investment may mean the 
end of the current practice of offset purchase agreements. No foreign com-
pany now has any right to own interests in Iranian oil and gas fields; they 
are awarded a right to develop a field at a given price and receive an agreed 
return on their investment. When the plant has been amortised and the 
developer has received his share, the plant passes to Iranian authorities or 
companies. Western oil companies will prefer to invest in Iraq, but because 
Iran needs Western capital, it may have to abandon such special contracts – 
which will be a traumatic step, as these offset agreements are enshrined in 
the Constitution. Another economic consequence of the conjunction of a 
Western-oriented Iraq and a conservative Iran was capital flight.  
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Respondents felt that Iran had been “encircled”, as 911 led to the sta-
tioning of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  
Foreign troops have been stationed in Afghanistan. The new situation has 
had a negative impact on economic activity.  
It has strengthened our feeling of being encircled by the USA, and very 
much increased the feeling that the USA is our powerful neighbour. This has 
led to an extensive debate in Iran on whether the way to go is to fight this 
mighty neighbour or adapt to it.  
The USA is advancing ever closer to our frontiers. With its offensive 
interference in the region it had previously secured a foothold in the Gulf, 
Central Asia and Northern Iraq, and has now also become our big neighbour 
in Afghanistan.  
Finally, several respondents feared that the USA would now go to war 
against Iran itself. We shall look at this perception at the end of the next 
chapter, in the context of an analysis of “the Axis of Evil”.  
 

PART III IRAN 
 
Chapter 6  
Iran and “the Axis of Evil” 
Introduction 
In his State of the Union message to Congress on 29 January 2002, President 
Bush launched the expression, “the Axis of Evil”, to include Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea: “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of 
evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.” 
We have already reflected on the rhetoric of this slogan, in the Introduc-
tion, noting how it deployed the two components, “Axis” with its memories 
of the Second World War, and “Evil” with its eschatological religious 
thinking. In particular we noted how it implied not only that certain geo-
graphical regions were the source of the Evil in the world, but also that they 
were all in alliance with one another in order to promote that Evil.  
In terms of American intentions, the launching of the phrase “Axis of 
Evil” to supplement the “War on Terror” marks a new phase, in which the 
focus shifted from bin Laden and al-Qaida – almost certainly the perpetrators 
of the 911 attacks – with their allies and bases in Afghanistan, to a series of 
other states, whose involvement in that operation ranged from minimal to 
non-existent. The uncharitable might link this shift to the failure to catch 
Osama bin Laden, in that the Administration had a need to show that it was 
still “doing something”, even if that something was unconnected with bring-
ing the WTC attackers to justice.  
The key concepts in this shift have been firstly “terrorist states”, which 
implies the “indivisibility of terrorism” and therefore the collective responsi-
bility for 911 of any state so designated; and secondly, “weapons of mass 
destruction”, because anyone who possesses them may be tempted to sell or 
give them to “terrorists”, thus evoking fears of chemical, biological or even 
nuclear attacks on American cities. However, anyone who already possesses 
nuclear weapons is immune from attack, as for instance Pakistan, whose 
military intelligence service was the chief sponsor of the Taliban, and possi-
bly North Korea. That none of this applies to American allies goes without 
saying.  
At first the USA concentrated on the Iranian development, with Russian 
assistance, of a nuclear power station in Bushehr. The Americans consider 
that this can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Subsequently, the USA 
learnt, to its own surprise, that Iran had a nuclear weapons development pro-
gramme near the city of Natanz. Secretary of State Colin Powell used this as 
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an example of how a nation determined to develop nuclear weapons can 
keep the process hidden from inspectors and other outsiders. 
The topos of “terrorist states with weapons of mass destruction” is there-
fore confined to hostile states that may, at some time in the future, acquire 
nuclear weapons which they may, at some time in the future, possibly be 
tempted to bestow on terrorists. Iran most definitely qualifies under these 
criteria, in that it is considered a hostile state, has a nuclear programme and 
cannot prove that it will not so bestow these weapons, since no one can 
prove a negative. The American government’s approach to the burden of 
proof was amply demonstrated in the case of Iraq, where it asserted that 
neither the USA nor the UN needed to prove that Iraq had WMDs, but that 
the Iraqis had to prove that they didn’t, and that any evidence presented was 
a fake.  
Two other reasons for granting Iran membership in “the Axis of Evil” are 
probably the theocracy’s general hostility to the USA (opposition to Good 
must necessarily be Evil) and its attitude to terrorism; generally, that Iran 
does not consider the Palestinians’ struggle against the Israelis to constitute 
terrorism, and specifically, the country’s support for Hizbollah in Lebanon.  
That Washington is not yet talking about the invasion and occupation of 
Iran should give no grounds for complacency, as the whole story of the “war 
on terror” has been one of vague sliding transitions. When the phrase was 
launched, Iraq was never mentioned. Then came increasing American pres-
sure to let the UN inspectors do their jobs, then came the determination not 
to believe the inspectors, then came the express aim of regime change. At 
first regime change could mean Saddam cooperating, but later it meant 
removing him by force. Analogous to this, it is not difficult to imagine the 
Americans requiring the shutdown of Bushehr and Natanz, then demanding 
that Iran prove the non-existence of other programmes, then refusing to 
accept anything as evidence, then declaring that the only way to be sure is to 
remove the present government.  
Against this background, we asked our Iranian elites why they thought 
they had been accorded membership in “the Axis of Evil”.  
The stab in the back 
Prior to “the Axis of Evil” speech, Iranian-American relations had been 
undergoing a thaw. One factor was Khatami’s idea of a “dialogue of civili-
sations”. Another was the apology proffered in March 2000 by Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright for the events of 1953. She admitted that the USA 
played a major role in the overthrow of Mossadeq and thereby put an end to 
Iranian democratisation for the sake of its own oil interests. She also apolo-
gised for the USA’s support of the Shah’s brutal repression and for its short-
sightedness in supporting Iraq’s war against Iran from 1980 to 1988. Elite 
interviews in both 200040 and 2002 showed that Albright’s apology made a 
strong impression on the Iranians.  
A third factor was the Iranian collaboration with the West over Afghani-
stan. The USA gradually grew disenchanted with its former clients the Tali-
ban. At the end of the 1990s Madeleine Albright stated that the USA was 
                                                     
40  Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 2 2001.  
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now an opponent of the Taliban because of their revolting treatment of 
women and their general disrespect for human rights. Similarly, on 25 Sep-
tember 2001 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visited Teheran, the first official 
UK government visit since 1979, with a view to getting Iran to join the anti-
Taliban coalition. He stated that Iran was a useful and important consultee as 
regards Afghanistan. It was clear that Iran had nothing to do with 11 Sep-
tember. For their part, the Iranians were supporting the Northern Alliance, 
whose ethnic backbone was the Taziks41 of the Panshir Valley under the 
legendary guerrilla leader Ahmed Shah Masoud. In other words, Iran and the 
USA now had a common interest in crushing the Taliban. Iran envisaged a 
new geopolitical role for itself in Afghanistan and Central Asia, in alliance 
with the USA. On 27 November 2001 representatives of the Northern Alli-
ance and various Afghan exile groups met in Bonn to construct a transitional 
administration. The Northern Alliance accepted an international peace-
keeping force, and by 5 December the negotiators had agreed on a govern-
ment of national unity under Hamid Karzai. Iran played a constructive role at 
this conference. Everything seemed to point towards collaboration. 
(In passing, we would mention that conservatives in the Muslim world 
often speak with two tongues; time and time again we find that Muslims 
want the West to come and “help” them with conflict situations, at the same 
time as they strongly condemn Western interference. The war in Afghanistan 
was a perfect example of this – Iranian conservatives were happy to see the 
USA crush the Taliban, while at the same time profiling themselves in Ira-
nian opinion as being against American intervention. Muslims who accuse 
the West of double standards are not themselves innocent of this.) 
Some disputes nevertheless arose, in consequence of “incidents”. These 
were of such a character that they could have been resolved with greater 
goodwill. It appears, however, that bad historical memories resurfaced and 
undermined the basis for this détente that promised to return Iran to the 
mainstream of international politics. Historic experience has created negative 
psychological structures, and the Revolution maintained them; it is within 
these cognitive frameworks and their psychological baggage that the Iranians 
interpret the USA’s behaviour. The possibility that the other side has inno-
cent intentions is discounted. We can probably say that if the enemy image 
of the USA were to be smashed, the entire ideological cognitive system, the 
political ideology we call Islamism, would fall apart. However, unless that 
happens, the negative cognitive framework will magnify all misunderstand-
ings and disagreements. Under such conditions it is hard to achieve détente.  
Despite the measure of friction in the new partnership over Afghanistan 
and the “Karine A” arms-smuggling incident,42 the inclusion of Iran in “the 
Axis of Evil” came as a bolt from the blue. Here are five respondents:  
                                                     
41  Taziks are the Iranians’ ethnic cousins in Central Asia, surrounded by mostly Turkic 
peoples.  
42  Thursday 3 January 2002 Israeli commandos boarded the “Karine A” in the Red Sea and 
seized 50 tonnes of arms meant for the Palestinian areas. At a press conference the follow-
ing day the Israeli defence chief Shaul Mofaz said that the ship belonged to the PLA and 
the cargo was mostly from Iran. Sharon called Iran “the world’s terrorist centre” and clai-
med that the cargo was proof that Iran and the Palestinians were planning an attack on 
Israel together. Iran denied everything, and it later emerged that the ship was Iraqi-owned. 
Yasser Arafat denied knowledge of it, and a PLA commission of enquiry concluded that it 
was an independent operation on the part of some Palestinian security personnel. The 
USA kept a low profile, in part to discourage Israeli reprisals. 
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With his policy after 11 September, Bush has overshadowed the work of 
those who supported normalisation between Iran and the USA. Of all the 
countries in the region, Iran is the one that absolutely had nothing to do with 
11 September. Nevertheless it was Iran, for reasons connected with domestic 
politics, that had to pay the highest price for what happened. 
Before the launch of the concept “the Axis of Evil” and thereby the decla-
ration of American enmity, the Iranian perception was that the antagonism 
between the two countries was not eternal, but something that could be 
changed. The slogans of the Islamic Revolution were directed against the 
Shah, and even the embassy hostage-taking43 was a denunciation of Ameri-
can interference, not an expression of hatred of the USA as such. The hostil-
ity between the USA and Iran was either rooted in history (Mossadeq) or in 
political conditions. Both Khatami’s ruling idea of the dialogue of civilisa-
tions and Albright and Clinton’s admission that the USA had wronged Iran, 
were crucial to the way the Iranians perceived the USA. A process in the 
right direction – forwards – was in progress. But never before has the USA 
stabbed us in the back like after 11 September: Iran defended the progressive 
forces in Afghanistan, played a constructive role in the Bonn conference and 
defended the establishment of a democratic regime in the country.  
When Bush used the term “the Axis of Evil”, it was as if he hit the mod-
erate forces in Iran with a hammer. 
The phrase came straight after the collaboration between USA and Iran in 
Afghanistan. The sense of betrayal was strong. 
“The Axis of Evil” is a slap in the face of all those who trusted the USA. 
We shall see more of the respondents’ sense of surprise, incomprehension 
and injustice in the following section.  
Why is Iran on this list? 
The respondents 
We decided to operate here with a large number of possible motives so as to 
bring out some subtleties. As is only natural, some of the categories run into 
one another, but the general structure of the respondents’ cognitive universe 
is nevertheless plain. In the table and in the sample responses that follow, we 
have chosen to group the topics under three main heads: avowed American 
aims, geopolitics and psychology. There are unusually many statements 
because for obvious reasons this question excited the respondents greatly 
and many suggested several American motives, in some cases up to four at a 
time.  
                                                     
43  In 1979 Iranian students occupied the US Embassy in Teheran and took 53 hostages. 
Khomeini exploited the spectacular event strategically by letting it drag out, and as a 
mobilising factor for Islamism. What began as a not very well planned student 
demonstration ended up as a tool of the theocrats and spelt the end of Iran’s first post-
revolutionary government, a secular one – as well as Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Not until 
January 1981 were the hostages released.  
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Table 8 The USA’s motives for including Iran in the “the Axis of Evil” 
(N is the number of statements)* 
Avowed American aims  
Al-Qaida 3 
Removal of WMDs 6 
Democratisation 5 
Geopolitics  
Domestic motives  8 
Hegemony 13 
Israeli interests 13 
Psychology  
Ingrained hatred 4 
Need for an enemy image 5 
Irrationality 11 
 N = 68 
 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no significance tests 
are reported, nor are percentages given. 
Avowed American aims 
Only three respondents mentioned al-Qaida or terrorism specifically. One 
thought Iran’s support for “terrorism” was a factor; it is not clear whether he 
meant bin Laden or Hizbollah or both. Two cited the free passage through 
Iran granted to members of al-Qaida. It is possible that talk of “pressure on 
Iran” is code for making Iran abandon its support for terrorism, or for that 
matter weapons of mass destruction, but here we have coded only explicit 
references, and assigned vague talk of “pressure” to Hegemony, see below.  
The threat to the USA from Iran’s possession of weapons of mass 
destruction attracted rather more attention, being invoked by six respondents. 
One thought this was the prime reason for “the Axis of Evil”. Another took a 
“situational” approach to the position of both sides on this issue: the need to 
feel secure will lead the country inter alia to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction. As the West perceives things, states that cannot cooperate on the 
basis of mutual trust will eventually move in the direction of developing 
weapons of mass destruction. A third also indicated a certain sympathy, by 
mentioning long-distance missiles that can reach the United States. Yet 
another thought that the warning was actually meant for Russian ears, pre-
sumably because the Iranian nuclear programme would not be possible 
without Russia.  
One third of what we might call the avowed American aims is democrati-
sation. Five respondents touched on this theme. All are worth reproducing:  
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Iran violates human rights and this is hurting the pro-Western forces in 
the country.  
Bush’s speech was probably meant to frighten the Iranian hard-liners, and 
because politicians in Washington think the reform movement is in the proc-
ess of giving up, the aim may have been to pressure Iran towards a democ-
ratic government.  
It was an attempt to exploit those groups in Iranian society who feel 
themselves unjustly treated. After the war between Iran and Iraq, conditions 
became bad. We have religious groups who isolate themselves and have no 
understanding of what it means to create a modern society. These groups 
exercise power far beyond what the modern world can accept. The point is, 
however, that Iran can solve this problem best itself. The USA tried to 
exploit the events of 11 September to fish in troubled waters.  
Since March 2001 the gap between the rulers and the ruled in Iran has 
only widened. The problem is that the Iranians cannot trust the clergy, they 
have no faith in them. In the meantime Khatami and Khamenei are playing 
“Good mullah, bad mullah”. It is conceivable that Bush meant his speech to 
present the Iranian people with the choice between security for the land and 
people on the one side, and Islamic jihad on the other. The message can also 
be a clear signal to the reformers to do something, to get going.  
After 11 September the USA began to pay attention for the first time to 
the abuses of human rights in Iran.  
However, this respondent went on to undermine his own reference to 
democratisation as a possible motive: But otherwise it has been quiet. It is 
remarkable that we don’t hear more positive things about the reform move-
ment, which after all is the main force for democracy. Another explicitly 
repudiated the notion of American interest in democratisation44: Mr. Bush 
has exhibited a lack of interest in protecting civil society, civil rights and the 
development of political parties in Iran. 
Geopolitics 
Several respondents mentioned domestic factors, either in so many words or 
by implication. For instance, we have coded as Domestic two mentions of 
“anti-Iranian” elements in Washington; one respondent linked these to Bush, 
another spoke of a lobby.  
Several regarded “the Axis of Evil” concept as the result of a tug of war 
within Washington. We could have also coded these in terms of the results 
of such a process and the aims and desires of the winning side, but it is 
sometimes implied that the concept was a weapon in this struggle. For 
example:  
The speech’s primary aim was in domestic politics. It was a rhetorical 
phrase that probably plays well in domestic American politics.  
Bush wants to show the American people that he is keeping an eye on 
Iran.  
The code-words in the concept “the Axis of Evil” were intended for 
American public opinion. Bush was speaking to the American people and 
                                                     
44  This negative statement has not been coded as an explanation, but the preceding sentence 
belongs under Irrationality. 
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then the question is whether he really meant what he said. But public opinion 
is important, and it is up to the diplomats to tone down the impression.  
It was a dramatic action, the expression was meant to serve as a propa-
ganda tool to get attention.45  
The phrase may be a product of the power struggle in Washington, in 
which the hawks have the upper hand.  
 There was a debate in the USA about whether to use diplomacy or 
threats and power vis-à-vis Iran. In the end the victory went to those who 
thought that Iran should be compelled to change its policy by force.  
And what is the objective of these hawks? The respondents displayed a 
massive conviction that the name of the game was American hegemony. 
Here are four respondents: 
They have seen that the time has come to put pressure on Iran. The hawks 
have lost faith in Khatami, who they no longer expect to achieve any-
thing.46. 
I think the Bush administration has concluded that the pressure the USA 
has exercised on Iran has not given any results. Stronger medicine is neces-
sary. “The Axis of Evil” was a power ploy that I think they have succeeded 
with. 
They see the time as now ripe to pressurise Iran, not least because they 
are of the opinion that Khatami is finished and the reform process has run 
out of steam. We may speak about a marriage of convenience between the 
ultraconservatives in Teheran, Washington DC and Israel.  
The USA does not trust Iran’s post-revolutionary governments because 
they have defined themselves ideologically in opposition to the West. 
Many respondents hinted at a pre-existing agenda; they did not specially 
mention the “New American Century” project, but seem to have it in mind:  
11 September was not the basis for “the Axis of Evil”. The idea has been 
ready for at least a couple of years, the WTC was a welcome opportunity to 
launch it. 
Bush was taking the opportunity to promote unilateralism. The people 
Bush surrounds himself with are also an explanatory factor. They are ultra-
conservative and militaristic. They are taking ideas from the Cold War when 
the USA played the role of world policeman.  
It may be a warning that the neo-conservatives in Washington will employ 
military means in foreign policy. It is misleading of the USA to speak of “the 
Axis of Evil”. On the other hand, the USA’s containment policy in this area 
is expansionist. It deprives people of the right of self-determination.  
The USA wants to play the role of saviour of the world. “In God we 
trust” is on the American dollar.  
The usual thing is that we can define the borders of a state, but the USA 
is not like other states. The USA is a place, not a country – it is everywhere. 
The USA is power. The USA included Iran in “the Axis of Evil” in order to 
demonstrate power vis-à-vis Iran. This was a form of power that was justi-
                                                     
45  It is possible that Iran’s attention is meant here, rather than that of other Washington 
actors, in which case this statement would belong to Hegemony.  
46  Since the respondent does not state what it was the hawks wanted Khatami to do, this 
statement has been difficult to code. For example, it might mean that they have given up 
hope that he will stop Iran supporting terrorism. 
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fied on the basis of democratic and humanitarian ideas – good and evil. It 
was to frighten Iran, spread terror and fear.  
This is primarily about the USA’s security interests.  
Iran’s important strategic role makes the country of great interest to the 
USA... The USA desires agreement with Iran. If they are not reconciled, the 
USA will claim it has free hands to attack.  
Two respondents took their arguments in a direction reminiscent of “the 
Great Game”:  
The phrase may, for example, be intended as deterrence in order to pre-
vent Iran getting politically involved in Afghanistan. 
The idea that Russia might once again sink its teeth into Central Asia, as 
in the days of the Soviet Union makes the USA uneasy. The USA is there-
fore interested in these countries developing relations, not only with Russia, 
but with other countries of the region. Neither Turkey, nor Afghanistan, nor 
China will in this context be the right partner. Iran, on the other hand, with 
its access to the sea, may become the transit country for goods from these 
states. Iran also has great national resources and a population with high edu-
cation. What prevents Iran playing such a role for the USA is out Islamic 
government. This problem must therefore be solved. As the situation is 
today, the USA is facing an unsolved security problem in Central Asia.  
The clear implication of this respondent’s analysis is some kind of take-
over so as to enable Iran once again to be a key piece on the American stra-
tegic chessboard.  
We have counted no less than 13 of these statements hinting at or com-
plaining of hegemonic intentions on the part of the USA, intentions for 
which “the Axis of Evil” concept is merely a cloak. This highest score, how-
ever, is shared by mentions of Israel.  
Three respondents thought of the “Israeli angle” in connection with Ira-
nian arms shipments to the Palestinians. Of these, one specifically cited a 
“50-tonne consignment”, another a “boatload” as being the triggering fac-
tors. This is a reference to a real incident. Two others referred to Iran’s 
“interference” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to Iran’s creation of 
“difficulties” for an agreement between the parties.  
One respondent concentrated on Hizbollah and Israeli revenge for its 
defeat in Lebanon: Iran and Israel have been in continuous war with one 
another for the last twenty years. The war has been fought in South Lebanon. 
The effective fighting of the Iranian-supported Hizbollah forced Israel out of 
Lebanon. This is something that Israel cannot forget, and the Israelis are 
therefore not interested in seeing a flourishing Iran.  
Three respondents mentioned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in very gen-
eral terms, as for instance “Israeli’s security interests”, “the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine” or Bush’s speech as being caused by “strong pressure 
from Israel”.  
Like many people in the Muslim world, four respondents saw the Israeli 
tail wagging the American dog: 
In addition came the pressure from the Jewish lobby. Israel hates Iran. 
I think that Israel has also helped to put Iran in “the Axis of Evil”. They 
have exploited the situation in their own interest, manipulated recent events 
to convince the hawks that something must be done about Iran.  
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The USA’s policy is directly tied to Israeli interests, it is dictated by 
Israel’s national interests. The USA pumps huge amounts of money into 
Israel, but not into the oil states of the Gulf where their interest lies.  
Israel needs crises in the Middle East that distract attention from Pales-
tine. Iran has served this purpose for a long time. 
Psychology 
We turn now to what we may call psychological factors. Four respondents 
interpreted “the Axis of Evil” rhetoric as a result of the “bad blood” between 
the two countries: 
The USA has selected Iran as an enemy country because it has constantly 
expressed its hostility towards the USA. 
History has laid the foundation for the hatred Iranians feel for the USA. 
The USA cannot forget the hostage crisis of 1979, and the Iranians think that 
it was no accident when the airliner carrying 250 passengers was shot down 
over the Gulf. It was without doubt the US Navy who were behind it.47 
This goes back to the defeats the USA has experienced in relation to Iran 
in the course of the last 23 years, the feeling of humiliation that Iran has 
inflicted on the USA. Iran has out obstacles in the way of mutual under-
standing.  
Because Iran has a government founded on Islam, the USA hates the Ira-
nian Islamic Republic. The USA is religious and atheistic at one and the 
same time, more atheistic than any other country in the world.  
This ideological hatred is related to another theme of the respondents, the 
American need to have enemies. Five interviewees mentioned this; one 
counted up four reasons for Iran’s membership of “the Axis of Evil”, then 
added that these all made it easy to create an enemy image of Iran. Another 
took the Axis as a characteristic of “American enemies”. A third quoted an 
Iranian ambassador as saying that propaganda is essential to the USA, and 
now this propaganda is focused on us.  
Two more respondents were extremely explicit about the pathology of 
enemy images: 
The USA has a need for an enemy image. They have always conjured up 
enemy images. There was a time when terrorism was linked to the drug bar-
ons they declared war on, without much success. Now they need a new 
enemy image.  
The need for a new enemy image is a contributory factor. The USA is 
trying to find an identity that can unite the nation politically and culturally. 
The phrase is connected with this identity crisis. Bush is trying to divide up 
the world into good and evil people, heroes and villains, friends and ene-
mies. He is trying to underpin his politics with a form of metaphysical lan-
guage, good and evil. He is creating a divide between Us and Otherness. 
This is a dangerous political discourse, which has negative consequences for 
global politics. When the aim is a bipolar world, it is easy to conceptualise 
so-called “rogue states”.  
This theme segues naturally into our last explanatory paradigm, down-
right irrationality. Here we count both the respondents who use that term and 
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to Mecca. 
Daniel Heradstveit 
nupi september 03 
74 
those who so to speak shake their heads in puzzlement, or give reasons why 
“the Axis of Evil” makes no sense. Five examples of the second category 
are: 
Despite the fact that Iranian representatives threw verbal stones at the 
USA, we note that the country supported the USA at the Bonn meeting.  
Even if Iran is not quite in line with other states in the region, the Iranian 
government is not as dangerous as some people think.  
The strange thing is that when Washington talks about “the Axis of Evil”, 
it does not mention the Wahhabis and Saudi Arabia, who are behind the ter-
rorist schools in Pakistan and elsewhere.  
In reality there are no fundamental conflicts between Iran and Israel, nor 
between Iran and the USA. I don’t think Israel wants the Iranian government 
overthrown.  
President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were of a 
different metal than Bush. The way Bush is going, he is pouring oil on the 
flames of anti-Americanism, he is giving the fundamentalists a helping hand.  
 These respondents argue that Iran has done nothing to deserve “the Axis 
of Evil” label or that the USA is shooting itself in the foot. This implied 
irrationality can easily be the prelude to an explanation in terms of domestic 
American politics and so forth, and sometimes was. However, other respon-
dents are much more emphatic that the labelling is inexplicable, and they go 
on to condemn it as irrational. Here are four examples: 
That Iran was included in “the Axis of Evil” is a mystery. It was a very 
sudden change in American thinking. It came as a shock and is not rational. I 
cannot explain it. The remarkable thing is that the states in question are a 
heterogeneous group, they are very unlike. Tarring Iran with the same brush 
as North Korea is really surprising.  
The phrase was not founded on strategic rationality and seems very 
poorly thought through. The countries in the “Axis of Evil” are very differ-
ent.  
The phrase is quite irrational. Former Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright and President Khatami both adopted sensible positions.  
Bush is behaving like a Baptist preacher with a highly provincial outlook 
on the world.  
Two respondents unpack “irrationality” and cite emotions: 
More than a strategy, the phrase is an expression of anger. 
It is a mystery to me. Relative to Clinton’s presidency it was a sharp 
change of course. The phrase is founded not on rational thinking, but on feel-
ings.  
Commentary 
Metaphors are tied to cultural contexts, what can be an effective rhetorical 
instrument in one culture may not convey meaning in another. Due to a quite 
different Iranian experience of the Second World War, none of our respon-
dents reacted to the word “Axis” at all. The term “evil”, on the other hand, is 
not specifically Western and so functions as intended in both American and 
Iranian cultural contexts. We might even say that “evil” carries even stronger 
negative connotations in Iran than in the USA, even though the Americans 
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are a far more religious nation than most European countries. Some 
respondents seemed rather to accept the validity of a list of “evil” states, but 
thought that Iran should not be on it, c.f. the several who stressed the 
difference between Iran and for example North Korea. Their surprise was 
not at the verbal aspects of the slogan but at the strange company Iran was 
made to keep. Although the respondents emphasised the startling irrational-
ity of tarring Teheran with the same brush as Pyongyang, they did not 
explicitly attribute this irrationality to American religiosity. The nearest we 
come to this is the respondent who thought Bush to be like a Baptist 
preacher from the boondocks.  
It is, then, the Realpolitik aspects of the “Axis of Evil” that bothered our 
Iranian respondents the most. The irrationality of the “Axis of Evil” was 
seen to a greater degree in terms of the dynamics of internal American poli-
tics, both the usual Washington infighting and the wider constituency of the 
American public. Many respondents saw the slogan as a consequence of the 
dominance of extreme right-wingers, hawks and Cold Warriors, who are still 
living in a bipolar world – not the USA versus the Soviet Union, but the 
USA versus assorted Black Hats, who are all in cahoots with one another. In 
this way the rhetoric of “the Axis of Evil” is seen as illustrating a symbolic 
conflict between the USA and Iran that is not related to any real conflict of 
interests.  
There lies an implication of irrationality also in the familiar topos of 
American foreign policy being run from Israel. Some of this thinking is con-
spiratorial, other lines of argument are firmly grounded in realities on the 
ground, such as the way Iran and its instrument Hizbollah succeeded in 
ejecting Israel from Lebanon, and in the alleged Iranian arms shipments to 
the Palestinians. The geopolitical explanation of “the Axis of Evil” is 
couched roughly half in terms of intrinsic American thirst for world domina-
tion, half in terms of Israel’s strategic interests. In both cases the Realpoli-
tick enmity is aggravated by ancient hatreds.  
So few respondents made specific mention of al-Qaida, or weapons of 
mass destruction, that we may speak of a consensus in the sample that these 
factors are nothing but stalking-horses for American global hegemony. How-
ever, it cannot be ruled out that when the respondents talk about “pres-
surising” Iran without specifying what Iran is being pressurised actually to 
do, they are actually thinking of pressure to abandon support for terrorism 
and/or the nuclear programme. Their reticence may be embarrassment, or 
self-justifying “spin”, but the material does not allow us to be sure of this. In 
the same way, our sample was vague as to whether American hegemony 
means pressurising the current Iranian government to do its will, or replacing 
that government. The respondents did not use the term “regime change” that 
subsequently became so relevant to Iraq, but some hinted that Bush may 
have been attempting to give the reformers a helping hand. Their references 
to democratisation and American intervention in the political process were, 
however, heavily outnumbered by their references to US/Israeli strategic 
interests and US hegemony; they do not give the impression that they con-
sider the Bush Administration to be particularly interested in them either 
way.  
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A war against Iran?  
We did not ask the sample specifically to comment on the probability of an 
American war against Iran itself, but the subject was frequently touched on 
in the respondents’ answers to the question of the consequences of a war on 
Iraq, and elsewhere.  
We noted with interest that the respondents were particularly uncertain 
about the USA’s attitude to Iran. Bush gave Iran a green light on participa-
tion in the overthrow of the Taliban, but then put Iran in “the Axis of Evil”. 
Behind the sharp words the respondents used against the USA there lay a 
hope of reconciliation, grounded on objective features of the situation in the 
Gulf. We had the diffuse and subjective impression that our Iranians did not 
like being compared in any way with Iraq, at the same time as they were not 
sure that the Americans understood the essential differences.  
Here are three respondents hoping for détente: 
We should not ignore the possibility that Afghanistan will benefit the 
USA. But there are strong anti-American forces in the area who are more 
extreme than we have ever experienced in Iran. Iran is more cautious in its 
criticism of the USA – it is possible to conduct a dialogue with Iran. 
It would be in accord with the USA’s long-term interests to act in a more 
friendly way vis-à-vis Iran. For Iran is not at the same stage of development 
as the Arab countries.48 In five or ten years we will be friends with the 
USA. Iran has no other choice than to collaborate with the USA. 
The main problem for the USA is the Arabs, The elites of the Arab world 
like the USA while the grass-roots hate it – in Iran it is the other way round, 
the grass-roots love the USA but the elites have big problems.  
Some thought that the Americans might decide to demonstrate their 
power, but that they were waiting for the right moment; others that the USA 
would not attack at all, while a third group thought a limited attack (for 
example a strike at nuclear facilities) not improbable. Here are five respon-
dents who do not expect such an attack: 
That Bush uses expressions such as “good” and “evil” suggests less seri-
ous intentions than for example a military action against Iran. This is an 
abstract way of speaking that it is difficult to relate to any specific plans for 
Iran.  
The expressions he uses – good and evil – do not suggest that he is 
thinking of imminent military action.  
The USA should reconcile with Iran because it will need Iran’s help. My 
perception is that the USA will not launch an attack on Iran. Some time in 
the future, through secret channels the USA and Iran will reach an agree-
ment. 
I do not think there will be any military action against Iran, but the phrase 
strengthens Muslim hatred of the USA.  
There is no consensus in the American Administration to attack Iran. 
That the USA has not yet attacked Iraq is not connected first and foremost 
with regional conflicts, it is a matter of domestic American politics. Bush 
wants to militarise society. For this he needs a big military budget that the 
American society must accept.  
Here, on the other hand, are seven respondents who are more pessimistic: 
                                                     
48  Iranians feel much more modernised and far superior to the Arabs. 
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The USA has decided to solve the Iranian problem.  
The USA desires agreement with Iran. If they are not reconciled, the 
USA will claim it has free hands to attack.  
It may be a warning that the neo-conservatives in Washington will 
employ military means in foreign policy. 
There was a debate in the USA about whether to use diplomacy or threats 
and power vis-à-vis Iran. In the end the victory went to those who thought 
that Iran should be compelled to change its policy by force.  
11 September has created a general unease and fear in Iran. People are 
afraid of a new war, that the countries that fought Iraq will now start a war 
with us.  
We should disguise the fact that certain groups of the population think 
that a new war in which blood is spilt can lead to something positive. What 
has happened may induce Iranians to leave the country. They are afraid of 
what can happen here.  
They (the conservatives) fear that the USA will make bombing raids into 
Iran. There are two main targets: our nuclear facilities and Pasdaran (The 
Revolutionary Guard), or more precisely the fractions within it that have 
caused trouble for the USA. 
During the interviews we had the impression that the respondents were 
even more worried than they were willing to admit. Given the ferocity of 
their condemnation of American behaviour in general, this reluctance to 
attribute to them the further evil of making war on Iran may seem surprising. 
The explanation may be that it is “too close to the bone” – it is getting too 
serious, they are frightened and do not want to think about it too much.  
Should the USA adopt a harder line, two respondents thought that Iran 
would quickly give way:  
I am not sure what will happen to Iran, but the country will probably buy 
itself some time. If Iraq gets a new government, this will weaken Iran’s 
position. And history shows that when a danger approaches, Iran yields – as 
for instance in the war against Iraq. The situation will make the Iranians 
flexible and eager to adapt to the new power constellation. If Iran faces a big 
enough threat, the government will change course. Iran will conform to the 
USA and orientate itself in a new direction politically.  
Iran will be intimidated by the threat from the USA. Domestic conditions 
in Iran are bad enough as they are. The Caspian (oil), Central Asia (gas), 
Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are all in one way or 
another strategic allies of the USA. If the USA goes to war against Iraq, this 
will put Iran in an unpleasant situation. That NATO is now almost at the 
Iranian frontier means that Iran is surrounded by the USA on all sides. In a 
way we can say that Iran is encircled. As the Israelis put it: we are under 
diplomatic attack.  
Others thought the consequences of a military confrontation would be 
more serious: 
Were the USA to go to war against Iran, it will have the most serious 
consequences. Iran is not Afghanistan, nor yet Iraq. The country has much in 
common with the oriental civilisation stretching from Tazikistan to Pakistan, 
in addition to the Shi’i influence that stretches from Lebanon to Iraq. An 
attack on Iran may therefore cause great instability. It may be a benefit to the 
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arms manufacturers, while the oil industry needs peace and stability and can 
be badly damaged. Normally the currents of opinion change over time, so it 
would be wise of the USA to mount short military actions without too high a 
cost.  
If an American operation against Iran is unsuccessful, it will take a long 
time to make any changes in the country. The Islamic Republic will once 
again be strong and the ideological discourse will have new vigour. In Iran 
the question of support for Hizbollah in Lebanon is controversial, but with 
the development sketched out above, “the politics of symbolism” in this 
category will be regarded favourably.  
Chapter 7   
911 and “the Axis of Evil” in Iranian 
politics  
The Iranian self-image  
Before we turn to the respondents’ views of the current state of play in 
Iranian politics and which factions have profited and which suffered from 
“the Axis of Evil” rhetoric, we shall look briefly at what they said or implied 
about Iran’s image of itself in the new world created by the WTC attacks.  
The respondents 
Iran’s national unity has been strengthened 
11 September strengthened Iranian self-confidence. 
11 September led to the Iranian government feeling more responsibility 
for its people. In general people felt a certain satisfaction in noting that 
peripheral nations in the third world could play such an important role in the 
USA. It is a paradox that some of those who felt satisfaction also reacted 
against the blind and pointless violence. 
11 September has made the rulers understand that they must do more to 
remove the gap between the rulers and the ruled. The reformists are now 
openly admitting that this gulf – which is getting wider – exists. That politi-
cians take it seriously is shown by the greater freedom of speech: there are 
controversies and disagreements on the role that should be played in this by 
the courts, which are in the hands of the “Leader”.  
Prior to 11 September, foreign policy was a subcategory of domestic 
policy. This created a situation in which national security policy acquired a 
separate dimension partly elevated over domestic policy. Foreign policy was 
subject to a tug of war between different factions in which each conducted 
its own foreign policy. After 11 September Iran saw itself obliged to change 
its foreign-policy priorities. Conservatives and reformers came together 
more often than before in order to search for consensus in foreign policy. 
Previously, relations with Arab neighbours had a higher priority. In this field 
there was general agreement. The same could not be said of relations with 
Europe and the USA. The events of 11 September imposed a consensus and 
de-ideologising also in relations with the USA and Europe.  
Iranian foreign and security policy is more important than ever. Previ-
ously, each faction conducted its own foreign policy. Now there is no doubt 
that we need a single national foreign policy. We must think things through 
carefully before we act in the foreign-policy arena.  
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After the WTC, previous disagreements were laid aside. Before there 
were factions in the state conducting their own foreign policy. For example, 
Khatami wasn’t aware of what Pasdaran49 was doing in Afghanistan.  
Iran has become more integrated into the world community 
The events made Iranians realise that everything that happens in this world 
has come closer. Even what happens a long way away can have conse-
quences for Iran. The notion that we can isolate ourselves from the rest of 
the world has become weaker. 
Our geopolitical position meant that everyone had to talk to us after 11 
September. This made us feel important.  
11 September reduced the tension linked to Iran in the international com-
munity.  
The events affected every country in the world, and it is therefore not 
advisable to consider Iran separately. It was a watershed that many people 
think should form the basis of a new international system based on multilat-
eralism. European countries are concerned with this as well.  
The need to strengthen the global community and democratic values has 
always existed. The WTC has strengthened the global community.  
People are dependent on one another. This time it was the USA that was 
affected, next time it can equally well be us. The divide between different 
cultures is not so clear any longer, we can have the same feelings across 
cultural boundaries.  
11 September is a unique occurrence that has not only changed the 
USA’s perception of defence issues and international policy, the event has 
also changed the USA’s view of the world. The catastrophe was an excellent 
opportunity for Iranians to express sympathy with the USA and demonstrate 
that the country distanced itself from that sort of act. Iran joined the main-
stream of global politics. Khatami and most other Iranians expressed sym-
pathy with the USA, and in the work of democratising Afghanistan, Iran 
cooperated with the USA. Khatami’s approach reflected Iranian attitudes. 
The murder of Iranian diplomats at Mazar-i-Sharif50 and the hatred of the 
Taliban meant that even before 11 September there were Iranians who 
wanted a war with Afghanistan. The reformers were against it, however, 
because they thought that such a war would put the brakes on the reform 
movement. Previous periods’ mistakes in Iran and groups acting on their 
own in no way reflect on the reform movement’s will to fight terrorism. 
Connecting weapons of mass destruction to terrorism thus represents a 
wholly new problem for Iran.  
Iran is perceived as less extreme 
On 11 September we were confronted with a modern form of extremism. 
This weakened the image of Iran as an extremist country.  
Iranian extremism is viewed in a gentler light because the events so 
clearly showed that the extreme elements in Sunni Islam are willing to go 
                                                     
49  The Revolutionary Guard.  
50  In 1998 Teheran accused the Taliban of killing nine Iranian diplomats in an attack on the 
town of Mazar-i-Sharif. For its part, the Taliban claimed they were killed by a splinter 
group.  
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further than the extreme elements in Iranian Shi’i Islam. Extremism in Shi’i 
Islam is more modern than the Sunni.  
Although bin Laden was no hero, there was sympathy for him over the 
whole world. Even in Europe there were groups who wore bin Laden T-
shirts. Nothing like this happened in Iran, here there was no one who expres-
sed sympathy for him.  
It is important that Iran was not involved. The ideological vocabulary in 
Iran has changed. People no longer care about issues that are of only symbo-
lic importance. For example the man in the street has no interest in fighting 
in Lebanon. How does this serve our interests? 
It is important that not everybody in Iran accepted the logic behind the 
acts.  
It is important that Khatami condemned the acts after only 11 hours.  
Iran is the lighthouse of Islam 
We are unlike other countries in the region. Our political culture is in con-
stant development. And the very fact that we have not stagnated has given us 
confidence. Everyone who comes from outside must pass through Iran; this 
gives us power at the same time as making us vulnerable to attack.  
In general Arabic societies are stagnant. This is by no means the situation 
in Iran. We have a dynamic society with a political philosophy in constant 
development.  
Of the three countries that Bush first included in “the Axis of Evil”, Iran 
is the only one where the population is well-educated. Moreover, Iran plays 
an important geopolitical role.  
The Iranian reform movement, which claims that a modern political 
movement can grow up in an Islamic country, puts Iran in a special position. 
By focusing on elections and human rights, the reformists are sending a 
powerful message to Muslim countries and Farsi-speaking populations.  
Most countries in the Muslim world are heading towards democracy. In 
this way Iran, compared with the rest of the Muslim world, has a lead of 20 
years. 
Commentary  
We saw in Chapter (Positive or negative consequences?) how some respon-
dents thought that the USA had been weakened by 11 September. As we 
would expect from cognitive consistency theory the converse proposition, 
that Iran had been strengthened by it, was also well evidenced. The strength-
ening they describe takes the form of an increase in national unity and 
greater effort to conduct a coherent foreign policy and a greater integration 
into the international community. Our respondents are sure that the fact that 
Iran was quick to condemn the 911 terrorist attacks, the first Muslim country 
to do so, was favourably received by the rest of the world and would help to 
soften the West’s perception of Iran as a terrorist state. In the same way, the 
world community ought to be able to see that the Iranian ideological 
extremism (as exemplified by Pasdaran’s assassination of dissidents in 
exile) is in fact not so dangerous after all, in comparison with what happened 
in Manhattan.  
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It was also a common perception among our respondents that in conse-
quence of the WTC, Iran has become more important in international poli-
tics. After 11 September a lot of delegations came to Teheran. Iran looked as 
if it was about to be welcomed into the Western club. The respondents 
emphasised the constructive role they thought Iran played, and there was a 
general consensus that its work to create a democratic Afghan government 
were of great assistance to the West. Behind this enthusiasm it was easy to 
see a hope that this would be the country’s future. We have already noted the 
sense of betrayal they felt when the USA then turned round and demonised 
Iran (Chapter 6: The stab in the back).  
We may suspect that the interviewees have an overly optimistic view of 
the international community’s ability to distinguish between the “fundamen-
talism” of Iran and that of the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia. For the Iranians, 
these are not only two different political ideologies, they are two dramati-
cally different ways of thinking. Iran, they think, stands for an Islamic road 
to modernity, with the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The 
reform movement talks about Islamic democracy, the rule of law, freedom of 
speech, human rights and civil society. However, the Western world just tars 
the Shi’i Islamists with the brush of Wahhabi puritanism and obscurantism.  
The key concept in the mobilising rhetoric was “the Great Satan” (the 
USA). Today it is mostly the conservatives and ultras who cling to this 
enemy image, but it appears from the interviews in both 200051 and in 2002 
that Iranian elites, despite the Revolution’s attempt to liberate the country 
from foreign interference, still feel that they are in the power of the USA. 
The hope is that the USA will conduct some self-examination and confess its 
offences against the Iranian nation, so that new and good relations can be 
established, in turn facilitating a modern Iran. 
The Iranian polity in 2002 
The status of democracy 
A goal of our interview surveys in Azerbaijan (1999) and Iran (2000) was a 
comparative study of the status of democracy in the two countries. In 1999 
we interviewed the democratic opposition in Azerbaijan, and this was the 
reason why for our Iran 2000 study we concentrated exclusively on leading 
persons in the Iranian reform movement. When we started new Iranian 
fieldwork in 2002, however, we wanted to supplement the sample by 
including some eminent representatives of the conservative camp.  
We succeeded in obtaining only a single interview with a moderate con-
servative. The very enquiry was in itself an distasteful experience; we 
encountered downright hostile attitudes when we politely requested to talk to 
them. They gave us the feeling that we were doing something unethical and 
improper and that it was rank impudence to ask them. This illustrates the 
hostile attitude of the conservatives to the West. They appear to believe that 
even if their country is forced out of its self-imposed isolation by economic 
and technological developments they will be able to survive to cultivate their 
enmity.  
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We are also aware that several of the reformists we interviewed have sub-
sequently been arrested, convicted and imprisoned. It was dramatic and 
unpleasant when one of our interviewees was served with his prison sentence 
actually during our conversation with him.  
Since the election of President Khatami the tensions between ultras, con-
servatives and reformists have been aggravated. Iranologists and others are 
constantly discussing whether a civil war is in the offing, a new Algeria, but 
this scenario is generally rejected with reference to Iranian society’s revul-
sion against violence.52 Our interview data tend to contradict this, in that 
respondents asserted that there are groups who can envisage the use of vio-
lence. 
It should be noted that there is an economic background to all this. The 
clergy got rich on the Revolution by means of confiscating the property of 
the Shah and the Iranian diaspora, in addition to donations from believers to 
good causes. Today these properties, and the still arriving donations, have 
been converted into foundations that control large slices of the Iranian econ-
omy. There are signs that Khatami has succeeded in introducing legislation 
that will gradually reduce the economic power and influence of the theo-
crats.53 This is a factor working for the reformists.  
In Chapter 6 we mentioned the incident of the arms smuggling on the 
“Karine A”, which was surely done without Khatami’s knowledge. This kind 
of freelance activity has been typical of Iranian politics, witnessing to a 
fragmented society with an inability to achieve any consensus in foreign and 
security policy. However many elections there are, incidents of this type 
show a failure of nation-building – a multiplicity of centres of power. That 
Iran is unable to coordinate its foreign policy, which is instead the prisoner 
of factions, shows that it has a long way to go towards democracy and the 
rule of law.  
Below follows a medley of respondent voices talking about the state of 
play at the time of the interviews, though with statements about whether the 
conservatives have been weakened or strengthened by 11 September and 
“the Axis of Evil” deferred to the next sections. See also the statements in 
Chapter 7 above about Iran being a model for Islam.  
The policies Khatami has conducted up to now clearly show that he is a 
conservative. There is a difference between verbal and operational liberal-
ism. 
There are those in the American Administration who think the Iranian 
reform movement has lost its vitality. I agree with this opinion. It happened 
as long ago as 1999. The reason is that the reform movement has no strategy 
and those who join it are generally mediocrities. Khatami changes his mind 
five times a day. 
The Bassij does not play any important role. The organisation can be 
compared with a Scout association. It is not dangerous. Moreover, it is sub-
ordinated to Pasdaran.  
The mafia is active in maintaining the fixed exchange rate, which Iranian 
criminals profit from greatly. It is therefore necessary that the authorities 
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53  Ibid. 
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stand united to get rid of the mafia. I am not uncertain of Khamenei’s atti-
tude, but what counts is that he supports the struggle against the mafia.  
If we are to have a hope of creating a good future for Iran, it is necessary 
that conservatives and reformers stand together. The ultraconservatives54 on 
the extreme wing do not only threaten violence, they carry it out. My 
neighbour was killed. This violence is perpetrated by some small groups 
within Pasdaran. They want to get the country into a military conflict. I am 
fully aware that 70% of Pasdaran voted for Khatami, but it doesn’t help 
much as long as the organisation has violent extremists in their midst. One of 
Pasdaran’s missions is to protect Iran’s boundaries. The big cross-border 
alcohol and drug traffic provides Pasdaran with enormous incomes. The 
conservatives are not a homogeneous group, they contain elements involved 
in shady dealings.  
11 September has led Muslim intellectuals to revise their view of funda-
mentalism. There is a tendency to a more sceptical attitude than there used to 
be.  
In the last analysis it is the social changes that will determine the result. 
For example, Iran’s demographic development will be crucial.  
There are many fractions in Iranian politics but the most important thing 
is to note the main currents in conservatism and reformism. The ultraconser-
vatives are also an important part of the picture.  
Ten years ago we needed an intelligent president to end the Cold War 
(Gorbachev). Now we need a crazy president in Iran to wake up public 
opinion.  
When we consider states and governments, we must look in what direc-
tion they are moving. Instead of the previous militant line, Arafat now wants 
to take a political line. When we discuss change, it is not enough to look 
only at political changes, we must take the social too. There is much more 
personal freedom in Iran than earlier.  
Whereas Rafsanjani emphasised economic policy and Khatami the politi-
cal aspects, we are now giving priority to social values. Greater freedom as 
regards the chador is an example of this. Society must be built on democratic 
values and allow individual freedom. We should act rationally so that we do 
not create a “window of opportunity” for people of bin Laden’s type to do 
harm. Now we can express such opinions in Iran. It wasn’t like that before, 
Iran’s position was much less clear. 
The conservatives see that the goods given to the people have their own 
dynamic, which means that everything can spin out of control. This is a 
common phenomenon. For example, the various channels in the state-con-
trolled Iranian TV have now begun to send pop music to curry favour with 
the viewers. The conservatives are not against reforms, but don’t want 
Khatami to get the credit for them.  
In Iran the mixture of politics and religion we have today will within ten 
years be reduced to a minimum. The religious discourse will be restricted to 
domestic policy.  
The USA has decided to solve the Iranian problem, and wants to limit 
Iranian influence in this region. The two points above have made the ques-
                                                     
54  As mentioned before, the respondent actually said “radicals”, an Iranian usage which is 
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tion of extending the democratic right to participate in the Iranian political 
and social space a pressing one. 
One respondent said that Iran’s main problem is the Rentier State and an 
incompetent bureaucracy: getting a job is dependent on your contacts. What 
good does it do that 80% vote for Khatami?  
The balance of power 
The policy of the conservatives after 11 September is unclear. After the mas-
sive conservative offensive in April 2000, we actually witnessed a calming-
down. It became easier to publish and the imprisoned dissidents – such as for 
example the journalist Gandji55 was given better conditions in prison. The 
reformers interpreted this as suggesting that the conservatives – having 
understood that they themselves were capable of neutralising the President 
and the new Majlis – were now willing to give the reformers greater freedom 
of action. The panic after the landslide elections for the Presidency and the 
Majlis subsided after the conservatives discovered that the elected officials 
and deputies had no chance of facing down the conservatives’ won apparatus 
of power – that is, the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, the 
Assembly of Experts, the courts, Pasdaran, the Army and economic founda-
tions.  
It is interesting to note that in both interview surveys (2000 and 2002) 
fears were expressed of a violent coup d’etat, the starting-gun for which 
would be given by groups on the right wing.56 In April 2000 the rumour on 
the Teheran street was an imminent military coup, but it all settled down 
again after one of the Pasdaran generals publicly warned against any such 
ideas. That Pasdaran’s attitude was decisive for whether there would be a 
coup or not was confirmed by our 2002 fieldwork. However, the interview-
ees consider that the danger of a coup is by no means over, they do not think 
it improbable that the ultraconservatives take this step. The Western press 
confuses the conservatives with the ultras (“the radicals”), but Iranians know 
the latter as groups who feel excluded from the mainstream, but who are 
living on their privileges and thus having their cake and eating it too. In a 
situation of tension and chaos, the ultras are ready to seize power. The 
respondents were of the opinion that the conservatives are sectarian, blink-
ered and not averse to violence in the name of religion.  
During our fieldwork there was a lively debate within the ranks of the 
clergy, about whether there was religious justification for violence against 
opponents of the Revolution. There is no doubt that the ultras would answer 
in the affirmative.  
                                                     
55  Akbar Gandji, one of the most popular journalists in Iran, who had worked for a number 
of reformist newspapers, was arrested after participating in a conference arranged by the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation in Berlin in 2000. This conference was stigmatised by the con-
servatives who control the courts as anti-Islamic. According to the public prosecutor, 
Gandji’s books The Grey Eminence and The Red Eminence provide a distorted image of 
the Islamic Republic. Gandji claims that the murder of dissidents in the autumn and win-
ter of 1998 was carried out on assignment for the State. In 2001 he was sentenced to 10 
years of imprisonment and five years of internal exile. The sentence was appealed and 
reduced to six years of imprisonment. 
56  See Heradstveit, “Iran – reformer eller kaos”, Internasjonal Politikk, No. 4, 2000. 
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Here are our respondents talking about whether the conservatives had 
been strengthened or weakened by 11 September:  
The conservatives have been weakened  
11 September weakened the conservative forces in Iran.  
11 September toned down the use of anti-American slogans. They had 
been a rhetorical/ideological tool in the hands of the conservatives who had 
used them to resolve disagreements in domestic policy. The fact that they 
have to some degree changed their tune is connected with the fact that, for 
the first time since the Revolution, the threats from the USA are taken seri-
ously. The conservatives are afraid to play with fire. 
No, the conservatives have been strengthened 
For Iran the effect of 11 September has been negative. The conservative 
forces have been strengthened. They have exploited the war in Afghanistan 
by pointing to the USA’s brutal behaviour against the Afghans, at the same 
time as they were happy to see the Taliban put out of business. But it doesn’t 
bother them to speak with two tongues.  
The euphoria the reformers felt in 1999 was exaggerated. The conserva-
tives have great power, as the journalist Gandji has stated in several articles. 
The fact is that he is safer in prison than he would be if released. Dubious 
personages in the ranks of the conservatives and ultraconservatives57 would 
not hesitate to kill him. Among the ultraconservatives are those who would 
like to see a state of emergency, they want chaos. 
There is an atmosphere of distrust between the conservatives and the 
reformers. It is true that there is less political violence. The reason for this is 
that Khatami is not nearly so dangerous as the conservatives feared a couple 
of years ago. 
Unfortunately, we are now seeing that reformism has stagnated. 
Huntington’s theories have set us back.  
It is particularly difficult when over 50 American authors assert that the 
“American identity” has been attacked. When al-Qaida’s terrorist acts are 
exalted into a war of identities (war between civilisations), the gulf between 
the USA and ourselves is widened and mistrust of the USA is created. Not 
infrequently, spokesmen for democratic reforms in Iran are tarred with the 
same brush as the USA, which makes it hard to work for reforms.  
                                                     
57  What the Iranians call ”the radicals”, a usage too confusing for Western readers. 
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The impact of “The Axis of Evil” on Iranian politics 
The respondents 
 
Table 9: What effect has “the Axis of Evil” rhetoric had on Iranian politics 
and the Iranian factions? 
(N is the number of statements)* 
No effect in Iran 2 
Strengthened the overseas exiles 1 
Strengthened the reformers 2 
National unity 4 
Killed off dialogue with the USA 11 
A godsend to the conservatives and ultras 16 
 N = 36 
*Since we have a non-random sample and a relatively low N, no sig-
nificance tests are reported, nor are percentages given. 
 
 
No effect in Iran, strengthened the overseas exiles 
No Iranian group has exploited this to its own advantage.  
No single faction in Iran has benefited from the speech. On the other 
hand, the Iranian political opposition abroad (the Pahlavists) have benefited. 
The speech created an atmosphere that enabled the exile opposition to pre-
sent itself as an alternative to the Islamic government. 
Strengthened the reformers 
The reformers have benefited from the phrase. The conservatives have been 
scared and now see the USA as a real threat. For this reason they are more 
cautious about using the USA in the ideological struggle against the reform-
ers. They understand that this is not the time for ideological initiatives in 
domestic policy, Iran must act rationally. All rational foreign policy favours 
the reformers. The ideological element in politics harms the country and 
must be eliminated. 
As long as they were confident that no foreign state would overthrow the 
government, the rulers of Iran felt strong enough to oppress the opposition in 
the country. But after Bush’s speech on “the Axis of Evil”, and bearing in 
mind the activity of the secular opposition abroad – including Shah Pahlavi’s 
son – the government concluded that the USA would support the secular and 
Western-oriented opposition in Iran. In order to deal with such a situation 
and the problems this would bring, they went in for national reconciliation. 
Even if it is rather unclear what that means, this way of thinking has led to 
the release of political prisoners, such as members of the National Front. In 
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addition, oppositional newspapers operate more freely than the case was two 
years ago.58 
National unity 
… the reformers are concerned not to give the USA the impression that Iran 
can be frightened into compliance. The threat has brought the conservatives 
and reformers together, compelled to solidarity against what is seen as an 
external danger. 
 
… the interesting thing is that we in Iran – across faction boundaries – have 
reached a consensus on how to react to it. We shall not subject ourselves to 
the USA, but neither are we interested in giving the USA excuses for further 
confrontation. We are using the means we have at our disposal as regards 
reducing the effect the phrase can have internationally, in alia by cultivating 
contacts with the Europeans. 
 
… the conservatives have been surprisingly cautious. We think it is because 
they are quite simply scared that the USA will carry out its threats. In other 
words, this is too serious to exploit for propaganda purposes.  
 
If we are threatened from outside, we will stand together regardless of our 
views in domestic politics. 
Killed off the dialogue with the USA 
The last year has been disappointing for Iran. The USA has dictated devel-
opments. Khatami’s concept of “the dialogue of civilisations” has been 
shelved in favour of the USA’s unilateral policy. 
The groups that supported dialogue with the USA therefore lost ground. 
The speech changed the basis for joint action with the USA. In the new 
context, the idea of dialogue acquired a different meaning from before, 
which undermined the position of those who supported dialogue with the 
USA.  
The phrase Bush used has meant that the moderates must to a much 
greater degree than previously defend all positive steps they support in the 
relationship with the USA and in international policy.  
… in such a situation, the reformers will not advocate dialogue with the 
USA either. In the light of the collaboration with the USA, the reformers 
have taken over the conservatives’ arguments that the USA cannot be 
trusted.  
It has weakened the position of those who support a détente with the USA. 
The Iranian politicians who want dialogue with the USA see their chance 
as gone. The idea is now dead. 
The phrase came straight after the collaboration between USA and Iran in 
Afghanistan. The sense of betrayal was strong.  
Iranians who were previously neutral to the USA have unfortunately 
changed their views and are now against the USA. 
                                                     
58  It was during this interview (28 April 2002) that our respondent received his shocking pri-
son sentence. Less than two weeks afterwards, two of the most important oppositional 
newspapers were closed. 
Chapter 7.911 and “the Axis of Evil” in Iranian politics 
nupi september 03 
89 
With great satisfaction, they note that “the Axis of Evil” is a slap in the 
face of all those who trusted the USA. 
I think that “the Axis of Evil” has destroyed the foundation for a normal-
ised relationship between Iran and the USA. 
A godsend to the conservatives and ultras 
But we should remember that the conservatives, by maintaining the enmity 
with the USA, are not exclusively concerned with scoring domestic points. 
The fact is that they, too, want to negotiate. The problem is, however, that in 
Iran, faction-fighting is still more important than national interests. By 
exploiting Bush’s statements in domestic politics, the conservatives elevated 
factional conflict over national interests.  
Religious groups, those who exercise religious and political power, have 
had the greatest benefit from the speech. The speech was perceived as an 
insult to the values of the Iranian people and for that reason caused the Irani-
ans to rally round the religious values. This reaction strengthened the con-
servative groups. The mobilisation of religious and conservative ideas was 
strengthened by the fact that Bush’s speech came right before our celebration 
of the 23rd anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.59 This made it easier to 
get masses of people onto the streets and demonstrate against what Bush said 
– and this benefited the conservative forces in society. A bit later came the 
Palestinian issue in full force, and so we had a process where Bush’s phrase 
and Sharon’s policies reinforced one another. This was a marvellous oppor-
tunity for the conservative forces to mobilise society in the direction they 
wanted. In Iran, being for Palestine is the same thing as being anti-Ameri-
can; mobilising for Palestine is the same as mobilising against the USA.  
The right-wing profited from “the Axis of Evil”. The language used in 
the conservative newspaper Kayhan is now the same as during the war with 
Iraq, violent and bloodthirsty. Reality is presented in a way that requires the 
country to be in continual preparedness, the citizens must be on guard and 
form a common front against the enemy at the gates. The conservatives are 
using the American initiative to eliminate or oppress the opposition.  
When the USA, on the basis of its power position, insults a nation, secu-
rity questions acquire a place in national politics at the expense of topic such 
as freedom for the citizens. The groups that supported openness in domestic 
policy … therefore lost ground. The ultraconservative faction critical of the 
government and the state benefited from Bush’s speech. 
President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were of a 
different metal than Bush. The way Bush is going, he is pouring oil on the 
flames of anti-Americanism, he is giving the fundamentalists a helping hand. 
Mr. Bush has exhibited a lack of interest in protecting civil society, civil 
rights and the development of political parties in Iran. On the basis of Bush’s 
statements, the conservatives want to introduce a state of emergency in Iran.  
The fact that Bush made a distinction in his speech between the elected 
and the non-elected elements of the government could have been used by the 
reformers. They could have played on this distinction and so strengthened 
their position in Iranian politics. Instead, they collaborated with the forces of 
the dictatorship. The right-wingers immediately saw the danger that the sup-
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porters of religious dictatorship in Iran and the Taliban might be portrayed as 
birds of a feather, and thus that they might suffer the same fate as the Tali-
ban. To prevent this, they realised that in this situation they needed support 
from Khatami, and it turned out that Khatami was easy to play for a sucker. 
The reformers’ strategic blunder was due to an unconscious xenophobia. It 
was this that prevented them reaping the benefit of a situation that could 
have strengthened the forces of democracy in Iran.  
In the conservative camp there are those who have benefited from the 
phrase.  
The phrase goes in the conservatives’ favour. If the verbal hostilities 
between the USA and Iran continue, they will strengthen the conservative 
forces at the next election. 
The conservatives and the ultraconservatives, who – in contradistinction 
to the reformers – want dialogue, base their policy on hostile relations with 
the USA, will clearly benefit from Bush’s speech. After Afghanistan Iran 
expected that the dialogue with the USA would get wind in its sails, but then 
came the speech that gave the right-wingers the chance to say, “If they want 
to hurt us, then we’ll hurt them”.  
The extreme right-wing forces have derived advantage from “the Axis of 
Evil”.  
The conservatives’ assiduously used argument that the USA is hostile to 
Iran has been strengthened.  
The speech has strengthened the right-wing forces in Iran. The effect of 
the statement was extensive because it wounded national feelings that every-
one shares. Bush assaulted a people, their culture and their feelings. 
The conservatives welcomed the speech with open arms.  
Iranian conservatives have clutched the phrase to their breasts. Bush has 
given them the ideal ammunition.  
For Iran, all interference by foreign powers is the worst thing imaginable. 
When Bush used the term “the Axis of Evil”, it was as if he hit the moderate 
forces in Iran with a hammer.  
Commentary 
The WTC attacks and subsequent American policy have had a decisive 
effect on Iranian domestic politics. Iranian hatred is not reserved for “the 
Great Satan”, there are fierce conflicts among Iranians as well. Society is 
fragmented, with a destructive faction-fight between supporters of the revo-
lutionary Khomeini dogmas and those who want a modern Iran with the rule 
of law and freedom of expression.  
Only two of the respondents dismissed “the Axis of Evil” rhetoric as 
having few consequences for Iranian politics. One claimed that no Iranian 
faction had exploited the speech in its own interest, as everyone rallied round 
the flag, while another said that the only beneficiary was the exile opposi-
tion, the Pahlavists, giving them hope of imminent regime change. Everyone 
else considered that the phrase had had an enormous impact on the tug of 
war between the conservatives and reformers.  
Some respondents hint that there are groups in Iranian society which 
hope for a bit of outside help in getting rid of the dictatorship. At the same 
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time, a bloodbath is that last thing they want. In this perspective the policy of 
the USA under Bill Clinton, which now appears to have been shelved, was 
promising; it was implicit in this policy that Iran could, by small steps and 
avoiding war, create the rule of law and an Islamic version of democracy. 
For a country like Iran, American sabre-rattling under Bush is particularly 
alarming, as the fragmentation of the Iranian nation will mean that the 
already irreconcilable factions will hate one another all the more and exploit 
the resulting chaos to make a grab for power. It will also harm economic 
development and compromise Iran’s ability to deter other attacks. The anxi-
ety the liberal respondents feel leads several to contemplate exile.  
 “The Axis of Evil” led to real fear among not only the reformers but also 
among the conservatives. Two respondents considered that the speech had 
strengthened reformist forces by badly scaring the rightists. Having included 
Iran in “the Axis of Evil”, the USA will sooner or later attack. All-out war is 
not considered very likely, but both sides think that limited military strikes 
are a real possibility. The conservatives realised that, with the threat of an 
American military attack hanging over Iran, perhaps with a view to a Pahlavi 
restoration, this was no time for ideological adventures or the politics of 
symbolism. They thus toned down the anti-American rhetoric from the 
Revolution and, afraid that the reformers would get the upper hand, bit the 
bullet and offered them a measure of compromise and cooperation on the 
basis of “If you can’t beat them, join them”. One respondent thought, how-
ever, that “the Axis of Evil” represented a lost chance for the reformers, and 
that the conservatives had played Khatami for a sucker.  
In retrospect we know that this “Teheran Spring” was very brief (see 
Postscript). As soon as they felt they heard the “Danger Over” siren, the con-
servatives exploited Bush’s speech for all it was worth. 
Our material thus suggests that USA’s warning to Iran was effective. It 
the threat becomes serious enough, the Iranians will give way, and the sabre-
rattling had a great, though transitory, effect on the domestic situation.  
However, the scaring of the conservatives was not the only route to 
national unity. Another was that the reformers themselves were profoundly 
alienated. They thus met the conservatives half-way, with a suddenly decrea-
sed enthusiasm for normalisation of relations with a country that betrayed, 
threatened and insulted them in this manner.  
Despite the pain caused by the historical experience of USA–Iranian rela-
tions, the man in the street has a positive attitude to the USA and to a better 
relationship with that country.60 It is the dominant groups in the Iranian 
political classes that are hostile. This is the other way round from most Arab 
countries, where the regimes are pro-Western and the man in the street 
nurses a fierce hatred of the USA that can flare up at any time, for example 
during the 1991 Gulf War. According to the respondents, however, the Bush 
speech upset the positive trend that had begun in Iranian politics, such as a 
more open attitude to the international community and a normalisation of 
relations with the USA. There was much talk of the “objective” alliance 
between the two countries in overthrowing the Taliban and reconstructing 
the Afghan government. This, they think, demonstrated the usefulness to the 
superpower of having good relations with Iran. With the launching of “the 
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Axis of Evil”, however, all this was put on ice, and will not be taken out 
again for a long time. To stigmatise a country in that way was seen as a 
deeply hostile act.  
Strong and passionate as the respondents’ sense of betrayal was, the sud-
den death of the dialogue with the USA was nevertheless not the highest-
scoring effect of “the Axis of Evil”. That was reserved for the baleful effect 
on Iran’s domestic faction-fight. There is a massive consensus that the 
speech was a godsend to the conservatives, revitalising the bloodthirsty anti-
American rhetoric from the days of the Revolution. The conservatives took 
the speech as the final proof that their enemy image of the USA had been the 
right one all along, and that the reformers with their wish for dialogue were 
naïve. And it is very hard for the reformers to argue with this; most people 
will perceive the “Axis of Evil” to be insulting and degrading. Some of the 
respondents stated it was the violence-prone and coup-plotting ultras who 
profited most of all from Bush’s choice of words.  
In conclusion, we would point out that the crafters of a rhetorical device 
intended to function in one cultural and political context have only imperfect 
control over how that device is received and exploited in an alien cultural 
and political context. We would also remark that, while Powers know that 
their own citizens forget their differences and rally to the flag when attacked, 
they always seem to have difficulty understanding why this might also be the 
case for their enemies. 
Summary 
We began this study by pointing out the dubious rhetoric of the “war on ter-
ror”, and how the formal definitions of “terrorism” appear to have collapsed. 
The “war on terror” is a term that contains within itself the assumption that 
“terrorism” is everything that They do to Us and never anything that We do 
to Them. It is at one and the same time a police action against malefactors 
and a war against states, so that our side can do anything that is done in war, 
and yet all the actions of the other side are regarded as illegitimate, like 
resisting arrest.  
Such a rhetorical device is a piece of political communication, designed 
as a response to the political communication of knocking down the premier 
visual symbol of American capitalism. The game is to take the affective 
capital generated by this outrage and see how far it can be extended to cover 
operations against different “demonised” enemies.  
It is most unclear what would constitute “victory” in a global war against 
terrorism; presumably extirpation of the terrorists, but, allied to the Ameri-
can doctrine of preventive war against potential threats, this promises to turn 
into a war of extermination against whole cultures. The antithesis to the old 
diplomatic courtesies is the concept of the “terrorist state”, which is a differ-
ent ontological entity from our own, “freedom-loving”, states, and which 
cannot therefore be considered to enjoy any rights under the law of nations. 
We are only one step away from applying the “terrorist” label to the uni-
formed armed forces of sovereign states. In other words, “terrorist” has now 
been mapped onto “opponent”.  
As a rhetorical device, “the Axis of Evil” exploits both the history of the 
Second World War (as a metonym for fascism, involving memories of dis-
astrous appeasement) and religious eschatology (with its implication that We 
are on the side of Good and so can do anything we like). The most danger-
ous aspect of the device is that it tells Western populations that all its ene-
mies are not only evil but also united under a single umbrella. In this way it 
resembles the old theories of the International Jewish-Bolshevik Conspiracy. 
Evil is indivisible, and so responsibility is collective. This means that any 
state that seriously annoys the United States can be held co-responsible for 
the strikes on New York and Washington and treated accordingly.  
We can say that the yield on the affective capital generated by 911 has 
been extremely high, creating public support for the war in Afghanistan, the 
invasion and conquest of Iraq and quite possibly similar enterprises in the 
future. If, therefore, a war is fought against Iran, it will be fought not against 
a member of the community of nations but against “the cowardly terrorists 
of the Axis of Evil”. We thought it would be interesting to see what the 
Iranians have to say about this, using the same sample of the “oppositional 
elite” as we interviewed on Iranian democracy and the oil companies in 
2000.  
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Beginning with general questions about terrorism, we found that our 
Iranian sample was somewhat disinclined to construct definitions that were 
act-specific and actor-neutral. Some spoke of violence against the innocent, 
but the majority either considered that it was the political context that deter-
mined whether an act was terrorist (violent resistance to oppression is 
legitimate), or that it was merely a label for the acts of the other side. Of the 
latter, some considered that Iranians misused the label in this way too, but 
the dominant mode was indignation at the double standards of the USA, for 
whom terrorism is always what the Palestinians do but never what is done to 
them.  
Asked to explain Islamic terrorism generally, the respondents focused on 
global structural factors, such as the alienation and frustration caused by the 
world’s political, economic, social and cultural “class divide”, and also on 
local structural factors, the failure to resolve regional crises and stop repres-
sion. We noted with interest the respondents’ failure to cite structural rela-
tions within Muslim countries themselves, that is, the corruption and incom-
petence of Arab regimes. In the same way, they had little to say about 
Muslim attitudes and a great deal to say about Western attitudes, namely 
ignorance, discrimination and contempt.  
Whereas practically everyone in the West assumes that Osama bin Laden 
organised the attacks of 911, in the Middle East there is less agreement about 
this. Iran has long been addicted to conspiracy theorising, and this is fully 
manifested in the respondents’ attribution of the causes of the WTC strike. 
Only one third of the sample thought that al-Qaida carried out the attack all 
by itself, the majority thought either that they must have had help from 
within the USA itself, for example from the CIA, or that responsibility was a 
mystery that could not be penetrated.  
However, our expectation that there would be a cognitive-dissonance 
nexus between attribution of responsibility and (dis)approval of the attack – 
if it was a bad thing to do, then the Muslims didn’t do it – was disappointed. 
Although flirting with conspiracy theories that seem to exculpate al-Qaida, 
the respondents roundly condemned the attacks. Even those who “under-
stood”, agreed that this was not the way to proceed. This is a difference from 
opinion in Arab countries. It is possible that the official Iranian “line” influ-
enced the sample here; many respondents were indignant to be asked the 
question at all.  
We asked the respondents to explain bin Laden’s actions and subjected 
the results to cognitive-attribution analysis. There is a tendency to situational 
and expressive attribution, which can be considered an attempt to exculpate 
his acts as rational and understandable, while at the same time subjecting 
them to moral condemnation. Much of the respondents’ disapproval of 911 
is due to its having no positive consequences.  
In Chapter 4 we turned to the consequences of 911. Respondents agreed 
that it was a political earthquake that would enhance Muslim self-confi-
dence. Optimists thought that American self-examination would lead to a 
better understanding with the Muslim world, while others claimed that 
American intellectual laziness and cultural chauvinism would strange such 
impulses at birth. Indeed, it would lead to a backlash and even greater ruth-
lessness in achieving and maintaining hegemony. Some respondents thought 
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that 911 was actually welcomed by certain American forces, allowing a 
return to Cold War modes of militarism.  
Coded in the same way as their explanations of bin Laden’s behaviour, 
respondent attributions for the behaviour of George Bush and the US came 
out massively dispositional. The respondents use hostile and emotional lan-
guage about the US, such as “burning desire” and “thirst” for global domina-
tion; the superpower is regarded as a political pathogen. They consider 
Americans to be ignorant, blinkered and militaristic, in contrast to Europe-
ans, who have greater insight into the Muslim world and who were cured of 
militarism by the Second World War. We were struck by the fact that the 
respondents accuse the Americans of an incapacity for self-criticism while 
exhibiting the same vice themselves.  
Suggestions for improvement in US relations with the Muslim world 
focused on geopolitics (e.g., end to Iraqi sanctions and support to authori-
tarian governments) and of course the Palestine issue, but to an even greater 
extent psychological factors – ranging from the very general to the highly 
specific, and making great use of the word “dialogue”. Contrariwise, the 
clash of civilisations would be further aggravated by myopia, stereotyping 
and propaganda.  
We next asked our respondents about the (then ongoing) war in Afghani-
stan and were surprised to find a spectrum running from considerable sym-
pathy and understanding for the American action, through sympathy tem-
pered with unhappiness with the means, to hostility based on it being a bad 
and counter-productive idea. Here the ritual condemnation of the evil super-
power is mostly absent. Explanations divide roughly half-and-half between 
situational and dispositional. We attribute this to the fact that overthrowing 
the Taliban was in Iran’s own national interest, which means a sudden loss 
of interest in the politics of symbolism.  
It was clear when we were in Teheran that the next item on the American 
“shopping list” would be Iraq, and so we asked our respondents not if, but 
why the US was going to war. There were very few mentions of the “offi-
cial” reasons for the war, such as weapons of mass destruction and democra-
tisation. The coming war was seen overwhelmingly in terms of American 
and Israeli strategic and hegemonic interests.  
The consequences of the war were expected to be destabilisation, 
including the involvement of neighbouring states in the conflict, further 
antagonising of Muslim opinion and the fragmentation of Iraq. Opinions 
were divided as regards how close the Shi’i population of the South wanted 
to get to Iran. Some respondents hoped that the democratisation of Iraq 
would “infect” Iran itself. On the other hand, a Western-run Iraq would be a 
disaster for Iranian oil policy and competitiveness. And Iran was now 
“encircled” by American power.  
Chapter 6 turns to Iran itself, outlining American concerns with its 
nuclear programme and showing how the US appears to be preparing the 
ground for an attack on Iran with the same methods as employed in Iraq. We 
then demonstrate the respondents’ sense that “the Axis of Evil” represents a 
betrayal of Iran’s constructive assistance to the West over Afghanistan, in 
fact a totally unforeseen “stab in the back”. 
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This leads naturally to the question of why Bush chose to put Iran on 
such a list with such a label. We sorted the replies into three groups of three 
each. The avowed American aims and interests were not much in evidence: 
there was some attention to alleged assistance to al-Qaida and other terror-
ists, weapons of mass destruction and democratisation. Much more attention, 
however, was given to a triplet of “geopolitical” factors: domestic motives, 
hegemony and Israel. There was considerable belief that the demonisation of 
Iran was the result of Washington infighting, or Bush playing to a domestic 
audience. The dominant explanation, however, was in terms of American 
and/or Israeli strategic interests and the American desire for global hegem-
ony, a programme for which the whole “Axis of Evil” concept is merely a 
disguise. A third group of explanations is psychological: some respondents 
attributed the “Axis” to the historical bad blood between the two countries, 
others thought in terms of the chronic American need to manufacture ene-
mies, while the largest group in this category consider it as irrational, driven 
by emotions or ignorance or simply inexplicable and insane. The picture that 
emerges is thus of an expansionist superpower that is dangerously out of 
control.  
The respondents were about evenly divided on the question whether the 
USA would actually attack Iran – that is, make a limited strike, no one 
expected all-out war. However, they gave us the impression of being more 
worried than they were prepared to admit.  
In the last chapter we turn to domestic Iranian politics and the impact 
thereon of 911 and “the Axis of Evil”. The respondents were quite upbeat on 
the first, seeing it as causing a strengthening of Iranian national unity and a 
more coherent foreign policy. Further, the WTC attacks and Iran’s prompt 
condemnation meant that the Iranian “fundamentalists” were no longer seen 
as the worst that Islam had to offer. After a section devoted to miscellaneous 
comments on the status of democracy, we asked which faction was strength-
ened or weakened by 911. The majority view was that the conservatives had 
been strengthened. If this seems to contradict the optimistic noises men-
tioned above, that may be a contradiction in the minds of the respondents 
themselves.  
Finally, we asked our sample to identify the impact on the Iranian factors 
of the “Axis” speech specifically. The results were quite unambiguous: a 
tiny minority saw it as helping the reformers or the Pahlavist exiles, a larger 
minority emphasised the way it scared or offended the conservatives and 
reformers into collaborating with the other camp, but there was an over-
whelming consensus that it had both killed the nascent dialogue with the 
USA stone dead and come as a godsend to the conservatives and the ultras.  
Postscript 
We began to interview our respondents in the “Teheran Spring” when the 
conservatives, scared by the Bush sabre-rattling, found it expedient to be 
more pleasant to the reformers. That one of our respondents received his pri-
son sentence in the middle of our conversation, however, turned out to be 
prophetic. Shortly after we left the country the conservatives switched 
course. The American threat seemed less acute, and the collaboration with 
the reformers was seen as having outlived its usefulness.  
Iran celebrated Press Freedom Day (3 May 2003) in its own inimitable 
fashion by closing two reformist newspapers for insulting Islam.61 A number 
of prominent reformers in the ranks of the intellectuals, journalists and stu-
dents have been arrested. In September 2002 President Khatami presented 
two bills intended to reduce the power of the clergy, which attracted solid 
support in the Majlis. At the beginning of November 2002, however, the 
historian Hashem Aghajari was condemned to death for blasphemy. He is 
refusing to appeal, and is thereby likely to become a martyr and a strong uni-
fying symbol of democracy. Aghajari’s speech that attracted his sentence 
called on Muslims to think for themselves; he said that Islam needed its 
Reformation, as Christianity had before it. Muslims need an Islam that 
respects the rights of all, an Islamic humanism where state and religion are 
separated. This amounted to a frontal attack on the office of Iran’s Supreme 
leader, Ali Khamenei, an office that violates the spirit of the democratic 
Iranian constitution. His death sentence sparked strong reactions among the 
Iranian reformers, violent protests and huge student demonstrations, the big-
gest for three years. Four student leaders who had led peaceful demonstra-
tions against the death sentence were arrested by plainclothesmen and 
charged with endangering national security and insulting Islamic values.  
In the summer of 2002 the US changed its policy towards Iran. The Bush 
Administration, having given up hope of collaboration with Khatami and his 
supporters in the government, now turned to the extra-governmental ele-
ments of the opposition. Despite the election of Khatami partisans to the 
Majlis, in Bush’s eyes Iran is conducting an uncompromising hostile policy. 
His hard line is welcome to the Defense Department but represents a defeat 
for the State Department.  
By the beginning of 2003, Iran regarded the obviously imminent Ameri-
can invasion of Iraq with mixed feelings. On the one hand Iranians longed to 
see the back of Saddam Hussein, on the other they feared a flow of refugees 
and fresh problems with “its own” restless Kurds. In addition came the 
encirclement effect of having American troops to both east and west, and the 
prospect of a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles and active nuclear programme. During his visit to Oslo in January 
2003, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi stated that as a matter of principle 
Iran would not participate in an attack on Iraq or open its airspace. 
                                                     
61  One of these bans was rescinded immediately, the other not.  
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The subsequent American victory in Iraq led the Iranian government to 
reconsider its relations with its arch-enemy. Kharrasi has made statements 
suggesting a will to improvement. On the other hand, Khamenei is blocking 
all such efforts. According to Kharrazi, however, it is not quite so simple as 
the conservatives opposing détente with the US and the reformers advocat-
ing it, both sides are split.  
We began writing this work during the invasion of Iraq. We conclude it a 
couple of days after a double restatement of the thinking behind Bush’s 
“Axis of Evil” – his visit to Auschwitz in order to tar the US’s current ene-
mies with the brush of the Holocaust, and Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld’s warnings to Iran. The “shopping list” is still in the basket.  
 
 
Daniel Heradstveit, Oslo, June 2003 
Appendices 
Appendix I – List of Respondents in Teheran 2000 
 
1. Dr Shahriar Rohani is a Political activist and adviser to President 
Seyyed Mohammad Khatami.  
He served as the spokesman for the committee that, after the Islamic 
Revolution, took over all Iran diplomatic and consular functions in the 
US, including at the UN. Rohani held this position for about 13 months, 
after which he moved back home to become the editor in chief of Keyhan 
(Universe). At the time of the Revolution, Keyhan was the most popular 
daily with a circulation of about 400,000, which is still a record. Just 
before the Islamic Revolution, the paper was bought by a revolutionary 
businessman, and it became a supporter of the Revolution and the Free-
dom Movement (Nehzate Azadi). The Freedom Movement was a party 
founded after Mohammad Mossadeq’s fall in 1953 by Mehdi Bazargan 
and other veteran members of the National Front (Jebheie Melli), 
Mossadeq’s party. After the Revolution, disagreements with the clergy 
pushed them into opposition, where they still are, 20 years later. 
 
2. Dr Hamid Zaheri is an oil expert. General Manager for International 
Affairs of the National Petrochemical Company (Sherkate Mellie 
Petroshimi). OPEC spokesman from 1974 to 1983.  
 
3. Dr Alireza Tabibian is Associate Professor at Teheran University and 
member of The Institute for Research in Development and Planning, a 
semi-governmental organisation. He is the architect of the second five-
year economic plan under Ali Akbar Hashemi Bahremani (better known 
as Rafsanjani, which refers to the city he comes from, Rafsanjan).  
 
4. Dr Morteza Mardiha is an intellectual and writer and political journalist 
on the daily Asre Azadegan (The Time of Liberals). This paper, which 
was shut down by the conservatives in April 2000, was the successor of 
two dailies shut down one after the other, Jame-e (Society) and Neshat 
(Happiness). All three dailies, with the same editorial board, advocated 
the establishment and development of public, non-governmental media as 
the forth pillar of democratic society. Dr Mardiha is known for a prag-
matic rather than an idealistic approach.  
 
5. Dr Abdelkarim Soroush was formerly Professor of Philosophy at Tehe-
ran University, and a member of the Iranian Philosophical Society 
(Anjomane Hekmat va Falsafeie Iran). He is regarded by many as the 
leading intellectual and theorist of the reformist movement. He is now 
suspended from his professorship. His doctrine of compatibility between 
democracy and Islam, and his intellectual struggle against vulgar/ritual-
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istic interpretations of the Muslim religion, have made him the bugbear of 
the conservative clergy. Time Magazine has offered the following 
description of him: “Abdelkarim Soroush, the 52-year-old philosopher 
who has emerged, reluctantly, as the Islamic republic’s most dangerous 
dissident. Soroush poses such a challenge to Iran’s powerful religious 
establishment that his situation is unlikely to be eased by the recent 
election as President of Mohammed Khatami, who promised more 
openness and freedom. Soroush’s sin, in the eyes of the mullahs, is to 
question the central tenet of the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s notion of 
Islamic government: that Iran’s holy men have a God-given right to rule. 
That appears to go too far even for Khatami” (Time, 23 June, 1997, Vol. 
149, No. 25.). 
Though he is not himself a politician, his writings are inevitably interpre-
ted in a highly political way in Iran. 
 
6. Dr Alireza Rajaiee was newly elected member for the 6th parliament. In 
a very controversial decision the Council of Guardians (Shoraie 
Negahban) declared his election invalid. He is head of the political writ-
ers of the pro-democracy daily Asre Azadegan (The Time of Liberals). 
Although not officially a member of any party, his candidacy for parlia-
ment was supported by a wide range of pro-democracy groups including 
student organisations. 
 
7. Mr Mohammad Torkaman is a political historian, writer and journalist 
interested particularly in oil-related events. He is pro democracy and 
human rights and close to the Freedom Movement (Nehzate Azadi). 
 
8. Mr Ali Akbar Moeenfar was minister of oil during the Bazargan gov-
ernment. Now he is an oil consultant. He has been a political activist 
since Mossadeq’s time as a member of the National Front (Jebheie 
Melli). After the fall of Mossadeq he joined the Freedom Movement 
(Nehzate Azadi) of which he is currently one of the leaders. He also 
joined the Islamic Society of Engineers (Anjomane Eslamie 
Mohandesin). He was elected from Teheran to the first post-revolutionary 
parliament, where he became a member of the group opposing clerical 
rule.  
 
9. Dr Ghassem Salehkhoo is an international financial consultant, pro 
democracy and human rights. He has been Iran’s ambassador to Japan, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Afghanistan and its representative to the 
IMF.  
 
10. Dr Morteza Nasiri is a lawyer, expert on international contract law, now 
with an office in both Teheran and the USA, politically close to the Free-
dom Movement (Nehzate Azadi). He has represented some Iranian 
national companies such as IranKhodro (the biggest automobile factory 
in Iran) as well as private industries in international contexts. He acted as 
an adviser to the Bazargan government.  
 
Appendices 
nupi september 03 
101 
11. Dr Mohsen Sazegara is consultant to the President and a political activ-
ist and writer (journalist). He is one of the founders of the Revolutionary 
Guards (Sepahe Pasdaran), now a radical reformist, and a member of the 
committee established by Khomeini during his exile in France. It is inter-
esting to note that almost all the members of that committee are now 
either executed, like Sadegh Ghotbzadeh (the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs), or exiled, like Abolhassan Banisadr (the former President, now 
living in Paris), or belonging to the present opposition in Iran (Sazegara 
himself). The function of the Paris-based committee was to translate 
Khomeini’s speeches and thoughts for Western media and more generally 
to the entire world. In addition the committee designed many revolution-
ary policies and approaches. Dr Sazegara was later one of the founders of 
the now closed daily Jame-e (Society) and is still very active in pro-
democracy activities like managing meetings and writing critical articles 
in the daily press.  
 
12. Dr Parviz Varjavand is leader of the National Front (Jebheie Melli) and 
was Minister of Culture in the Bazargan government. The party goes 
back to Dr Mossadeq, who was famous for his struggle with the oil com-
panies, particularly BP. He is also a political writer and professor at uni-
versities such as Islamic Azad University.  
 
13. Dr Hossein Zaiem is an oil industry management and marketing expert, 
and a member of the National Front (Jebheie Melli), the party established 
by Dr Mossadeq as an umbrella organisation for all modernisers. The 
main item on the agenda was to nationalise Iran’s oil industry. The 
National Front’s days of glory ended with the coup of 1953, and it now 
lives mostly on its history and its heroes. 
  
14. Dr Mohammad Hosein Bani-Asadi is an engineer and consultant at Iran 
Industrial Foundation Co. He is member of the central committee of the 
Freedom Movement (Nehzate Azadi). The Freedom Movement is the 
only overt opposition group in Iran that dates back to Khomeini’s day. 
The Movement was against the continuation of the war with Iraq and the 
totalitarianism of the clergy (Rohaniiat). (Rohaniiat is used as the proper 
name for the conservative body of clergy belonging to the establishment 
as opposed to Rohaniioon which has the same dictionary meaning as 
Rohaniiat but in political usage stands for the more reformist part of that 
establishment. Khatami, for example, belongs to the Rohaniioon but 
Rafsanjani to the Rohaniiat.) Dr Bani-Asadi is the son-in-law of ex-Prime 
Minister Bazargan and was his special adviser. He is also the founder of 
the Bassij militia, founded at the beginning of the Revolution. (Bassij is 
the name of the organisation and Bassiji refers to a member.) 
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Appendix II – List of Respondents in Teheran 2002 
 
1. Bahman Farmanara, b. 1942, went to England at the age of 16 and stud-
ied acting and then to the US where he studied filmmaking at USC. He 
returned to Iran to work in Iranian TV. Returned to the US and Canada 
1980–90, where he ran several film companies. He has made 5 feature 
films, the most recent of which are Smell of Camphor, Scent of 
Jasmine, and House Built on Water.  
 
2. Sadegh Ziba Kalam, b. 1948, studied engineering in London and took 
his Ph.D. at Bradford, UK, on the Iranian Revolution. He is a professor 
of Political Science at the Faculty of Law and Political Science at Tehe-
ran University.  
 
3. Farhad Ataie, b. 1953, holds a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies from U.C. 
Berkeley. He is Professor of Economics at Imam Sadegh University.  
 
4. Anonymous playwright.  
 
5. Abadollah Molaei is Director of Euro-American Studies at the Institute 
for Political and International Studies, Teheran.  
 
6. Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour holds a Ph.D. from the US. He is Director 
General of the Institute for Political and International Studies, Teheran.  
 
7. Mahmoud Sarioghlam was educated in the United States. He is a Pro-
fessor at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Shahid 
Beheshti University and Head of the Centre for Scientific Research and 
Strategic Studies of the Middle East.  
 
8. Hamid Reza Jalaiepour is one of the most active reformist journalists. 
He was involved with most of the now-closed newspapers, including 
Jame'eh and most recently Bonyan.  
 
9. Farshid Farzin, b. 1967, an M.A. candidate at the Faculty of Law and 
Political Science of Teheran University, working on his thesis on Inter-
national Law and Satellite Legislation. He is also a consultant to Atieh 
Bahar consultancy firm.  
 
10. Amir Mohebian: No biography. He is a columnist for the conservative 
newspaper Resalat and is considered to be the most vocal spokesperson 
for the conservative side.  
 
11. Mohammad Ali Najafi, b. 1945, holds an M.A. in Architecture. He has 
also directed several films and television series. His architectural firm is 
responsible for designing a mosque and a cultural centre in Teheran.  
 
12. Siamak Namazi, b. 1971, received his M.A. in Urban Planning from 
Rutgers University and has lived in Iran since 1999. He is the Risk and 
Strategic Management Director at Atieh Bahar Consulting in Teheran.  
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13. Dr Hadi Semati, b. 1960, received his Ph.D. in Political Science from 
the University of Tennessee in Knoxville. From 1978 to 1980 he was in 
the United States, returned to Iran, did his military service and worked 
for the Foreign Ministry. He spent the years 1985–1993 in the US and 
currently teaches at the University of Teheran, Faculty of Law and 
Political Science.  
 
14. Hatam Ghaderi is Professor of Political Philosophy at Teheran’s 
Teacher Training University.  
 
15. Ahmad Zeydabadi, b. 1965, is a Ph.D. candidate in Teheran Univer-
sity’s Faculty of Law and Political Science. His dissertation is on 
Religion and State in Israel. He works as a journalist in the Foreign 
Desk of Hamshahri and various other newspapers. He was in prison for 
7 months in 2001 and was recently sentenced to 23 months plus 5 years 
of prohibition from journalistic activity.  
 
16. Farhad Firouzi is a previous editor of the weekly journal Karnami. 
Independent writer, author.  
 
17. Ibrahim Asgharzadeh, b. 1955, studied electrical engineering at Sharif 
University and became part of the student movement before the Revo-
lution. He was one of the main US hostage-takers and was an MP in the 
third parliament. He is currently an elected member of Teheran City 
Council and an outspoken reformer. 
 
18. Seyyed Ibrahim Nabavi, b. 1958, is Iran’s most popular satirist whose 
newspaper columns appear regularly in the mainstream and reformist 
press. He was imprisoned for his writings and currently runs his popular 
website nabavionline.com. 
 
 
 
Iran and “the Axis of Evil” 
The rhetorical device of the “war on terror” rests on the assumption that 
“terrorism” is everything that They do to Us and never anything that We do 
to Them. The linked device of “the Axis of Evil” exploits both recent history 
and religious eschatology to persuade Western populations that all their ene-
mies are not only evil but also united under a single umbrella of collective 
responsibility for the attack on the WTC. If, therefore, a war is fought 
against Iran, it will be fought not against a member of the community of 
nations but against “the cowardly terrorists of the Axis of Evil”. We set out 
to discover what our sample of the Iranian oppositional elite has to say about 
this.  
The majority either considered that it was the political context that deter-
mined whether an act was terrorist (violent resistance to oppression is legiti-
mate), or that it was merely a label for the acts of the other side. Explanati-
ons of Islamic terrorism focused on local and global structural factors. 
Although flirting with conspiracy theories that seem to exculpate al-Qaida, 
however, the respondents roundly condemned the attacks, not least in terms 
of their having no positive consequences. Whereas al-Qaida was explained 
mostly situationally, American behaviour was explained dispositionally, as 
political pathology. Respondents wanted the US to make a greater effort to 
understand and talk to the Muslim world. Attitudes to the Afghan war were 
mixed, but the (then imminent) war on Iraq was seen overwhelmingly in 
terms of American hegemony and Israeli interests and was expected to be 
extremely destabilising.  
The respondents feared an American attack, and regarded their member-
ship in “the Axis of Evil” as a stab in the back after Iranian help in Afghani-
stan. This demonisation was seen overwhelmingly in terms of American 
geopolitical designs, ignorance and downright irrationality – an expansionist 
superpower that is dangerously out of control. The WTC attack initially 
caused a strengthening of Iranian national unity and a more coherent foreign 
policy, but most of the respondents regard “the Axis of Evil” as killing the 
nascent dialogue with the USA and coming as a godsend to the conserva-
tives and the ultras. 
 
